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
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
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India and the Common Market

By T. N. KAUL

I AM very grateful to the East India Association for giving me this opportunity of meeting some of my many friends in this country. I knew that I would have to pay for my tea, but I had not quite realized that I would have to pay for it through the tape recorder, so I must confess to you that I have not prepared a speech for this occasion. I am not going to make any pronouncement of the official policy of the Government of India on the subject that has been selected for me. I wish to talk to you primarily as a citizen of India, but also, if I may, as a citizen of the Commonwealth, and perhaps look a little into the future and try to put before you some of the hopes and aspirations of a citizen of the world. Geography plays a very important part in the life and activity of any country, but geography is not everything. History perhaps plays an even more important part. Then there are economics, the social and cultural traditions of the country, and to my mind what distinguishes the Commonwealth from other regional groupings of the world today is in fact that the Commonwealth is not merely a regional or geographical association of contiguous territories. It is far more; it cuts across many geographical divisions, many racial and religious divisions, many cultural and social divisions and yet it has come to be something that we do not find in the rest of the world anywhere. Perhaps it may be a pointer of the shape of things to come in the future, when we may perhaps live to see the fulfilment of our ideals one day. It is in this spirit of our past association, of our present friendship and even more of the greater possibilities of this association of friendship that I wish to share my thoughts, my doubts, my hopes and my aspirations as a citizen of India and as a Commonwealth citizen and as a citizen of the world with you this afternoon.

SOVEREIGN RIGHTS

No one can question the right of any sovereign and independent country—and I presume, in spite of Mr. Macmillan's hesitation, that your country is a sovereign and independent country—to decide for itself whether it should join a particular organization or not. Therefore, the press reports that we saw flashed across the front pages in bold headlines in most of

the daily newspapers in this country "Commonwealth Prime Ministers show the red light" and so on are meaningless. After all, every sovereign independent country has to decide for itself whatever it wishes to do. But other countries, particularly countries allied to this country through the link of the Commonwealth, have also a right to express their doubts or their hopes of a possible step that your Government might take in this direction, and we would not be friends if we did not share our doubts and our apprehensions. Therefore, I wish to speak to you quite frankly as a friend among friends and not as a critic—I have no desire to participate in the political controversies prevailing at present on this subject in this country—but I wish to put before you some of our doubts and hesitations and apprehensions as well as some of our hopes about this step that you are likely to take in the near future. The development of the Common Market of the European Community is a natural historical development on the Continent of Europe, and no one will feel apprehensive about it if Europe became more prosperous, increased its production and did not injure or harm the interests of other countries. So far as Britain is concerned we would be very happy to see Britain even stronger, even more prosperous and wielding even more influence than she does today. It is for Britain to decide whether by joining the Common Market and the European Community she can increase her influence and her economic strength and political influence. We can only judge from the picture as it emerges to this day, and judging by the results so far achieved in spite of the very able and persistent efforts of Mr. Heath—for whom I have very great admiration—and his able team of very distinguished colleagues, the picture that has emerged so far does not present a very pleasant prospect for many of the Commonwealth countries. It is possible that we may be perhaps more apprehensive than we need be. It is possible that once Britain joins the Common Market she may be able to exert an outward looking influence. It is possible that she may be able to get better terms for the other Commonwealth countries, but surely you would not blame a country, a Commonwealth country, if she shared her doubts and apprehensions with you before you made the final plunge. This is exactly what the various Commonwealth Prime Ministers did at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. They pointed out the difficulties at home, they pointed out the repercussions it would have in their economy, they pointed out social upsets and upheavals it might produce in certain concentrated communities and certain areas which are dependent on Commonwealth trade, and particularly on trade with Britain. It was their duty to do so; if they had not done so they would have been failing in their duty towards their own people and towards the Commonwealth.

So far as India is concerned, we have been told that 47 per cent of our exports in the shape of tea will have free entry into Europe. I was reading only this morning in the newspapers that this nil duty is going to be nullified by the internal excise revenue imports which exist at present to the extent of 78 per cent. For instance, in the case of Germany, unless we have an assurance that these internal revenue excise imports are not going to nullify this nil duty, there is very little prospect of our exporting tea to the Continent of Europe. In any case tea is not a habit that can be developed overnight; it will take time. It is possible that the Europeans may perhaps follow your noble example and take to the cup that cheers, but it is going to take time. We will try it, but if these internal excise revenue imports are maintained to nullify the nil tariff, then I am afraid this nil duty on tea has no meaning. Secondly, we welcome the opportunity to enter into comprehensive trade agreements with the Six. We were going to do that in any case, but until we have done so, we consider it unfair that we should be deprived of the free entry of our goods in the U.K. that we have had so far. The present proposals envisage the imposition of the tariff in seven stages, beginning from the date of accession of the U.K. into the Common Market. This is going to affect the textiles exports of India, Pakistan and of other countries into the U.K., and it is going to hit our exports very badly. We would have preferred that this duty should come into force after we had entered into comprehensive trading with the Six and not before, because this would be a bargaining counter we could use, but if this is going to be applied from the very date that the U.K. accedes to the Common Market then our bargaining power with the Six has decreased to that extent and we do not know what shape the comprehensive trade agreement is going to take. Then again, if the tariff structure of the Six was such that it would not discourage the development of even simple industries in the developing countries, but was meant mainly to encourage the more sophisticated industries among the Six, we would have no grouse against it, but the fact is that even simple commodities like oil seeds, if they are exported without being crushed they can come in almost duty free, but if we crush the oil seeds and export the oil, the duty is immediately doubled. Take hides and skins, for instance. If we use an ordinary simple dye for tanning them immediately the duty is imposed. We do not think that this concept of imposing duty even on simple primary produce processed simply, and not in a sophisticated manner is a happy trend towards the developing countries. If this is an indication and a pointer of the way that the Common Market is going to function in the future, then I am afraid some people may be justified in feeling that the Common Market has an inward looking policy and not an outward looking policy. We are most grateful to Mr. Heath and his able

team for having pressed these various points of view before the Six very persistently and in a very able manner, but you cannot merely depend on the good intentions and the good ability and persistence of able negotiators. You judge every negotiation by the results achieved, and so far as countries like India and Pakistan are concerned, I think we have a justified reason in feeling that unless these difficulties are removed, unless we have an indication that the Six are going to adopt outward looking policies and not an inward looking policy, we feel that we are justified in having some apprehension about the U.K. joining the Common Market. These are a few instances I wanted to give you to show you why we are apprehensive about it.

BALANCE OF TRADE

We are a developing country. We have launched our Third Five-Year Plan; our balance of trade with the Six is very much against us. In 1950, for instance, we had a balance of trade with the Six of about \$10,000,000 and today it is adverse against us to the tune of about \$300,000,000 annually. In 1950 we had, I believe, a positive balance of about £7,000,000 with the U.K., and today it is in your favour to the tune of about £40 to £50 million. We cannot maintain this unbalance of trade because we have to import capital goods and machinery for our development plans, so how are we going to pay for them? We cannot perpetually go on begging for your loans and your aid because we have to service those loans and pay them back with interest. It is not a kind of charity, and even if it were a charity I do not think pure and absolute charity is good for any country. You had the Marshall Aid after the war, but you did not perpetually depend on it; you were able to stand on your own feet. That is exactly what we want to do. Therefore, the emphasis should be much more on trade and much less on aid. It is true that we will need to depend on foreign loans for a considerable time, but we wish to switch over this balance of emphasis from aid to trade and this can only be achieved if sufficient incentives and impetus are given to exports, not only to our traditional items like textiles and teas, hides and skins, but to our simple manufactures which we are trying to develop during our Five Year Plans. It does not matter really—I do not think the heavens will fall—if Britain joins the Common Market. What its effect will be on the prices of food, on the standard of living, the wages of labour and so on in this country is for you to consider and decide. Also what effect it will have on your foreign policy, on your sovereignty or of your Parliament, etc., is for you to consider. I do not think we have any right to pass any judgment on that issue, but I think we have a right and a duty to think as to what effect it will have

on the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth as I said, is not a mere geographical grouping of contiguous countries and therefore it is possible—it is not necessary—that by joining the European Community the U.K. may perhaps lose that central position she holds within the Commonwealth. Her policies are bound to be influenced by considerations affecting the continent of Europe, sometimes more, sometimes less, than considerations affecting the Commonwealth.

PERMANENT VALUES

Be that as it may, I should like to put before you a few positive ideas apart from the economic and political aspects. I think the Commonwealth is strong today, is in existence today, not merely because of our economic links, not merely because of our political ideology, but much more because we are linked together by certain lasting and permanent values that bind us together perhaps imperceptibly, but very deeply. Take, for instance, the English language. I think this is one of the greatest gifts that our association with your country has given us, but today the standard of English in India, I am afraid, is falling very rapidly. What are you doing about it? What are we doing about it? Whenever we want more Englishmen to go from this country to India to teach in our colleges and schools we find a very poor response. Why is that? Because, I feel, enough attention has not been paid either in India or in this country towards this very vital link which binds not only our two countries, but the whole speaking world together. I have been going round various universities in this country in Edinburgh, Leeds, Liverpool, Birmingham, Manchester, London, Oxford and Cambridge, and everywhere I have discussed this matter with various vice-chancellors and principals of colleges and deans of faculties, but although they all agree that it is an excellent thing to do, when we put forward the concrete proposal "Let's have an exchange of teachers and students" the answer is "Oh well, that involves financial considerations." Of course it does, but it has got to be done. I would like to put before you a simple scheme which I would like you to think over. We are short of foreign exchange; you are also short of foreign exchange to some extent although not to the same extent as we are. Let us exchange professors, students, teachers, fellows, lecturers so that our people can come to this country. We should bear their travelling expenses to England and back to India, and you bear the local expenses here of board, lodging and maintenance. Similarly your people could come to India on a reciprocal basis; we do not want a one-sided flow of such people. Your people could come to India and you pay their travel expenses to India and back here, and we should pay their local expenses, board,


lodging, maintenance, etc. It is a simple scheme and I think it could be worked. I think it could be pushed further. I think it would bring our youth and our intellectuals closer to each other and yet I do not think enough attention has been paid to this. I put it to you that you might think about this idea and perhaps try to influence opinion in this country in favour of it. I am not talking merely of India and the U.K., but I think that such exchanges on a reciprocal basis should take place among all Commonwealth countries, even countries outside the Commonwealth. Similarly in matters of trade or economics. So much attention has been paid to your country joining the Common Market, but have we paid enough attention to increasing and developing trade and commerce within the Commonwealth? Whenever this idea has been put forth—Mr. Ikramullah knows more about it as Chairman of the Commonwealth Economic Committee—I do not think it is received with as much encouragement as it should have been. Whether the U.K. joins Europe or not, I think it is necessary that we should push forth this idea for developing trade between the Commonwealth countries.

IDEALS OF DEMOCRACY

A third idea that I might venture to put forth is this. There are certain values which we consider important and vital to our society both of your country and in our country. These are the ideals of democracy, not necessarily the same form of Parliamentary democracy that you have in this country, but giving the people the right of representation and a say in matters that concern the country. The rule of law, respect for the individual, respect for human dignity—these are some of the ideals which we cherish as much as you cherish in this country and I think we could further these ideals, further strengthen them by giving them both social, political as well as economic content, and I think these are some of the matters in which our two countries and other countries of the Commonwealth could co-operate with each other, could strengthen the links between them in spite of the economic and other effects that you are joining the Common Market may have. And, lastly, I just wish to say this, that I spent a very happy three years as a student in this country almost thirty years ago. I did not know whether I was coming back again or not, but fortunately I had another opportunity of serving in this country and I have spent two very happy years. People have been most kind to me, most generous to me. I shall carry back with me very happy memories of your kindness, your generosity, and try to imbibe some of the qualities that make you a great nation and bear them in mind when I speak about your country in my country. Let me assure you that although

in 1947 people in my country had grave doubts about remaining within the Commonwealth, in 1950—although we became a republic—we still remained within the Commonwealth and public opinion was very much in favour of it, but I did not realize until I came to this country two years ago what the value of the Commonwealth is. I do realize this today. It is because of this regard for the Commonwealth and the values that the Commonwealth holds vital that I speak to you to think about the effects of your joining the Common Market, and if in spite of the effects that it may produce, if in spite of your inability to secure the modifications we want, if in spite of that you wish to join the Common Market, good luck to you, but please bear in mind the other more fundamental and deeper values that bind us together.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for arranging this function and asking me to share my thoughts with you. I am most grateful to you and your colleagues and to the East India Association for the constant friendship and encouragement that you have given me. I shall always remember it.



President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philippines (left) at the recent talks with President Mohammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan

Lecture Discussion

India and the Common Market

A farewell reception to Mr. T. N. KAUL was given by the East India Association on Tuesday, 9th October, 1962, at Over-Seas House, St. James's, s.w.1.

Sir JOHN WOODHEAD in welcoming Mr. Kaul said: I must first explain why I am in the Chair. Our President, Lord SPENS, has unfortunately had to attend a meeting in Oxford today and could not make it in time for this afternoon's meeting, but we are hoping tht he will appear before we close the meeting. He sends his apologies to you all for not being able to preside this afternoon.

Our honoured guest this afternoon is Mr. T. N. Kaul, who has been Deputy High Commissioner for India in London for the last two years and during nine months of those two years he carried out the duties of both the posts of High Commissioner and Deputy High Commissioner. Mrs. Pandit left before the new High Commissioner, Mr. Chagla, arrived, so for nine months Mr. Kaul was both High Commissioner and Deputy High Commissioner. He is now retiring from the appointment at India House and going to India for a well earned holiday and I am sure he has earned it well; to carry on two posts at the same time is no easy job. Mr. Kaul

has taken a great interest in the Association's work while he has been in London. He has been a frequent attendant at our meetings, he has been of great assistance to Sir Francis Low and myself, and we appreciate very much the interest he has taken in our Association and thank him for all the help he has given us.

Mr. Kaul is a man of the world—I use that phrase in the highest sense of the term. You will understand what I mean when I describe his appointments for the last fifteen years. He first went to Moscow, where he was First Secretary, then he went West and was First Secretary at the Embassy in Washington, then he was assigned to the Far East and was a Minister in the Embassy in Peking in China for three years. Then he moved again not so far West and was Chairman of the International Commission on Vietnam. Next he became Ambassador in Iran, the country that we knew as Persia, and I believe he had a very interesting time there; I know that oil played a certain part in his activities. Finally he came to London where he has been for the last two years as Deputy High Commissioner for India and for a time High Commissioner. He is now returning home after serving six years abroad continuously, and we wish him every prosperity and good health

in the years to come. Unfortunately, we are going to have to ask him to pay for his tea because he is going to talk to us about India and the Common Market. I am sure you will find what he has to say very interesting and instructive.

DISCUSSION

Mr. FRENCH: I feel that Mr. Kaul has given us an excellent account of the underlying feelings of India in relation to the Common Market. What we did notice during the Commonwealth Premiers' Meeting was an underlying anxiety, if I may say so, of many of the Commonwealth Premiers that the Common Market was likely to aggravate the Cold War. I would very much like Mr. Kaul to amplify the views which, I think, Mr. Nehru himself did express. The plea for the Common Market is the suggestion that it is the unity of Europe which is at stake, but I felt that Mr. Nehru and many of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers were saying that it is the unity of the world which is really at stake.

Mr. KAUL: I think what Mr. Nehru said was that we should bear in mind the possible repercussions that the Common Market might have on the existing tensions in Europe and the rest of the world. He did not say that Britain's joining the Common Market would necessarily increase those tensions, but he said that it was possible,

depending on whether the Common Market adopted an inward looking or an outward looking policy. Naturally there are differences of opinion among the Six themselves, and whether Britain's joining the Six is going to influence Britain more than Britain can influence the Six remains to be seen, but I think it is important to bear in mind the possible repercussions of Britain joining the Six. It is possible that it may increase the tensions; on the other hand it is also possible that Britain may be able to exercise a healthy influence in the Six. We are not sure that either will happen, but I think it is well to bear that in mind, and if Britain feels and feels strongly that she will be able to exercise a healthy influence on Europe—as I said—good luck to her.

Sir STANLEY REED: May I ask your forbearance if, instead of commenting directly on the able and informing address we have heard today, I draw attention to a more general aspect of the economic situation? The air has been filled with prophecies of the ills that will befall the Commonwealth if we join the Six. It is useful, in times of controversy, to consider the negative side, to consider the position of the Commonwealth if it does not join the Six. The wind of change is blowing strongly. It is going to blow more strongly still. The integration of the Six has only begun. It is going to grow strongly until it takes the form of a Central European State, at first economic, later political

and defensive. We are entitled to ask those who demand isolation what would be the position of Britain faced with this block dominating Europe West of Moscow, a block where Britain finds a market for fifty-two per cent of her vital exports. Facing this position, is there any possible doubt that the clear policy for Britain, and in the long view of the Commonwealth too, is to take an active part in these discussions, to approach them with an open mind with the purpose of joining in the organization of the Six if equitable conditions can be framed? A blind adhesion to outworn policies, economic and political, when the wind of change is blowing so strongly, is to invite disaster.

Sir CYRIL JONES: Mr. Kaul has raised, or just touched upon, a rather important question, namely, the giving of greater consideration to the promoting of inter-Commonwealth trade. It is important because I think one gets the impression sometimes that the effect of the U.K. joining a Commonwealth market is looked on almost wholly from the point of view of safeguarding the U.K.'s purchase of goods from Commonwealth countries and very little from the point of view of safeguarding the purchase by other Commonwealth countries of U.K. goods. This question of promoting inter-Commonwealth trade from that point of view is very important, and I wonder if Mr. Kaul could tell us if any specific proposal has

ever been considered towards that end, such as a possible organization of a Commonwealth free trade market or a free trade area or any other similar proposal and what sort of reception it would be likely to get from Commonwealth countries.

Mr. KAUL: I do not think this is a question I can really answer with any degree of accuracy, or that I am qualified to answer it. Perhaps our friend Mr. Ikramullah can tell you if any proposals have been made in this direction or not, but I do know that our own representative in the Commonwealth Economic Committee did suggest that we should investigate this question of further developing Commonwealth trade. I do not think it got a very hearty reception, perhaps because the various members are not interested in the U.K. joining the Common Market or not joining the Common Market, but I do hope that once this thing is over and out of the way that this question will be given the consideration it deserves. When you talk of a Commonwealth free trade area, it is all right for industrialized countries like the U.K. to talk of free trade in every commodity in every industry, but you were yourself a developing country at one time and I would like you to bear in mind the needs and requirements of other developing countries which are in the same condition today as you were perhaps 100 years ago or less. So as long as there is good faith and goodwill and a desire to

negotiate, I have no doubt that inter-Commonwealth trade can be further developed. I know that a few years ago our traditional economists used to say we should only concentrate on the export of traditional items and we should not bother about developing other items for export, but some unorthodox people like me and others suggested that we must look into the future. I am sure that that is the case with everything, that if you do make an attempt, you investigate, you study, you discuss, ready to negotiate, you will find avenues in which you can develop Commonwealth trade. It need not necessarily be a 100 per cent free trade area, but I am sure that many of our needs and requirements can be filled by the U.K. and perhaps some of your needs and requirements can be filled by us. Therefore, as long as we can balance each other's trade I am sure that a way can be found.

Lieut.-General Sir THOMAS HUTTON: Just a contribution to this study of English. I wonder whether it has been considered whether a quota of Indian students could be sent to our teacher training colleges and at the end of their course here spend two or three years teaching in this country, which I am sure they do extremely well. It would be very welcome because we are very short of teachers and I am sure that the fact they went to these colleges would make it very easy to induce a number of our young people who

have gone through the colleges to go out to India and teach there for a few years as long as they were assured of suitable employment on their return. I believe that would be easier than trying to dig people out of existing jobs to go off and take their chance in other countries.

Professor CATLIN: I would like if I may supplement that. Two or three years ago I happened to be Chairman of the NATO Conference FIBO, and this was the precise question that we had to deal with. The problem is how to send our technicians—above all educationalists—abroad and how to encourage that circulation, and our last speaker put his finger on the right point. It is not only a matter of financing; people are very idealistic over it. There is the question of their coming back and the question of changing the university tendency to give priority and seniority to people who remain instead of giving priority and seniority to people who go out and get experience and come back again. I wonder whether Mr. Kaul would agree.

Mr. KAUL: This is exactly one of the proposals I have been discussing with various universities and colleges in this country and I entirely agree that there should be some provision by which teachers who go out from this country to India or other countries will not lose their chances of promotion or seniority when they come back, and also that it should

be on a reciprocal basis. People from India should come here if possible to take their places if they are trained enough, or after further training or even apart from that to study other subjects. So far as London University is concerned, I understand that it has been recently decided that overseas service by British educationists will not effect their promotion or seniority. So far as Oxford and Cambridge are concerned, they have told me that this problem does not arise because for most of the fellows their seniority of promotion dates from the date they become fellows. So far as other provincial universities are concerned, I think Leeds for instance is willing to adopt such a measure, but the point is that it would not be an Indian taking the same place as that of an English teacher, but he could take someone else's place in another subject. Also I do not think that sufficient emphasis is given to the teaching of modern Indian languages, or Oriental history. I was shocked to find that apart from the School of Oriental Studies in London neither Oxford nor Cambridge nor any of the provincial universities teach Hindi or other regional languages of India which

have a very rich literature. Today there are more Englishmen in India than there have been ever before, and the volume of British investment in India is more than double what it was in 1947. If you want your people, like old pioneers, to know the country, to know the people they should be able to speak the language of the region where they are going, and I think it is necessary perhaps to know at least one other Commonwealth language apart from English as perhaps it is for us to know English. That is why I always emphasize this basis of supremacy. We must get rid of this mother complex and child complex. Then alone I think we can withstand any storms and stresses and strains.

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Sir JOHN WOODHEAD: We are very grateful to Mr. Kaul for coming to us this afternoon and delivering such an interesting and instructive address. We wish him every success in the future and may we send his wife our best salaams. Will you kindly pass a hearty vote of thanks to Mr. Kaul for coming to us this afternoon and speaking to us as he has done.

Progress in the Production of Minerals in India

By SARDAR SWARAN SINGH

Union Minister for Steel, Mines, and Fuel

THE imperative need to lay firstly, during the Third Five Year Plan period, the foundations for rapid industrialization of the country cannot be over-emphasized. The development of industries depends largely on the supply of raw materials, power, fuel and facilities for transport. This entails a sustained drive towards the maximum utilization of our mineral wealth. Thus the production of minerals, which form the sinews of industry, is the bed-rock on which the superstructure of industrial growth must rest. The country has made significant progress towards the achievement of the objectives in respect of coal, oil and other minerals as set out in the Second Plan. I shall presently deal with each of these aspects of the exploitation of our mineral wealth. However, the advances made during the Second Plan, which is now coming to a close, should be viewed, in retrospect, with due regard to the stresses and strains imposed on the economy by the deficiency of internal resources and the consequential dependence upon external sources for machinery and technical 'know-how.' Viewed in this perspective the country can be justifiably proud of its achievements in the field of mineral development and we can look forward with confidence to the attainment of the goals set for us in the Third Five Year Plan.

COAL

It is heartening to find that, in terms of the annual rate of production, our target of coal production has been exceeded. Our objective in the Second Plan was to attain a rate of production of 60 million tons a year during the last quarter of the Plan. The total production in the month of January was 5.14 million tons which gives an annual rate of about 62 million tons. Out of the two undertakings in the public sector, the Singareni Collieries Co. has already reached its prescribed target of three million tons a year, and the other the National Coal Development Corporation Ltd. has attained a rate of about 13 million tons a year against

its target of 13.5 million tons. The private sector too has achieved its target rate of production; this rate in January, 1961 being about 45 million tons a year.

This achievement becomes all the more creditable when viewed against the numerous problems which the industry had to face during this period. In a fast developing economy like ours, it is inevitable that difficult problems arise and have to be faced. The industry had latterly been particularly agitated about the difficulty in the movement of coal, specially from the Bengal/Bihar coalfields. Recently there has been some accumulation of coal at pit-heads. But the situation need not depress us unduly. The Railways have been steadily increasing their transport capacity and the number of wagons daily made available in the Bengal/Bihar fields today is appreciably more than what it was in the preceding years. It is now about 5,000 wagons per day as against 3,668 in 1957. In terms of quantity the total movement of coal by rail during 1960 was about 45.6 million tons against 38.2 million tons in 1956-57. What has happened is that the demand for wagons has far outstripped the present availability due to the very rapid developments in the various sectors of our economy. All the same, the essential users have, by and large, continued to get their minimum requirements uninterruptedly. Among these essential users are the steel plants, power houses, railways, steamer services, etc. A constant watch has also been kept in regard to supplies to various industries like textiles, refractories, paper mills, and foundries, and supplies to them have been maintained. The sector among coal consumers that has really been seriously affected by the shortage of transport is the brick-burning industry. But then it has to be remembered that this category stands almost the lowest in the order of priorities among some sixty classes of consumers. Another difficulty about brick-burning coal is that, while in the case of industrial consumers there is a yard stick by which their consumption needs can be put to a test and their demand for coal assessed realistically, the same is not possible in the case of brick-burning coal and the gap between the demand and the actual supplies appears to be unduly large. It would thus be seen that when the total movement has been increased by about 18 per cent during the last five years, and the important categories of consumers have generally got their essential supplies, the criticism that is being levelled in regard to the transport bottlenecks is out of all proportion to the reality of the situation.

The real difficulty today has arisen because the major production of coal is concentrated in the Bengal/Bihar region including Karanpura, and the coal has to move to consumers over distances ranging to about 1,200 miles. Then the bulk of the movement from this region has to be in the direction above Moghalsarai. The capacity in this direction for the

movement of coal was limited to 1,900 wagons per day, and the Railways expect to have increased it to 2,100. It has been estimated that for transporting all the additional production that has come up recently in Bengal/Bihar, the accumulation of stocks in Karanpura alone amounting to about one million tons out of a total pit-head stock of about 3.5 million tons in the overall, a movement of the order of 2,600 wagons per day has to be effected in this direction. It is problematic whether an increase of this order in the rail capacity in this direction can be achieved reasonably quickly. A fresh approach to the pattern of production of coal and its transport is, therefore, necessary. For example, so far as coal for general purposes is concerned, there should be more attention to expanding production in the Central India and other outlying coalfields. Regions lying in the vicinity of these coal fields need not get their supplies from the Bengal/Bihar fields unless certain categories of consumers must inevitably get Bengal/Bihar coals for technical reasons. Such consumers will be few, and when I mention this, I do not include among this category those who insist on Bengal/Bihar coals just because of their higher heat value, bulk for bulk. It is time that consumers start adjusting themselves to the coals available in these outlying fields. Another measure of relieving congestion in the above Moghalsarai direction is to divert more coal from Bengal/Bihar fields to the coastal States of the South and Western India by the sea route via Calcutta port. At present coastal traffic of coal is confined to about one million tons per year, The question of diversion by sea of an additional one million tons immediately is being examined. As a consequence, an equivalent amount can be moved from Bengal/Bihar region towards Moghalsarai and bring the much needed relief to the consumers. A Committee has been appointed consisting of representatives of the Ministries and authorities concerned and they have been charged with the responsibility of implementing this scheme as early as possible.

Another measure of reducing pressure on rail transport is to resort in greater measure to road transport. It is advisable that large consumers not far from the coalfields take their bulk requirements by trucks. There is possibility of further relief to the rail transport system if certain industries in the Southern and Western parts of the country and the Railways in that region switch over to the use of furnace oil instead of coal. This will release rail transport at present utilized in moving coal to them. The implications of this proposal are presently under examination.

Then there is the scheme of loading of coal round the week. It has to be remembered that the Railways' transport plan is based on a regular turn round of the wagons each day of the week. Stoppage of loading on Sundays leads to slowing down of wagon turnover, the adverse effect of which is felt over a long period. It will, therefore, be appreciated that

Government's policy of introducing seven-day loading is in the best interest of both the producers and the consumers, and I expect the whole-hearted co-operation of the industry in implementing this decision. I quite appreciate that in the Bengal/Bihar fields, collieries have generally resorted to Sunday loading and I am informed that the gap in this region between average loading on week days and on Sundays is a minor one, say, round about 70 to 80 wagons against an overall loading of about 5,000 wagons per day. But certain collieries in the outlying fields such as those in Pench and Chanda have not yet adopted this measure fully. It has been stated that about 800 wagons are being lost each Sunday. This is a cause for concern. The necessity for Sunday loading in the outlying fields is all the greater because the load from these fields to the consumers is comparatively less and consumers can get considerably greater supplies if Sunday loading is resorted to here. A concerted effort is, therefore, necessary by the colliery owners in this region to take to this measure without delay.

Another happy feature in the coal industry has been that, on the whole, cordial relations have been maintained between employers and employees. The very fact that the industry has performed the difficult task of stepping up coal production from 38 million tons in 1955 to a rate of over 60 million tons this year, is proof of such harmonious relations between the workers and employers. Such measures as the adoption of the code of discipline, the setting up of works committees and a negotiating machinery, have all contributed in no small measure in bringing about an atmosphere of good will. Workers and employers are co-partners in the colossal task of the country's economic development, and I look forward to the continuance of these harmonious relations in the coal industry which is undertaking an even larger programme of coal production during the third Five Year Plan.

While we should be legitimately proud of the achievements during the Second Plan, a much bigger task awaits us now and we cannot be complacent about it. The target of additional production is 37 million tons, of which no less than 17 million tons are to be contributed by the private sector. This target is not a figure artificially imposed or pre-determined. The figure has been built up on the basis of an assessment made by the industry's own representatives, in association with the Government's representatives.

This figure represents what the industry is capable of achieving, and it is essential that it gears itself to the task without delay. The industry has already given indication that, by and large it will be able to finance from its own resources the capital investment necessary. This is as it should be and is very heartening indeed. As regards foreign exchange

requirements, we are anxious to ensure that this vital sector of the coal industry gets what it needs essentially. It do not anticipate any serious difficulty in this regard. We are exploring the possibility of getting foreign assistance for this purpose either from the World Bank, representatives of which have recently shown interest in this regard, or from other lines of foreign credit which may be available to India. Unless advance planning is done carefully and all requirements intelligently anticipated, progress is likely to be hampered midway for one difficulty or another. These details will also enable us to keep a regular watch on the progress of each individual unit so that, if there is any inevitable failure in any one sector, adjustments may be made betimes in the programmes of other collieries in order to ensure that there is no shortfall in the ultimate achievement.

OIL

As in the case of coal, the demand for petroleum products has been rapidly increasing. From 4·6 million tons in 1955 and 7·5 million tons in 1960 it is expected to rise to about 14 million tons by the end of the Third Plan period. Except for a small production from the Digboi area in Assam, almost the whole of the requirements are being met by imports. The rapidly increasing demand for these products and the heavy drain on foreign exchange which is of the order of Rs. 100 crores per year at present calls for concerted efforts to establish indigenous production and refining of this very essential commodity.

New reserves of oil have already been located in Upper Assam and appreciable quantities of natural gas are also expected from this field. The Government of India have participated, with the Burmah Oil Company, in the formation of Oil India Limited which will produce 2·75 million tons of oil every year from this field as well as transport the crude oil by pipeline being laid to Barauni in Bihar via Gauhati in Assam. This major pipeline will be completed in two stages; the first stage will synchronize with the coming on stream of the first refinery in the public sector at Gauhati before the close of 1961, and the second stage of the pipeline will be completed in time for the second such refinery at Batauni sometime in 1962.

The pipeline is at present being completed to carry 2·75 million tons per year of crude oil, of which two million tons will be transported beyond Gauhati, while its capacity when expanded will enable the transport of 4·5 million tons up to Gauhati and 3·25 million tons beyond.

The Oil and Natural Gas Commission have been continuing their search for oil during the past several years in the Jwalamukhi and Hoshiarpur areas in the Punjab; the Cambay and Ankleshwar areas in Gujarat;

and Sibsagar area in Assam. Oil was struck at Ankleshwar and Rudrasagar during 1960. To establish the extent of potential oil reserves in Cambay and Ankleshwar areas, a number of test wells have already been drilled there. It is expected that a total of 20 wells in Cambay and 15 wells in Ankleshwar will be completed by the middle of 1961. Arrangements have also been made for obtaining additional drilling equipment required for this purpose.

After trial production and drilling of more wells in Gujarat area, it will be possible to work out in detail the total extent of the two oil fields and possible reserves therein. Based on the above possibility of crude oil production, it has been decided to establish a refinery in Gujarat with a capacity of two million tons per year with possible further expansion.

Government have decided to invite foreign oil explorers to join the quest for oil in India subject to mutually acceptable terms. Interest has been evinced by various foreign oil companies and negotiations are at present in progress.

It is proposed to establish during the Third Plan period a Lubricating Oil Plant of a capacity of 100,000 tons of H.V.L oils somewhere on the Western Coasts. The preliminary action is under way. Some varieties of L.V.L oils will be manufactured at the Barauni refinery.

The utilization of about 38 million cubic ft. per day of associated natural gas from Naharkatiya areas has been under consideration. Projects for power generation, fertilizer, manufacture, domestic-cum-industrial consumption, carbon black, synthetic rubber and polyethylene, cement, etc. have been approved. In order to evolve a suitable pattern for utilization of non-associated gas from Assam, refinery gases and refinery cuts, a petro-Chemical Committee has been set up and is presently at work.

OTHER MINERALS

Efforts made so far in raising the output of mineral ores to broad base the country's efforts in industrialization may now be considered. At the beginning of the First Five Year Plan, the value of minerals produced in the country was Rs. 71 crores. In 1956, i.e. at the commencement of the Second Plan, the production was valued at Rs. 107 crores—an increase of about Rs. 36 crores, and during 1959, it has reached Rs. 141 crores. Though the final figures for all minerals during 1960 have not become available as yet, it is expected that there has been an improvement even over these figures. The major contributors to the increase in value and in quality were iron ore, chromite, kyanite, bauxite, dolomite, rutile and steatite. A slight fall is noticeable in the production of ilmenite, manganese ore, apatite and magnesite. The rise in the case of minerals

that I have mentioned earlier is in keeping with the development in the major metallurgical industries. The noticeable trends during the last five years have been a greater emphasis on the export of processed and semi-processed minerals in the place of raw ore, greater emphasis by all producing units to detailed proving of deposits within their leaseholds, and a greater desire to associate specialized staff in prospecting and exploration. The installed capacity in the country in respect of almost all minerals is today sufficient to achieve not only the target rate of production set for the Second Five Year Plan but in some cases will also enable a higher rate of output.

The Third Five Year Plan envisages far higher targets in respect of some of the mineral ores. In the case of iron ore, for example, whereas the Second Five Year Plan target was 12.5 million tons (against which a rate of 11.5 million tons was reached in February, 1961), that for the end of the Third Plan is 32 million tons. Even this target may have to be revised upward, not only because of the larger indigenous demand but also because of the growing demand for export. Linked with this development has been diversion of a larger number of entrepreneurs to the mining industry. New areas hitherto lying unprospected have been assessed and deposits uncovered. Such increased activity has also resulted in a shift of emphasis in the Departments like the Geological Survey of India and the Indian Bureau of Mines, and even though work on the academic side continues to receive attention, field work has expanded in manifold directions. In this connexion, mention should be made of the proving of several copper deposits, of gypsum deposits in Rajasthan, of pyrites deposits at Amjor, of the magnesite deposits at Almora and the bauxite deposits in Saurashtra and Kutch in addition to the proving of large coal deposits and the discovery of new seams.

Based on an address to the Indian Mining Association.

Pakistan: On the Road to Industrialization

By MAQSOOD KHAN

THE last two years in Pakistan have witnessed a veritable revolution on the industrial front. Uncertainties have given way to a new spirit of purpose—a sense of direction and a will to speed up the process of industrialization and to achieve the targets set by the planners.

The enunciation of the new industrial policy in February, 1959 set the tone. It left private investors, both local and foreign, in no doubt as to the importance the Government of Pakistan attached to the private sector and the role it was required to play. Maximum utilization of installed capacity, balancing and modernization of existing units were given no less importance than establishment of new projects.

Foreign investors were given attractive incentives. A policy of liberal imports of raw materials and spare parts was initiated. The result was a big boost in production. With 1954 as the base year, it stood at 200 in 1960 as compared to 118 in 1959 and 161 in 1958. The ground was prepared for the future development of small-scale and cottage industries on a sound basis. This was also a period of progress for all the departments and institutions financing industrial growth.

The industrial sector (private) in Pakistan is very sensitive. The present regime in Pakistan has assisted, in no small measure, in creating a climate in which there is a fuller and freer flow of private capital. One of the primary objectives of Pakistan's economic policy is to create an investment climate in which foreign and local capital can thrive. Policies have been framed from time to time in order to provide added fiscal and other incentives to private enterprise.

Liberal taxation reliefs have been designed to encourage investment and tariff protection is given to deserving industries. The tax holiday has been extended from two to four years in West Pakistan and for six years in respect of new industries set up in East Pakistan and in relatively less developed areas of West Pakistan. The central budget for 1961-62 has carried this policy a step further. The tax holiday in certain areas will now go up to eight years.

That foreign investment is welcome, has been made absolutely clear, and all restrictions with regard to local association have been removed.

Repatriation of capital and remittance of profits are allowed freely. Arrangements have been negotiated for avoiding double taxation with several countries.

A significant development in Pakistan was the establishment of the Investment Promotion Bureau in April, 1959, to promote foreign and local investment in industry with a view to realizing the targets of the country's development plans in the private sector. The Bureau functions as a Clearing House for all problems which investors may face. It has undertaken the functions of a central office to which investors could refer not only investment proposals but also their problems regarding land, water, power, etc., without having to go from one agency of the Government to the other.

Offices corresponding to the Investment Promotion Bureau have been set up at the headquarters of the two Provincial Governments to assist industries in establishing new industries in the Provinces. A Central Permission Committee under the aegis of the Bureau has been set up to deal with applications for the establishment of new industrial concerns or expansion of existing industries involving foreign investment.

This Committee has, during April to May, 1961, sanctioned investment proposals totalling Rs. 527 million out of which investment in foreign exchange amounts to Rs. 356 million.

Recently Advisory Councils have been set up within the Bureau to advise the Central and Provincial Governments on matters concerning foreign investment and it is expected that these Councils will provide a useful link between the Bureau and institutions interested in industrial development.

In addition, the Bureau has sponsored the establishment of High-powered Facilities Boards in the two wings of the country to assist the investor in setting up industries.

A detailed industrial investment schedule has been drawn within the framework of the Second Five-Year Plan.

The schedule for the private sector covering the period July, 1960 to June, 1965 was announced in November, 1960. It provides for an expenditure of Rs. 2,844 million of which Rs. 1,000 million has been utilized during the period July, 1960 to March, 1961. The utilization of the provisions of the industrial investment schedule to the extent of 35 per cent during the first nine months of a Five-Year term is most encouraging and has been made possible by the foreign exchange made available through foreign loans.

Pakistani Industrial Development Corporation is a unique institution in Pakistan. This combines Government initiative and finance with private enterprise. The P.I.D.C. was established primarily with the object of

promoting industrial enterprise which private parties were either unable or unwilling to undertake.

The policy of the Corporation is to supplement rather than to displace, private enterprise. It has, therefore, refrained from setting up industries, even within its charter, such as cotton textile mills, which are receiving adequate attention from private investors.

Secondly, the emphasis of the Corporation is on promotion, rather than ownership of industries. Every effort is made to attract private capital into the projects of P.I.D.C. and where private participation is not forthcoming at the outset, to transfer the completed projects to private hands at the earliest convenient opportunity.

During 1960-61, Government investment in P.I.D.C. projects amounted to Rs. 175 million as against Rs. 138 million in 1959-60. P.I.D.C. also associated private capital to the extent of Rs. 14.5 million during 1960-61 out of which Rs. 4.3 million was foreign private capital.

During 1960-61, there was an over-all increase of 25.6 per cent in production and 33.4 per cent in exports by P.I.D.C. industries as compared to the previous year. The P.I.D.C. has played a vital role in the development of the jute, paper, shipbuilding, natural gas, sugar, fertilizers and other chemicals, cement and sugar industries in the country. In pursuance of Government's policy, it is intensifying its efforts in East Pakistan.

In early 1960, a Director-General of Small Industries was appointed in the Ministry of Industries and this Department is vigorously pursuing the development and promotion of the small scale industries. For the first time an industrial investment schedule for small industries has been drawn up. It provides for an investment of Rs. 190 million of which Rs. 116 million is in foreign exchange.

Active industrial financial institutions are a necessary pre-requisite for promoting industrial development. In this field the two prominent institutions in the country are the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation and the Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation.

The P.I.C.I.C.'s assistance is available both for balancing and modernization of existing units and for setting up new industrial capacity. P.I.C.I.C. is not merely a mortgage bank lending against the security of existing assets but a development institution which takes up projects in the blue-print stage and assists in the planning and development of such projects.

The P.I.C.I.C. began its operations in 1958. By the 31st May, 1961, it had sanctioned 204 loans for an aggregate amount of Rs. 195 million of which the equivalent of Rs. 162.8 million is in foreign exchange currencies and Rs. 31.3 million in local currency. The P.I.C.I.C. has diversified its investments both geographically and by types of industry and it has until now ventured into 55 industrial sectors.

Impressions of Hong Kong

By F. B. DE MELLO KAMATH*

Commissioner for India

I HAVE lived three years in Hong Kong as the Representative of the Government of India. Let me tell you at once that I have enjoyed my stay here. I have learned a great deal by observing the way this colony is governed, the means by which the people support themselves, and their behaviour towards one another. When a stranger comes into a new place, he is ready with certain expectations. So was I in May, 1959, with notions of what Hong Kong was like, picked up from casual reading or travellers' tales. The real Hong Kong that I saw was a big surprise, far better than my expectations.

As the ship enters the harbour in the early morning, the visitor is fascinated by the green and brown hills of your city, a gift of nature on which man has raised a bustling port, a city, and a colony. Living on one of these hills I command an entrancing view by day or by night, of which I have never tired. The ships in the harbour, some 70 or 75 on any day, bear glowing witness to Hong Kong's commercial success. So do flights of dozens of aeroplanes landing or taking off at all hours on their way round the world. Hong Kong by night reminds me of Diwali, our festival of lights in India, when we set out tiny oil lamps to celebrate the coming of the new year. But here it is Diwali every night, with millions of lights and many coloured neon signs glowing in the sky.

When you look at the shops filled to overflowing with merchandise from the four corners of the earth, cheaper sometimes than it is in the country of its origin, you understand why 220,000 tourists came to Hong Kong last year and spent nearly two million dollars a day. People from India, where the import of luxury goods is merely a trickle for lack of foreign exchange, are astonished to behold the variety and wealth of watches, cameras, radios, clothes, toys and so on, and find it hard to pick the right ones to buy. These desirable objects are cheap by comparison with the high prices, including prohibitive customs duties, charged in some countries. I know that one of your headaches is to keep prices down and fixed so that the tourist not only gets a fair deal but can see that he gets it.

* Text of a talk to the Rotary Club of Hong Kong Island East.

The visitor in your midst is enchanted by the courtesy of your people, despite language difficulties, their orderly behaviour, and their neat and tidy ways. Watching crowds disperse after a parade or a football match quickly and quietly, I marvel at the inborn sense of order and discipline that they show. Though Hong Kong is the home of more than a million refugees, I have seen very few beggars in the streets. This fact speaks volumes for the self-help of the individual and his keenness to work as well as for the growth of industry that has provided jobs for everybody. I had a gardener, an elderly man, who spoke good English and wrote a fine hand. He must have been a person of some importance earlier in his life. To find him a gardener convinced me that a regard for the dignity of labour goes hand in hand with respect for learning. I am told that on road-mending jobs are to be found persons who were in much better circumstances in China but who are happy to make a fresh start in practically any occupation. It is hard for secure, sheltered people to realize that in nine cases out of ten a refugee leaves one set of distressing conditions to face another set, at least to begin with. It is their courage and their hope of finding a better life that mark the refugees of Hong Kong. By their skill and their industry they rise in the world, and they have helped to make Hong Kong what it is today.

The Colony's history is full of surprises. It was acquired from China after a long struggle, but proved to be a rocky and barren island, a pinpoint on the map of Asia, a bitter disappointment to all. However, it attracted goods from all over the world to sell to China until the Korean war came with its embargoes. Freedom of trade, which has disappeared from the globe, is still Hong Kong's first principle, and explains its growth through good times and bad. But this freedom would not have saved the colony once the refugees started pouring in some 12 years ago, had not men from Shanghai, with their capital, skill and enterprise also sought refuge here and set up factories and workshops. What might have been a disaster was thus turned into a victory. The decision to shelter people fleeing their own country was not only a humane policy but proved in a short while to be a turning point in Hong Kong's history. It is today not only a free port but an industrial centre importing raw materials and exporting 184 million pounds worth of its own manufactures, roughly 80 per cent of its total exports. For its tiny size Hong Kong's exports equal those of New Zealand, exceed those of Yugoslavia or Ireland or Nigeria, and are three times those of Israel. It is an achievement with few parallels in history, and one of which the Government and people of Hong Kong are proud. Neighbours watch its growth with interest, and the plans being discussed in some countries for the establishment of free ports testify to the value of Hong Kong's example to underdeveloped regions.

I have visited schools, colleges, factories and workshops and observed people at work and play. I have seen the skilled hands of young men and women turn rough materials into elegant and desirable products. Unfortunately I do not speak Chinese, but the boys and girls who are at school with my son struck me as self-reliant, forward-looking persons. They should be, in Hong Kong's stimulating atmosphere. Another point is the elegance, the slim photogenic quality, of a great many of your people. The care taken by the average man and woman to be neat, presentable, even attractive, is characteristic. Rarely do you see horny-handed sons of toil in this busy hive of industry. I see workmen using gloves to protect their hands. I see school children picking up their book-filled attache cases sponge in hand. As a matter of fact, the hands of the Chinese people are fascinating, an index to much more than the care taken in looking after them.

Hong Kong is overcrowded because three and a quarter million people live in not much more than 12 square miles of land developed for residential, commercial and industrial purposes. New townships are being created and industrial estates are being organized and refugee settlements are being built. In the process we see hills removed and the sea pushed back to make more room. But the scarcity of land and the topography give one the feeling of being cribbed, cabined and confined. A temporary resident like me, used to living in a large country, wishes there was more space. Still, drives in the New Territories, picnics on the lovely beaches, and cruises among the islands do offer some pleasing compensation. If one wishes to get lost over a weekend, there are, I am told, remote places where one can retire and engage in such pastimes as fishing or catching up on one's reading. The smallness of Hong Kong's size does not prevent people from enjoying golf, tennis, cricket and football, and the place has a memorable annual event, a walkathon, to its credit.

Refugees and overcrowding go together. There are some heavily congested areas on the island and in Kowloon where living conditions must be grim. When night falls, darkness hides the squalor and the coloured lighting sheds a romantic glow on a sector of the city which, I know, all wish to renovate. But land values, the cost of new buildings and rents have gone up and housing is still scarce. I watch with amazement the squatters on rooftops and hillsides living their hard and meagre lives, often exposed to the sun and wind and rain. I see women balancing buckets of water on a slim bamboo pole across their shoulders, a baby strapped to the back, a shopping basket in one hand, toiling up the slope to start the day's cooking. It is only the love of life and the love of the family that drives these women to engage in piece work in their spare time at home to support the children at school or the distressed people

they left behind in their villages. Skilled hands, a sense of the value of time, and tireless industry save them from want and the loss of their natural pride. Their toughness evokes admiration.

A question linked to this situation is the level of wages and the charge of sweated labour that is often made. I was speaking to a distinguished public man on this subject the other day, and he explained to me that on a recent visit to London he went over with a Labour Ministry official the budget of a British factory girl and compared it to that of a Hong Kong factory girl. The British girl earned more money per hour, but she had to pay more for her daily needs and for such things as clothes, hairdos, cosmetics and other luxuries. In Hong Kong, the level of expenditure of a factory girl on luxuries as well as necessities is much lower because of the general cheapness; and the wages are also lower. In terms of real wages, however, the Hong Kong girl, he said, was better off than the British factory girl. It is unfair, he contended—and he appeared to be reasonable—that goods made here should be condemned because of the low money wages paid to the workers. What Hong Kong strives to do, it seems to me, is to pass on to the consumer abroad the economy in production gained from the low cost of living which is brought about by low taxation, an inexpensive administration, and freedom from customs and excise duties, in addition to purely industrial and commercial efficiency.

I now come to the second principle that stands out in Hong Kong's history. It is the absence of politics. While the Commonwealth is convulsed from time to time, in Asia or Africa or in the new world, by demands for constitutional reform or political independence—demands which have been gracefully conceded—there has been not a murmur of that kind in Hong Kong's brief history. It has been said: "Happy is the country that has no history." The Hong Kongite may well add: "Happy is the country that has no politics." Here, people are content to be left alone to follow their bent—to earn their wages, their profits or their dividends. I have lived in a few British colonies, past and present, and it is a unique experience to live in one where in this respect the winds of change do not blow. Nor is there the slightest interest in elections or in a government by popularly elected representatives. For one thing, an election will increase the cost of administration and for another it may cause civil commotion. So nobody wants an election. There may be differences of opinion about the merits of communism here or elsewhere, but it is not a practical issue for the colony. Hong Kong carries on with a purely colonial type of government with which the world was familiar before 1914. Perhaps it will continue to be governed in its present style by popular consent and enjoy the singular distinction of being the last relic of colonialism to remind the world of a brilliant episode in history. One notices that the reins of

administration are lightly held, that difficulties are met as they come, that restrictions, rules, regulations, orders, amendments are minimal. On the other hand, the administrators go all out to conserve and develop the trade of Hong Kong, which is its lifeblood. They inspire, direct and aid the setting up of new industries; they attend with untiring zeal to the opening of new schools and colleges, hospitals and clinics; they organize social welfare centres. The privileges of the underprivileged are mounting. They are encouraged and helped to help themselves. All this is done without deficit budgets. No loan or foreign aid is received and Hong Kong is not a member of the Colombo Plan. Hong Kong is perhaps the only case of its kind in the world where since the war the Government has enjoyed a budget surplus year after year. True it is easier in a small, compact colony like this to organize the administration with such unusual efficiency; but it is there for all to see and admire.

It is a fact that extreme forms of capitalism and communism are to be found on the two sides of the narrow Shum Chun river. While a great experiment in collectivization is going on in China, Hong Kong pursues what must be regarded as obsolete doctrines of *laissez faire*. How do they manage to get on with one another? The relations between the two during my stay were marked by two important events that I shall always remember. The first was the agreement last year with China that gave Hong Kong access to water from the Shum Chun reservoir to augment its supply. The generosity of the Chinese Government in offering the water was matched by Hong Kong's ready acceptance on payment. It was an exercise in co-existence in keeping with the best traditions of British diplomacy. Water is the limiting factor in Hong Kong's expansion, and when the Government's own schemes on Lantau and elsewhere are ready, the colony will have a 24-hour water supply, and capacity to industrialize the economy further. Let us hope when that day arrives, the people of Hong Kong will not relax from the discipline imposed upon them by the short hours of water supply at the hottest time of the year when tempers are far from cool.

The second important event was the recent refugee influx. The steady trickle of illegal immigrants over the years suddenly became a flood which took all the time and energy of the small police and defence forces that the colony possesses to cope with and return to their homeland. The manner in which these refugees were treated was most impressive. It was here that the blend of British efficiency and Chinese politeness, so characteristic of the colony, was in striking evidence. No violence, rough handling or harsh words were used. The uninvited guests were taken to a camp, given a square meal, and sent home by lorry or train over the border. When it was realized that Hong Kong's capacity to absorb refugees was limited, the flood ceased almost as suddenly as it had started.

Apart from refugees, Hong Kong has other storm clouds on the horizon. The restrictions on its exports, voluntary and otherwise, have come as obstacles to the textile industry, and the solution of the problem, mainly diversification, cannot be far off. The ingenuity and enterprise of businessmen in finding out what people want and where, which led to the supply of well made, low cost products to the United Kingdom and to the United States, will doubtless discover fresh wants and new markets. In this line of discovery, I believe Indians in Hong Kong are established pioneers. It was they, I am told, who helped to introduce Hong Kong products to the Western world. When I went to Africa for the first time five years ago, I was surprised to see Hong Kong made shirts, pots and pans, plastics and sports goods in the shops not only in the towns, but in the jungle. Such goods will always appeal to people in many parts of the world where they do not insist upon highly priced articles in their shops. Then we have the riddle of the common market, still some distance from us. I have no doubt whatever is decided upon will not be to the detriment of Hong Kong.

Hong Kong is news today in many countries where people feel concerned about its problems. I am sure to be asked, when I go home, how I fared in the colony. I may tell you frankly that the three years I have spent here have been all too short. Time has flown from one day to the next. There are so many absorbing things to do. There are interesting people to meet, not only residents but visitors from many lands who come to study business opportunities or new experiments in administration. I have never been in a city with so many new motion pictures to see immediately on release from their studios. I am not a racegoer, but your racecourse with its thousands of spectators, millions in bets and big packets in tote dividends, is fantastic. Your restaurants which serve the finest Chinese food, especially those in Aberdeen, are unrivalled. The 50 acres of arable land in this colony of 400 square miles hardly support its population, and one marvels at the organization which provisions Hong Kong like a ship, and brings food from far away places to fill the city's rice bowl. Your newspapers have plenty of space not only for daily crimes, calamities and catastrophes, but for readers' gripes and grumbles. Your booming hotels are going to increase and multiply, and the speed with which new ones rise is staggering. Your homes, be they the fortresses millionaires have built for themselves, or modest flats in tall apartment houses, are comfortable and tastefully designed. Hong Kong must be the only place in the world where a man can get clothes made to measure in 24 hours. And amid the rush to make money, people find time to go to Church and pray. The City Hall which I have seen rising from its foundations has already become a temple of culture where your artists will have opportunities of developing their talents side by side with the great masters invited from many lands.

When one considers the question commonly asked by visitors: "How long will Hong Kong last?" and the reply given indicating lack of certainty, one wonders how the people work, marry, bring up families and plan for the future. Sooner or later China will be able to manufacture and sell more cheaply than Hong Kong. Peking has scrupulously respected Britain's sovereignty over Hong Kong and over the leased New Territories. But the lease will expire in 1997. At the same time Hong Kong is a source of foreign exchange earnings for China to the extent of some 2,000 million dollars annually. What may happen when China is admitted to the United Nations and trade embargoes are lifted cannot now be foretold. Pessimists abound in this world, but I am not one of them. I think the Hong Kong Government and businessmen generally have confidence in the future and their projects are based on investment over the next 10 or 15 years. It requires a great deal of courage to face such a short term future, but it is being done and with notable success. Perhaps it also affects social relations. It is usual for members of the consular corps in any city like this to feel that they are here for a short while and that it would be wise to get on with one another. Such an attitude must be general in this colony and one feels happy to observe the prevailing lack of tension. Hong Kong is remarkable for its live and let live outlook, its active interest in the underprivileged, and its kindly spirit of tolerance. These are precious qualities in an individual or a people, and I am thankful I have seen a demonstration of them.

When I came to Hong Kong in 1959 I came determined to find out for myself the secret of Hong Kong's prosperity in a part of the world that is far from prosperous. I think *laissez faire* doctrines on the economic side and popular apathy on the political side are responsible. But more than these features, I believe it is something that we have to call the spirit of Hong Kong that is at the base of its abounding success. It is difficult to define, but it is made up of optimism, of faith, of courage. This spirit has attracted people of all nationalities, notably my own countrymen, to make Hong Kong their home and to play their part in building its prosperity. According to Arnold Toynbee, the historian, great civilizations develop in response to a challenge. Though poorly endowed by nature, which has been niggardly with the basic elements needed for life, Hong Kong has grown beyond all expectation. It has met one challenge after another and in the struggle has grown stronger and more prosperous. If the past can serve as a guide to the future, Hong Kong the dynamic should with every reason overcome the next challenge whatever it may be and emerge the better for it.

The Arab League

By EDWARD A. RIZK

THE League of Arab States, which recently celebrated its seventeenth anniversary, is this century's expression of a sense of Arab unity, of racial and religious integration, that is as ancient as Islam itself.

The formation of the Arab League—as the Organization has generally come to be known—did not represent an attempt to create, or even resuscitate, Arab unity. Contrary to much Anglo-Saxon political thought, the representatives of the eight Arab lands who attended the preliminary conference at Alexandria in the autumn of 1944 merely sought to contain memories and emotions evoked by a common past in modern political and organizational forms. Thus the Alexandria Protocol, which resulted from their deliberations, represented neither the termination of one period of Arab history nor the opening of a new, but a regrouping—on the basis of twentieth-century realities—of a single nation on a single and eternal course.

And although the most vital of those realities was undoubtedly the final phase of what has become known in Britain as the Arab Awakening, the emotion which most deeply moved the architects of the Arab League was not one of immediate political fulfilment but of acknowledgement of a divine message first heard in the seventh century. This was the message of the Prophet Mohammed, first and greatest of Arab unifiers. It was he who through his teachings first welded the Arabs into a homogeneous and powerful people that held sway over the whole of the Arabian Peninsula before seeking to transform their sense of national unity into the reality of a unity of all mankind. And it was in what is known today as the Arab World that this unifying mission later found its most complete expression.

When they ventured out of their peninsula to build their empire, the Arabs took with them not only their religion but also their language, their culture and their civilization; and this process of the arabization of the vast territories now identified by the proud names of sovereign Arab states was fortified by inter-marriage between the conquerors and the local populations. Indeed, so complete were the human results that when the Arab Empire eventually disintegrated under the onslaughts of the Mongols in the thirteenth century these lands retained their Arab character

and have done so ever since. For although it is but historical truth that most of the trappings of Arab civilization faded and crumbled later under four centuries of Ottoman domination, that Arab culture languished and Arab intellectualism remained quiescent, the pilot flame of Arab unity burnt gently through the empty years while waiting for the winds of political evolution to fan it into a roaring bonfire of revolt.

And slowly but surely those winds whisperingly appeared. First, as the nineteenth century opened, in Egypt—where Mohammed Ali rose to challenge Ottoman power; then in Syria, in advance of Mohammed Ali's son, Ibrahim; and then again, among the Wahabis of the Arabian Peninsula. Finally, it was the advent of European domination and contact with European nationalism that aroused in the Arabs strong feelings of national consciousness, a sense of nationalism based on a common origin and a common culture.

By mid-century the winds no longer whispered but battered at those doors remaining closed to their message of deliverance through practised unity. The revival of the Arabic language in the Lebanon and Syria re-introduced Arab hearts and minds to the glories of Arab civilization and culture. Concurrently there was a similar cultural renaissance in Egypt. The emotions this generated in both areas blended with the enduring sense of unity—as fresh, as poignant as ever—to form a political nationalism that in less than fifty years swept the whole of the Arab World. And its unequivocal aims were Arab independence and political unity.

As the century closed with British, French and Italian influence expanding just as rapidly as that of the Ottomans declined, the spirits of the Arab nationalists rose in proportion with the increase in the number of occupying powers; far from being downcast under the weight of four alien regimes, the Arabs increased their efforts to achieve their aims on the declared basis of a united and independent Arab state comprising all the Arab countries east of Suez.

The First World War brought the Arabs hope, in the form of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, and disillusionment in those of the British-sponsored Balfour Declaration and the terms of the 1919 peace settlement. For instead of the independence they had been promised on entering the war on the side of the Allies under the leadership of Al-Hussein, Sharif of Mecca, the politically cynical peace makers divided the Arab World, with the exceptions of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, into French and British spheres of influence. And instead of the single land of their desire, the Arabs were parcelled-up in no less than five separate states and administrations—Syria, the Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and Palestine—and had imposed on them the additional offence of the Balfour Declaration

which, in effect, promised a cherished part of the Arab homeland to an alien people—all under the curious innovation of the mandatory system.

But the bonfire of revolt still smouldered from its consumption of Ottoman power and the same revolutionary winds persisted, sometimes softly and sometimes more loudly than ever before, and by 1941 all the new Arab states except for Palestine had made substantial progress along their separate roads to the common objective of Arab independence. And so it was that representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, the Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Yemen, and the Arabs of Palestine, came together at that hour of Arab destiny in the autumn of 1944 to approve the Alexandria Protocol which provided, on March 22nd the following year, the Covenant establishing the League of Arab States.

In one respect only did its conception deviate from the hopes of the early Arab nationalists—time had overtaken their aim of a single unitary state; geographical boundaries and administrative systems imposed by alien rule had become too deeply imprinted for their erasure to represent a practical proposition. Instead it was decided that a league of sovereign states would more fully conform with the existent political and administrative circumstances. The fundamental purposes of the Arab League are the strengthening of the ties between its member-States and the co-ordination of all Arab policies and activities in the common interest.

It follows that the League's political baptism followed swiftly on its birth. Indeed, so swiftly were the facts of continued French occupational activity in Syria and the Lebanon brought to the notice of the United Nations that in 1946 both these Arab lands achieved full independence in the wake of the final withdrawal of French power from the Levant.

That same year, too, the League took its first steps in support of Egypt's national aspirations, support that was to be resolutely maintained until the withdrawal of British troops from the Nile Delta, and shortly afterwards initiated the world-wide political and diplomatic activity on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine which continues to this day. For nearly fifteen years now the League has focused the attention of the world—and also sought to focus its conscience—on the plight of over 1,250,000 Palestine Arab refugees, and striven for solutions in accordance with international justice and fair dealing. At every opportunity, and on every diplomatic level, the League's representatives have resisted attempts to perpetuate the situation which has arisen from Zionist violations of United Nations recommendations and local armistice agreements; violations involving the illegal seizures of the ports of Haifa and Eilat, the Negev, and vast tracts of rich Arab agricultural land and orange groves—plus the illegal transfer to Jerusalem of government departments contrary to United Nations recommendations on the internationalization of the Holy City.

Throughout the same period the League has with equal steadfastness espoused the legitimate aspirations of Arab nations everywhere between the Atlantic shores of Morocco and the Arabian Gulf—and deep down into Africa as well. With the support of Asian countries its member-States have individually and collectively maintained the North African situations, including the Algerian, in the forefront of world awareness, while the League itself has operated, in Cairo, a North Africa Office. And Morocco and Tunisia are two of five nations that have become members of the League after recovering their full independence in the course of the seventeen years now under review; the three others are Libya, the Sudan and Kuwait.

The case of Libya is in fact exemplary of the practice made by the League with the diplomatic and political influence it derives from unity. In the cause of the people of this former Italian colony it sponsored, regionally, The Committee for the Liberation of Libya and initiated, internationally, diplomatic moves that developed into United Nations action in favour of Libyan independence. More, it was the influence of the League, above all else, that preserved the territorial unity of Libya against threats of division into three separate states.

Throughout its existence the Arab League has maintained a relatively simple organizational structure; only a handful of technical departments has been added to the original Council, Permanent or Special Committees and Secretariat-General.

The supreme body remains the Council, composed of representatives of all member-States, each having a single vote, and the tasks allocated to it range between deliberation on international disputes involving member-States to approval of budgetary measures and appointments. Other tasks are co-operation with international organizations, such as the United Nations, and mediation in disputes which threaten to lead to war between member-States or between members and non-members. The Council's unanimous decisions are binding upon all member-States, and those by majority only upon states accepting them.

Although the Council convenes in ordinary session twice a year there is provision for extraordinary sessions on request by two member-States and by invitation of the Secretary-General. Representatives of member-States assume the presidency of the Council at its ordinary sessions on a rota basis.

The League's Special Committees ensure the closest possible co-operation between member-States in a number of specific fields—such as finance, commerce, customs, agriculture, industry, communications, public health and culture. All member-States are represented on the Special Committees, while representatives of Arab countries still outside the

League for reasons not of their own making—non-selfgoverning status is a typical case—are also frequently invited to attend meetings.

The over-riding purpose of the Special Committees is the establishment of principles of agreement among member-States in matters within their competence; such principles are formulated as draft agreements for examination by the Council before submission to individual governments.

The Secretariat-General, a permanent body, consists of a Secretary-General, appointed by the Council on the basis of a two-thirds majority vote, and Assistant Secretaries-General—appointed by the Secretary-General with the Council's approval—together with their staffs. Although one of the Secretary-General's main tasks is the preparation of the League's budget, which he submits to the Council at the beginning of each fiscal year, his post also carries wide discretionary powers in political affairs. The present Secretary-General, Ambassador Abdul Khaliq Hassouna, a former Egyptian Foreign Minister elected in September, 1952, has played an important role both in world diplomacy and public debate. Indeed, his negotiatory and mediatory functions have, in practice, become wider in scope than those of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Chief among the organs established since the formation of the League are the Economic Council, the Joint Defence Council and the Permanent Military Commission. The task of the first, composed of the finance ministers of the contracting member-States, is the implementation of the League's Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty of 1950; that of the second, composed of foreign and defence ministers, the implementation of joint defence provisions made by the same treaty, and that of the third, on which serve representatives of the general staffs of the armies of contracting member-States, joint defence planning.

A number of special organs include the Refugee Office, the Boycott Bureau, the Anti-Narcotics Bureau, the Institute of Arab Studies and the Institute of Arab Manuscripts.

Although it is inevitable that the League's political and diplomatic activities should attract the larger share of world attention, achievements in economic, cultural, social and legal matters have mounted steadily.

Thus the Economic Council has established the Arab Financial Institution for Economic Development with capital amounting to £E20,000,000 in gold and divided into 2,000 shares each of £E10,000 value. Since becoming operational in January, 1959 the Institution has pursued its aim of inducing economic development by means of direct financing of productive projects. The Council also has to its credit the formation of the first combined Arab development project wholly backed by Arab capital—the Arab Potassium Company formed to exploit the Dead Sea salts with a nominal capital of £4,500,000.

But the League's economic activities have also extended beyond the Arab World. Close relations have been established with the Customs Co-operation Council, the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the United Nations Economic Commissions for Africa and Asia. Great attention is being paid to world petroleum affairs and no less than 37 nations participated in the second of two conferences convened by the League; Arab companies to operate tankers and pipelines have since been established. Communications is another field in which the League has been particularly active in recent years. Arab postal and telecommunications unions have been formed, while in April of last year the League concluded a convention establishing the principle of a world pan-Arab airline. In addition, plans are in hand for a pan-Arab railway network.

In social affairs the League continues its study of problems old and new in Arab society seeking to develop social consciousness through community services and model health and labour projects. Missions are regularly sent abroad to gain technical experience of value to Arab institutions and close relations have been established with the specialized agencies of the United Nations, the International Labour Office and the World Health Organization. Seminars and conferences on social subjects are regularly held under League auspices in the Arab capitals.

The League's main cultural objective is the revival of interest in the Arab heritage. Several cultural, scientific and educational conferences have been held for the purpose of unifying cultural trends in the different Arab lands. University education and the circulation of technical information in the Arabic language have been other subjects selected for discussion. One of the visible results of this activity is a steady flow of text books and reference material translated and published by the League in co-operation with the United Nations and the Institute of Arab Higher Studies.

In its first seventeen years of life the Arab League has shared criticism with several similar institutions of international or regional range. Some of that criticism has been made in good faith and some not, some has been valid and some deliberately false; and certainly there has been confusion among Anglo-Saxon commentators at various times regarding both the historical circumstances of the League's formation and its political motives.

But the charge most rarely heard or read is that the League is inactive—and those most closely associated with its daily operations draw encouragement from that fact. For while they are prepared frankly to admit that there have been difficulties, they would bitterly repudiate any suggestion of executive inertia or operational sterility.

Of course the broad truth of the matter is that the League's existence has spanned one of the most perilous and turbulent periods in the human

story—particularly so in the Middle East, where the process of emancipation has been bedevilled by international power politics—and that the League has had no monopoly of internal controversy. The United Nations has certainly suffered more from the political pressures and nationalist burgeonings of the post-war years than has the League.

Yet despite everything the League has progressed further and accomplished more than was forecast by the majority of its early critics; and the Arab unity which it crystalizes has, in the long term, benefited rather than suffered from divergencies over ways and means to a common end.

The Arab League, like other international organizations, offers tremendous possibilities in the service of mankind. It is on the basis of its potential that its value should be assessed.

Courtesy The Arab World.

Education and Economic Development in Asia

By Dr. M. S. ADISESHIAH*

THIS approach to education as a social investment and overhead, hides the casual relationship between the development of education and the economic development of Asian countries. This casual relationship between education and development has been given serious attention only recently, and it is in the West that the quantitative relationship between a given investment in education and the resulting rate of economic growth has been the subject of serious study. In the early days of the Soviet revolution, in the early twenties, the Soviet economist Strumilin was able to convince Lenin and Stalin that investment in primary education increased a worker's earning capacity more than 40 per cent, while secondary and university education increased his productivity by over 100 per cent and 300 per cent respectively. Later, he came to attribute something like 30 per cent of the continuous increase in the national income of the Soviet Union to its investment in education.

* Assistant Director-General of Unesco.

Studies in the United States have led to the conclusion that something like two-thirds of the dramatic increase that has been taking place during the present century in the national income of that country, is attributable to its expenditure in mobilizing and using its human resources, of which education is the central part.

Similar studies of the rate of economic growth in the United Kingdom, France, and the Scandinavian countries point to somewhere around half of the annual increase in the national production of those countries as being attributable to their educational and research expenditure.

The only Asian country where a similar analysis has been undertaken of the relationship between expenditure in education and the economic growth of the country is Japan. The Economic Planning Agency of the Government of Japan has computed that, in 1900, the percentage of national income spent on education was 1.85 per cent and the per capita income of Japan in that year was \$82. In 1958, the investment in education rose to 5.9 per cent and the per capita income was \$269. Thus, over a period of 50 years, Japan's national expenditure has trebled with more than a threefold increase in the average income of the Japanese.

The broad conclusion that emerges from these studies and analyses is that the development of a country does not depend merely on its natural resources (if this were so, the Scandinavian countries should be among the poorest), nor on capital resources alone (if this were so, the oil-producing countries should be among the most developed), nor on abundant labour supply (as otherwise Asia would be among the most developed).

Economic growth and development is much more dependent on the capacity to produce, and all that that implies. Such capacity is the direct result of a country's educational investment. This having been said, it is important to bear in mind three serious limitations of the thesis of the casual relationship between education and development.

First, this broad conclusion is still under discussion and detailed examination by economists and administrators, particularly with regard to the quantitative relationship that seems to be emerging.

Second, a country's capacity to produce depends on a wide range of investments, including training, research, and mass communication; and the term "education" has to be used either in a wide sense to cover all those, or, if used in a narrow sense, they must be added to education.

Third, the Asian countries face a very serious demographic problem known today as the "population explosion." Moreover, they are mainly an agricultural economy, and they face a chronic state of unemployment and underemployment of human resources. Hence, any simple transposition of the conclusions, of the relation between education and economic development, arrived at on the basis of the experience of Western

countries and Japan, to Asian economies, is not possible. Further research is needed on their adaptation and application to Asia. However, the broad conclusion that the development of Asian countries requires at least as much effort in bringing to them the capacity to produce, and the corollary of educational growth as increased physical production, remains valid.

UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION — THE FIRST STEP

At a conference in Karachi in early-1960, the Asian countries decided to launch a 20-year programme for making primary education universal in Asia. The quantitative targets they established were impressive. In 1960, 65 m. children were in primary schools; and, allowing for population increase, they provided for 220 m. children being in school by 1980. This involves doubling the training and employment of teachers during the 20-year period. It meant enrolling 156 m. more children, constructing 55 m. more classrooms, and 2 m. additional teachers' houses by 1980. Total cost of this programme for the period was a little over \$55 billion for the Asian countries. These millions and billions for the Asian programme seem staggering, but so are the needs of Asia, where two-thirds of the people of the world live.

Two years later (last April), the Asian countries assembled again at Tokyo to see how this primary education programme was being executed. They came to the conclusion that, with the exception of Afghanistan, Laos, and Nepal, all the Asian countries were now taking action in expanding primary education, so that by 1980 all of them would be providing seven year's primary schooling to every child. In the case of the three countries referred to, their attainment of this goal would have to be extended for a further 10 to 15 years. Afghanistan plans to reach this target by 1990.

Some countries, like Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, and the Philippines, will provide universal primary schooling by the end of this decade.

They were all concerned with the qualitative problems of the expansion they are now going in for, viz., the adequate training of teachers, relation of the curricula to the agricultural and rural realities of the country, and the very serious problem of wastage that they all face—that is, an average of 30 per cent of the children not completing primary school. Decisions have been made to concentrate during the next few years on the qualitative improvement of primary schooling.

Primary education for all is demanded by the people of Asia; it is provided for in their Constitutions. The Governments and leaders are, therefore, engaged in giving effect to this national desire. This programme is also an integral part of their development objective, and for this they are

relating primary education to the development programmes of the countries. The Indian and Pakistan Five-Year Plans recognize, as do the programmes in Ceylon, Indonesia, Malaya, and Thailand, that the provision of primary education will result in literate and educated agricultural and rural communities, open to change, able to use modern knowledge and techniques in their day-to-day occupations, and willing to move from areas and occupations where there is unemployment to those where there is need for their skills. The Asian primary education programmes are thus an important motive force in attaining the five per cent annual increase in national income at which the Asian development plans aim.

PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENTIRE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

At the recent conference, in Tokyo, of Asian Ministers of Education, a second major conclusion was reached concerning education in Asia as a factor of economic growth. This was that each Asian country should, during the next three years, develop long-term plans covering all the sectors of education—primary, secondary, higher, adult, and research and training programmes—as both an integral part of, and contributory to, their economic development plans. In this context, the primary education plans and programmes launched two years ago were recognized to be but the first step in mobilizing human resources for Asian economic growth.

The long-term educational perspective planning that each Asian country is to undertake will be based on educational and economic factors to be found in, or projected for, the country.

First, the population position and projection for the plan period must be taken into account; it should include internal migration and its effects on the educational system, particularly with reference to the rural urban migration, movements between lower and higher income groups, and intellectual and manual occupations.

Second, the economic profile of the country will have to be the basis for the education plan, which will include the present and future trends of the gross national production of the country.

Third, the investment that each country is currently making in its different economic and social sectors, and a forecast of what this trend of intra-sectoral investment is likely to be, must be undertaken.

Fourth, there will have to be an assessment of the human resources and needs for the developing economy of the country, out of which would arise the educational priorities and the identification of those levels of education that form an obstacle to economic growth, and on which national investment in education would be concentrated.

Fifth, the educational problems and bottlenecks that the country faces must be identified, whether in teachers and administrators, or women's education, or buildings, or wastage.

Sixth, the plan must provide for reform and adoption of curricula, including the reorientation of educational streams—academic and vocational, science and arts, engineering and research. This should include what has come to be called the technology of education—that is, the techniques and efficiency of the teaching and learning processes, including the new teaching and learning techniques symbolized by the teaching machine, educational television, and in the long run the use of communication satellites, as revolutionary educational media, particularly for mass education programmes.

Finally, the capital and recurrent costs of the educational perspective plan for the country would have to be carefully computed, together with the quantum of foreign aid that can flow into the educational development sector of the country.

In 1956 the Asian Ministers plan to meet again to review and approve a total long-term educational programme for their countries, as part of their economic development plans.

EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

In this way the countries of Asia plan to establish the normal educational pyramid for that continent by 1980. This normal pyramid till recently was expressed in the ratio 100, 25, 5; i.e., 100 per cent of primary-school-age children are in primary schools, 25 per cent of secondary-school-age pupils are in secondary schools, and five per cent of university-age students are in universities, with no illiteracy in the country. This kind of educational pyramid, which obtains in Japan and the West, involves an investment of a little more than four per cent of the national income of the country in education.

In Asia today, the average is a little over two per cent; in other words, about \$1,400 m. is being spent on education annually. The Asian countries have decided to double this investment by 1980, i.e., to around \$3,000 m. a year. For all the countries, and particularly the large ones—India, Pakistan, and Indonesia—this would mean an enormous effort and considerable sacrifice.

But it is an effort required both by the consequences of what their peoples desire, and by the demands of the countries' development. They are conscious that for the coming two decades they will have to make this effort, deploying their resources to the maximum in education, and tightening their national belts in the process.

There is also in this developing educational design in Asia a challenge to the West. Europe is emerging as an agricultural surplus area, needing markets that would absorb this surplus; its industrial production today is expanding dramatically and an outlet for this is needed. Western capital investment in Asia is limited by lack of pre-investment preparedness of various kinds. On the other hand, the fall in world prices of primary commodities and the emergence of regional economic groupings in the West, with their barriers against Hong Kong or Indian textiles and Pakistani jute, are leading to a serious fall in the export earnings of Asia and a contraction of the consumer and capital markets they represent.

Hence both the larger interests of world peace and understanding, and the immediate demands of expanding Western economic growth, suggest the West's joining, as partners, in financing the economic development plans and educational growth programmes of Asia. The strategy of Asian economic development today requires that each country shall do everything it possibly can in expanding and improving its educational system as the prerequisite to giving it the capacity to produce.

A C H A L L E N G E

There will be, however, for some years to come in each Asian country, in the circumstances referred to earlier, a gap between what is physically possible and what is fiscally possible in the educational field. It is to fill this gap—whether in foreign exchange or in personnel, training, or equipment—between what is educationally possible to an Asian country and what its fiscal system dictates, that the partnership of the West is clearly called for. I am convinced that the West will respond to this challenge, even as Asia is gathering her strength to meet the world challenge of tomorrow.

Courtesy Far East Trade.

Japan's Land Transport

JAPAN'S land transport has been operating at full capacity ever since the end of World War II. This is especially the case with railway transport.

War damage to railways was not as heavy as that on ships, but still it was considerable: the Japanese National Railways (J.N.R.), which constitutes the life-line of railway transport, lost 25 per cent of its electric trains, 20 per cent of its passenger coaches, 14 per cent of its locomotives, and 7.5 per cent of its goods wagons. Furthermore, new investments as well as repairs stagnated.

The number of buses fell to 11,000 in 1945 from 28,700 in 1936; motor-cars for hire to 7,900 from 37,000; and motor-lorries to 44,500 from 51,300. Actually, only 40 per cent of these vehicles were available for use in any event.

After the war the railways played a vital role in transporting passengers and foodstuffs to keep the nation from starvation. In fact, the National Railways in the immediate post-war period transported three times as many passengers as in 1936.

The heavy congestion of railway traffic after the war was relieved gradually as the national economy was stabilized. In 1950, the number of passengers carried by the J.N.R. reached 3,000 million, or about three times the pre-war figure, and the freight tonnage totalled 136 million tons, or 1.3 times the pre-war volume.

However, when the boom reached its peak in 1957, the inadequacies of the railway traffic proved a serious handicap to the nation's spectacular economic growth, and as much as two million tons of goods were held up at J.N.R.'s stations. Meanwhile, the total length of the J.N.R. rail lines had grown to 35,463 kilometres by 1959 from 27,813 kilometres in 1936, registering only a 27 per cent increase.

In land transport, motor-lorries are now making a greater contribution than before. J.N.R. has already adopted the door-to-door piggyback system connecting railways with motor-lorries, in goods transport. The retarded construction of highways, however, still places railways in an important position in long and medium-range transport. In big cities, railways constitute the most efficient means of transport for commuters.

The Japanese National Railways is now implementing a five-year expansion programme (started in fiscal 1961) the total cost of which is estimated at £975 million. This programme aims at raising the share of

double-tracks to 18·5 per cent from 13 per cent in March, 1961 and that of electrified lines to 22 from 12·9 per cent, to meet the rapid development of the nation's industries, population growth and the "leisure boom" resulting from the steady rise of personal income.

The new Tokaido Line linking Tokyo and Osaka, now under way, will cost £172·5 million and be completed by the 1964 Olympics in Tokyo. The existing Tokaido Line is the main artery of the Japanese railway system, accounting for three per cent of the total length of J.N.R's lines and 25 per cent of goods transport. The new Tokaido Line will be broad-gauged and electrified and cover the distance of about 500 kilometres between Tokyo and Osaka in three hours.

In Japan, there are also many private railways, which number 174, with their lines totalling 7,600 km. in length. In fiscal 1960 ending March 13th, 1961, they carried 7,166,480,000 passengers and 42,900,000 tons of goods.

Statistically speaking, every Japanese rode the National Railways 52 times a year, buses 64 times, and private railways 76 times. These figures show clearly the indispensable part private railways are playing in national life. Facing keen competition with buses, private railways are making great efforts for modernization and higher efficiency, and major companies are pushing on their five-year expansion programmes.

Motor-cars are now assuming greater importance in land transport. In March, 1961, the number of motor-cars totalled 3,575,000 units, or an increase of 25 times in 15 years (only 144,000 at the end of March, 1946). This sharp rise in number is expected to continue for some time to come. Heavy and light motor vehicles account for more than 80 per cent of the total. The so-called "people's cars" increased to 1,630,000 units.

The distance covered by motor transport is becoming larger and larger. The number of bus routes longer than 100 kilometres had increased to 156 by the end of March last year from 69 of five years before. The number of motor-truck routes larger than 200 kilometres increased to 803 from 98.

To alleviate traffic congestion, 109 kilometres of underground railways are being newly constructed in Tokyo (about 76 kilometres in Osaka and Nagoya). But already the need for further expansion of this project is felt keenly. As the underground railway construction is so costly (more than £2 million per kilometre) that substantial financial aid from the Government is strongly desired.

As for roads, the Japan Highway Public Corporation is taking the initiative in highway construction, for which project the Government has decided to appropriate £2,100 million for the 1961-65 period. With the Olympic Games just ahead, construction and expansion of roads are being expedited in Tokyo, while super-highways are also under construction throughout the country.

The Sino-Burmese Border Agreement


By M. D. STEPHENS, MA, FRGS

IN a discussion of the Sino-Indian border troubles a writer in the *New York Times*¹ referred to the fact that Peking "has ostentatiously settled a border dispute with Burma." This action towards Burma on the part of the Chinese was rather unexpected and it remains something of an enigma as to why the Western Powers have not taken greater note or why the Communists have not used it more for propaganda purposes. The regime in China has always been bellicose towards the other side in any of the former disputes it has had as its aggressive actions in Indochina, Korea and Tibet aptly demonstrate. Burma, with a large rice export, would seem to provide a tempting proposition for a country burdened with overpopulation.

In a 1946 edition of *Freedom*² published in Rangoon the sentiments were expressed that, "what with their teeming millions and their potential industrial power China and India will sandwich Burma between them. It is feared that circumstances beyond human control will compel the two countries to reach out hands of exploitation." Since these words were written India has proven herself more interested in her many domestic problems than in any ambitious external expansion. The same cannot be said of China. With her vigorous foreign policy China appeared likely to become an opponent of Burma. The latter had more underdeveloped farming potential than any other nation in Southeast Asia and China had a well-established claim to part of her territory. Why was it that what appeared inevitable did not take place? How did Burma escape the attentions of Peking's Communist imperialism? A closer look at the history of Sino-Burmese relations is revealing.

THE CHINESE IN BURMA

Before the Sino-Japanese War it had been estimated that perhaps a fifth of the Burmese economy was in the hands of the resident Chinese population. The Chinese controlled much of the trade in rice, timber and salt, but they were nowhere as commercially powerful as the British and Indians. They were less "noticeable" than their compatriots in such countries as Malaya, Thailand, Indochina and the Philippines. Unlike



The Sino-Burmese Border
Shaded areas are shown as territory of China in
Chinese Atlas

the Chinese in these countries the immigrants into Burma came to regard their new country more as "home." They might speak their own language amongst themselves, but they also had command of fluent Burmese.

Although there were anti-Chinese riots in Burma in 1931 the immigrants generally had good relations with the Burmese who affectionately called them "pauk paw" ("next of kin"). Such companionable sentiments are very commendable, but are rarely an advantage in a smaller Asian country's relations with China.

U Nu referred to the position of Burma in relation to her neighbours as "hemmed in like a tender gourd among the cactus." Being very much aware that the Union of Burma contained many minorities which, because of their nationalistic aspirations, could be easily exploited by an alien power wishing to make the situation difficult the Government has followed a policy of strict neutrality. It has made endeavours to remain on good terms with all nations. There is an isolationist tradition in Burma which is partly the outcome of all major invasions having exhausted themselves before they reached the Union, and also due to the excellent protection the northern mountains provide.

Despite the fact that Burma observed a policy of strict neutrality the Chinese Communist regime had a number of ready-made situations to exploit, the main ones being the rights of the Chinese minority in Burma and China's claim to part of the Union's territory. What was this border dispute over? During the Nineteenth Century the British authorities in Burma and the Chinese Imperial Government reached agreement on all but two sectors of their border territory. In the extreme north there was a triangular piece of land between the Rivers Mali Kha and Nmai Kha, and also in dispute was a strip two hundred miles in length which was to be found in the Wha region. Tinker³ writes that at this time "it cannot be said that these remote regions of trackless jungle posed any substantial problem: to both Chinese and Burmans it was an unknown land to which neither nation had the slightest desire to settle." But since the Chinese Revolution of 1911 there has been renewed interest in the region. The advent of the Nationalist regime in China led to a heightening of feeling in that country with regard to the border areas, which was further emphasized when the Chinese Communists came to power.

With an exploitable Chinese minority in Burma, a legitimate claim to part of the border region and an overwhelming power advantage the situation looked ripe for at least some good Communist propaganda, if not a Chinese take-over in the best Tibetian style. And yet Burma has managed to secure one of the most favourable agreements ever signed between a Communist and non-Communist power. Obviously there must be some reason behind the seemingly illogical actions of the Chinese.

POST-INDEPENDENCE BURMA

Despite territorial claims made by China relations between the Nationalist Government and Burma were cordial. The former was one of the sponsors of the new country when it made its entrance into the United Nations. But the Burmese Government could not afford to be sentimental in its foreign policy and when Nanking fell to the Communist forces in April of 1949 the Burmese ambassador remained there until his call to return to Rangoon in October. In December of 1949 the Burmese Government recognized the new order in China, the first country outside the Communist nations to do so. This latter move was made by the Burmese administration when the Communist party within the country was engaged in warfare with the Government.

Despite the apprehension of Burma where her large neighbour was concerned this factor did not stop her joining with the Security Council in condemning North Korean aggression in 1950. Of South Korea's position U Nu stated, "it won't do to simply stare at this state of affairs and tremble . . . when we joined the United Nations . . . what was foremost in our minds was the expectation of United Nation's assistance when our country is subjected to aggression by a stronger power." But in January of 1951 when the United States introduced a motion into the assembly branding China for her aggression in North Korea Burma voted against the American move; Burma and India were the only non-Communist powers to do so. The reason for Burma's hostility was that MacArthur's incursion into North Korea to them appeared to justify the Chinese retaliation. MacArthur's military policy dampened Burmese enthusiasm for the United Nations. The experience of Korea convinced them that they would have to avoid at almost any cost the possibility of becoming a battlefield for the Western Nations-Communist conflict.

At this time Burma was perplexed by the activities of Chinese Nationalist K.M.T. irregulars who were operating against Communist China from the more remote parts of Burma. Burma feared that this raiding would provide China with the perfect excuse for aggressive action against her. The K.M.T. troops were based at Kengtung, the Bhamo District and the Wa States to which China had some claim. Feelings ran high against the United States as the Burmese Government was well aware that Chiang Kai-shek's forces could not operate without the bolstering American aid. In the battles of the Spring of 1953 much of the equipment captured from the K.M.T. was American army issue, and three white soldiers were killed who were believed to have been United States citizens. Burma terminated American aid as she felt it was absurd to accept such when America was supposedly encouraging the enemies of the Union.

In March of 1953 the Burmese representative at the United Nations presented an account of K.M.T. activities to the Secretary-General which also proposed "to condemn the Kuomintang Government of Formosa for the said acts of aggression, and to take all necessary steps to ensure immediate cessation of the acts of aggression by the Kuomintang Government against the Union of Burma." The Formosan reaction was mainly one of bland denial, but their chargé d'affaires in Thailand admitted that the forces in Burma were Nationalist, his excuse being that they were operating in undemarcated territory. A counter-resolution on the matter was submitted by Mexico and accepted, mainly because it was milder in tone than that of Burma. Many of the neutralist powers in the world noted that it was only if the aggressor was Communist that energetic action was forthcoming from the Western nations on the behalf of the smaller nations.

What was of great importance throughout this struggle of Burma to rid herself of Chiang Kai-shek's forces was the attitude of Communist China. At no time during Burma's embarrassment did the Peking Government show anything but patience and sympathy; not unnaturally this gained the gratitude of the Burmese people. In 1954 U Nu visited China and on his return presented some suggestions for the solution of the problem of Formosa which caused much annoyance amongst the officials of the United States State Department. U Nu wished America to withdraw her forces from the area so that "then the possibility of peacefully liberating Taiwan would arise." U Nu stressed his desire to visit America, but this hint was ignored by the United States.

Despite the fact that Communist China had been scrupulously fair in her public dealings with Burma, there had been a large influx of Chinese over the border and not all of these people could be classed as political refugees. The Communist Government was careful to see that the Chinese in Burma had frequent reminders of their homelands; despite the good relations prevailing between Burma and China the latter encouraged the growth of a fifth column within the boundaries of the small neighbours. Obviously this was an exploitable safeguard against any deterioration in the feeling between the two countries.

THE DELIMITATION OF THE SINO-BURMESE BOUNDARY

When U Nu visited China during his Premiership in December of 1954 there appeared to be more problems needing urgent attention in both countries than just the question of the disputed areas on Burma's northern border. On December 12th, 1954 at the conclusion of U Nu's visit a

Joint Communique was published in which it was stated, "in view of the incomplete delimitation of the boundary line between China and Burma the two Premiers held it necessary to settle this question in a friendly spirit at an appropriate time through normal diplomatic channels." This sentence is fairly representative of the somewhat negative attitude which has dominated the history of the boundary between Burma and China. The "appropriate time" could be postponed indefinitely.

A year after the publication of this statement the matter was forcefully re-opened by a clash between Burmese and Chinese troops at Wakha in the Wa State during November of 1955. According to the Sino-British agreement of 1941 this was Burmese territory, but the Peking Government felt that such was invalid as it had been imposed by the British when China was weak from warfare with Japan. Also, the Chinese claimed that a British note dated April 10th, 1911 acknowledged that Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum belonged to China. The Chinese troops would not move until Union forces vacated these areas and also a large area in the northern undetermined section of the Burma-China border.

The Burmese were not surprised by China's claims to Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum, but they were upset by the postscript demanding much of Kachin State. A Joint Boundary Commission was set up to study the whole question. The Burmese Administration stated emphatically that it governed "all those territories which had been administered by the British Government, that these areas included Hpimaw, Kangfang, and Gawlum, and that they had at no time advanced into any area which was not already administered by the British as part of Burma at the time of the transfer of power."⁴ Pending the examination of the history of Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum the Government of the Union offered to withdraw the garrison at Hpimaw. With the approval of the Burmese Prime Minister U Ba Swe who had replaced him U Nu accepted an invitation from Chou En-lai to visit Peking to discuss the boundary problem. Before he left it was decided that U Nu should sue for the recognition of the boundary as the British had left it.

Despite having certain justifiable complaints regarding the 1941 boundary agreement with Britain China was willing to accept it as part of a general settlement. What the Peking Government asked of the Burmese was that the Namwan Assigned Tract lease should be abrogated, although special consideration of the Burmese highway in the region would be taken, and that Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum should be returned to her.

U Nu brought back his report to Rangoon and a few days later returned to Peking after consultation with the Burmese Government. At this time it was hoped in Rangoon that if the Burmese gave up their claim to

Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum the Chinese would be prepared to allow Burma to retain the Namwan Tract. U Nu immediately came into conflict with the Head of the Kachin State who opposed any idea of allowing the Peking Government to administer Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum. The opposition was reported by U Nu to Premier Chou En-lai and, after a final appeal to the Kachin leaders, U Nu returned to Rangoon with the Chinese proposals asking for the return of Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum and that the boundary line should run along the watershed between N'Mai Kha and the Salween River; this last point was a Chinese concession.

The Chinese regime had ample justification in both its claim on the Namwan Tract, which had been held on perpetual lease, and Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum. The Namwan Tract had been recognized as a Chinese territory by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1894 and the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1897; under the latter the British had persuaded the Chinese Government to rent the area to them for a sum of one thousand rupees per annum. Although Burma's only route between her Shan and Kachin States runs through the Namwan Tract she was well aware of China's right to the region and had already planned an other highway to the west.

The Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1894 and the Agreement of 1897 related to only that part of the Sino-Burmese boundary from the High Conical Peak (latitude 25 degrees and 35 minutes N.) to the tripartite junction of the Burmese, Chinese and Laotian borders. The 1894 Convention stated (Article IV): "It is agreed that the settlement and delimitation of that portion of the frontier which lies to the north of latitude 25 degrees and 35 minutes N. shall be reserved for future understanding between the High Contracting Parties when the features and condition of the country are more accurately known." Great Britain felt that the best boundary would be between the Salween and N'Mai Rivers, but China claimed that the boundary should be farther west. After further negotiation and surveying of the disputed area in 1905 the British Minister in Peking was instructed to get the Chinese Government to agree to "the watershed between the Irrawaddy and Salween basins up to the confines of Tibet" as the boundary with an annual payment not exceeding 1,500 rupees as compensation. This suggestion was declined by the Chinese Government and in 1906 the British Minister in Peking was instructed to inform the Chinese Administration that Britain would occupy and recognize this boundary anyway.

In 1910 the Chinese Chief of Teng-keng raided Hpimaw and, despite protests from Britain, the Chinese Government refused to take action as they did not acknowledge it as British territory. In January of 1911 a

British expeditionary force occupied Hpimaw, but withdrew after two weeks when negotiations were opened in Peking between the Government and the British Minister. A British Note of April 11th, 1911 rejected all Chinese claims to villages west of the N'Mai Kha-Salween watershed with the exception of Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum. The Lieutenant-Governor of Burma, Sir Harvey Adamson, considered at the time that the Chinese had a better claim to Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum than his own administration and informed the British Government of India; he felt that re-occupation would be an act of "indefensible brigandage." Adamson's idealism was not shared by the British Government who felt the strategic need for the areas and so on February 1st, 1913 Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum were annexed. There is little doubt that the Chinese claims were more than valid under the circumstances.

On February 4th, 1957 the Burmese Premier U Ba Swe addressed a note to Chou En-lai offering China 56 square miles (Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum) and mentioning the possibility of the Namwan Tract being assigned to Burma on a permanent basis. When U Nu became Prime Minister again in 1957 he met Chou En-lai to discuss the proposals of U Ba Swe. The Chinese Premier expressed the opinion that it would be unreasonable to expect his Government to hand over the Namwan region without other territory as compensation. Chou En-lai suggested the area inhabited by the Panghung and Panglao tribes as a suitable exchange.

In July of 1957 the Burmese Ambassador in Peking received an official statement from Chou En-lai concerning the boundary dispute. According to this China claimed 186 square miles of territory in the area of Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum, and 86 square miles of the Panghung-Panglao region in return for the Namwan Assigned Tract. Justice U Myint was despatched to Peking to explain that these proposals were unacceptable. The 56 square miles of the region of Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum mentioned in U Ba Swe's letter and the difficulties of exchanging the Panghung-Panglao area for the Namwan Tract were again stated by the Union Government. Chou En-lai felt that the problem of the northern boundary needed further investigation before he accepted the principle of delimitation by the watershed, and therefore proposed that a joint survey team should work in the region. On the general question of the border the Chinese Government felt it should "be turned over to a joint commission which could meet periodically, and send out teams to carry out necessary surveys, including those of the northernmost sector" (Report of U Nu).

In December of 1957 Deputy Prime Ministers U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein went on a goodwill visit to Peking. To them Chou En-lai proposed that the Namwan Tract should only be given permanently to the Burmese

if in return China received the Panghung and Panglao tribal areas. The Chinese Premier did modify his views on the northern boundary by agreeing that this section should, with the exception of the Taron River area, follow the watershed; there was to be, however, a reservation that the boundary might depart the watershed so as to look after the interests of some of the monasteries and medicinal herb producing areas "which are the property of the inhabitants to the north of the watershed." Again Chou En-lai suggested a Boundary Commission to "survey the Sino-Burmese boundary from Izurazi Pass to the Indian border, and also to settle, step by step, the question of the Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang area to be ceded to China, and also that of exchanging the Namwan Assigned Tract for the Panghung and Panglao tribal areas falling to the west side of the 1941 line."⁵

The Burmese Foreign Affairs Cabinet Sub-Committee which considered the Chinese proposals in February of 1958 felt that the question of trying to delimit the areas to be given for monasterial use and for the herb producers would inevitably lead to endless squabbling. The Burmese Ambassador to Peking was sent back to China to prevail upon the administration there to be content with Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum, and if this was not sufficient to see if the present state of affairs at that time with regard to the Namwan Tract could not continue (i.e. permanent lease). The Union leaders considered that the Chinese Government should accept the idea of a watershed boundary in the north without other conditions. In a letter from Chou En-lai dated July 30th, 1958 these proposals were declined and the ones suggested to the Deputy Prime Ministers adhered to.

A new Burmese administration came to power under the leadership of Bogyoke Ne Win who prepared to make fresh advances to China. General Ne Win felt that the boundary from Izurazi to the Indian frontier (with the inevitable exception of the Taron Valley) should follow the watershed, that Hpimaw, Kangfang and Gawlum should be returned to China and that the Namwan Assigned Tract should be exchanged for the Panghung-Panglao tribal areas to the west of the 1941 line. Ne Win managed to persuade the Shan leaders to agree to the transfer of the Panghung and Panglao areas. He proposed that of the 86 square miles of the tribal areas asked for by China 62 square miles should be offered. General Ne Win's scheme for the solution of the problem was sent to the Chinese Government on June 4th, 1959.

The Chinese reply received by the Burmese Government and dated September 24th, 1959 proposed that their suggestions of July 30th, 1958 and those of the Burmese administration should be used for further negotiations. Ne Win's reply of November 4th, 1959 "explained that

ever since Parliament had entrusted him with the responsibility for carrying on the administration of the country, he had been considering what further step . . . might be (taken) to bring about a fair and reasonable settlement of the Sino-Burmese boundary question . . . After long and patient endeavour . . . he was able to come forward with a compromise which had been embodied in . . . (the) proposals of June 4th, 1959. Bogoyoke Ne Win emphasized that it was only his position as a non-partisan Prime Minister which enabled him to secure the agreement of the major political parties and of the State Governments concerned to this offer being made.”⁶ Ne Win stressed the idea that the Burmese had gone further along the route towards satisfying the Chinese wishes than ever before in the past and concluded by saying that if the Chinese were willing he would visit Peking as soon as possible and discuss and formalize an agreement.

On December 22nd, 1959 Ne Win received a formal invitation to visit Chou En-lai during the following month. On January 23rd, 1960 the Burmese delegation arrived in Peking. On January 28th, 1960 the Sino-Burmese Boundary Agreement was concluded. In the northern area it was decided that the boundary should follow the watershed except where it crossed the Taron River Basin; this was as the Burmese had requested. From Izurazi to the High Conical Peak the boundary was also to follow the watershed with the exception of the transfer area of Hpimaw-Kangfang-Gawlum. The Namwan Tract covering 80 square miles was to become Burmese territory in exchange for the Panghung-Panglao area, although the exact amount involved in the latter, and also the Hpimaw-Kangfang-Gawlum region, had yet to be settled. China agreed to recognize, in the light of the situation, the need for a joint committee to finally agree upon the ultimate size. China also agreed to acknowledge the 1941 boundary and to surrender her right under that agreement to participate in the mining enterprises in the Lufang region.

Thus, after many years of negotiation and vacillation, for the first time China and Burma had a reasonably well-defined boundary. After such gentlemanly behaviour it is not surprising that the latter should feel friendly in its disposition towards its large neighbour.

CONCLUSION

In the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* for Sunday, March 12th, 1961 it was reported that “the peaceful student demonstration in Rangoon turned into one of the worst riots the city has ever seen. Two persons were killed and fifty-three wounded as some three thousand angry demonstrators stoned the American Embassy. The Burmese were riled over reports that Nationalist Chinese guerrillas, operating in the jungle near the Burma-Thailand

border, were being supplied with American-made arms." Five years before this outbreak might have signified only fear of retaliation from the Communist Chinese, but under the new conditions that prevailed such a simple explanation would not suffice. The biggest hurdle inhibiting Sino-Burmese relations was the disputed border which could have provided China with an excuse for aggression. Similarly the activities of the Nationalist irregulars was also a possible vehicle for Communist hostilities. Surprisingly the Peking Government acted with restraint whilst Burma endeavoured to crush Chiang Kai-shek's forces. On the question of delimiting the border areas China acted in a manner which could provide many of the Democratic powers with a lesson in good neighbourliness.

After such excellent treatment from the Chinese the Union must have felt more self-assured in its relations with Peking. Even allowing for the possibility that the demonstration in Rangoon in 1961 was Communist inspired, it is possible that the "angry demonstrators" were, in fact, "angry" and not just fearful. China's treatment of Burma must have won her a great deal of support within the Union.

Was Peking's generous policy towards Burma merely a lavish propaganda move? In a speech made by Chou En-lai at a State Banquet given in his honour by Burmese Premier U Nu on April 16th, 1960 he said that, "China and Burma are both peace-loving countries. They are both engaged in long-term economic construction and stand in need of a peaceful international environment and of strengthened co-operation with their neighbours. Solidarity and co-operation are in the fundamental interests of our two peoples." This was part of a lengthy address in a similar vein which reads like a propaganda speech and even attacks liberally "the imperialists." But why was not more use made of the material available if it was all done in the interests of propaganda? In the weekly *Peking Review* for the six months following the publishing of the details of the Sino-Burmese Agreement on February 2nd, 1960 there are but two articles on the settlement, a total of seven pages out of over a thousand. Possibly the Communist regime considered that word of their generosity would get to the ears of other nations without their assistance, but if this was so it would be the first time that anything of such a nature had been left to chance. To the Chinese it would be like having the winning lottery ticket and then relying upon somebody else to tell the organization concerned of your claim. Obviously China may have had propaganda in mind when she signed the border agreement, but it cannot have been the only reason for her actions. It may have been partly an effort to re-establish China's good name throughout Asia after her over-aggressive foreign policy.

Another factor which probably had the major effect in the surprisingly rapid agreement over the disputed border areas must have been the knowledge that General Ne Win was in the unusual position of leading a multi-party administration which would soon be replaced by another cabinet composed of members of one political party. Ne Win was astute in his approach to Peking and pointed out that he had, because of this reason, been able to make far more concessions to the Chinese than his successor would be able to. One gets the impression that Ne Win's approach to the Chinese Government went something like: "I am soon to be replaced by another administration which will come from but one political party and be therefore less flexible in its outlook and its ability to achieve any unified support amongst the various people with interests in the border situation; therefore you (i.e., the Chinese) had better quickly agree to the terms that I have suggested as they are superior to any offer you are likely to receive in the future." Of course this is only a hypothesis, but it seems like the sort of move a clever politician would have made under the circumstances. U Nu in his speech to the Burmese Parliament following the border agreement stated that the "main credit on our side for this settlement belongs to one man. That one man is Bogyoke Ne Win." Obviously U Nu considered that his colleague was the main driving force behind the Burmese success.

Writing in the *New York Times* Barbara Ward stated that, "few ex-colonial peoples put . . . China into the category of imperialists. They may distrust . . . (her) size and (her) pretensions. Violent suppression in Tibet has certainly had its impact on Asia. But still the Communist powers are not envisaged as steady, systematic plotters for world domination.⁷ It is so difficult to place oneself in the position of an Asian faced by Communist China. Perhaps the Sino-Burmese border agreement does not seem unusual to an Indonesian or a Burmese? The China that makes an amicable settlement with Burma after swallowing up Tibet is an enigma to Europe and America, but Asia would appear to understand.

Possibly another reason for the success of the Sino-Burmese negotiations was due to the Chinese population in Burma being small.

In 1956 Burma had a population of 19,677,000 of which perhaps 350,000 were Chinese. Malaya in 1957 had a population of 6,276,915 persons of which 2,326,498 were Chinese. As the Communist campaign in Malaya appears to have failed despite the large Chinese minority Peking may well think that a similar campaign against Burma would be futile. With a defeat in one area comes a need for new tactics in another.

Burma's Chinese are practically all merchants and artisans who would find less appeal in the Marxist dogma than the labourers of Malaya. To this can be added the fact that the Chinese in Burma have been absorbed

into the life of the country to a far greater extent than in most of the other areas to which they have emigrated. The Chinese of Burma think of themselves as citizens of the Union rather than expatriates of China. From Peking's point of view Burma is an unusually unattractive proposition for typical Communist tactics. Unless China indulged in outright conquest, which would alienate the rest of Asia as she has no legal claims to Burma as she did to Tibet, success would well-nigh be impossible. By extending the hand of friendship the Communists possibly hope to reap greater rewards than their more aggressive tactics could provide. Judging by the response of Burma their decision was a wise one.

The reasons for the success of the Sino-Burmese negotiations will remain something of a mystery until Peking should decide to publish an official report, an event which may never take place. At present the episode merely represents a vehicle for academic speculation, and a demonstration of the quality of diplomatic resources available to Burma.

¹ *New York Times*, February 19th, 1961

² *Freedom*, May 6th, 1946.


³ H. Tinker: "The Union of Burma."

⁴ Speech delivered by U Nu to the Burmese Chamber of Deputies on April 28th, 1960.

⁵ U Nu in *Burma*, Vol. IX, No. 4, for October, 1960.

⁶ U Nu in a speech before the Chamber of Deputies on April 28th, 1960.

⁷ *New York Times*, March 12th, 1961.



Banaras Brocades

By SUVIRA KAPUR

THE origins of the making of brocades in India is steeped in history. Our craftsmen have expressed their souls in the makings of "Kinkhab," showing a very high level of artistic excellence and beauty. The derivation of the word "Kinkhab" (brocade) has been a source of most interesting speculation, according to the Persian and Arabic scholars, since "Kin" means little and "Khwab" means sleep or dream, the brocade was given the name "Kinkhab" because though beautiful it was so rough that it would disturb the sleep of the wearer. Hoffman has a more credible explanation, he attributes the origin of the word to the Chinese language, in which "Kin" means gold and "Hwa" means flower—a gold flower.



The silver and gold industry in brocades flourished, there are references to it in the ancient tales of the Jatakas. Sanskrit books, particularly the works of Kalidasa and Banabhatta contain detailed descriptions of richly brocaded cloths in manifold designs.

During the period of the Mahabharata, rich brocades and shawls formed a part of the presents brought to Yudisthira by feudatory princes. Even under the Mughal kings the industry was heavily patronized by the royal court and flourished. Banaras and Gujrat became the two well known centres of brocaded cloth, whether worked in lengths or to enrich sarees and turbans. Historian of Mughal times has listed at least two varieties of brocade specially favoured by Emperor Akbar.

For centuries the craft has been purely hereditary, passing from father to son for generations. Even though with the change in times, mills are making cheaper stuff, the genuine hand-made brocade has many buyers at home and abroad.

In the brocade market of Banaras called "Kunj Gali," sarees and lengths of brocaded silks as well as brocades of exquisite workmanship are bought and sold in the traditional informal atmosphere.

The shop-keeper sits on the floor and invites the customers to do the same. The entire area of the floor is covered over with spotlessly white cotton sheets, and the customer is obliged to take off the shoes, before settling down to a feast for the eyes. The bargaining continues in comfort, lounging against bolsters to rest the arms and often chewing the traditional "pan-supari (betelnuts)."

"Kunj-gali," works on a system of its own that includes the individual weaver-trader as well as the representative of big business houses in export trade in India and abroad. There are shops with large stocks and others that function only from day to day, selling to the customer, what they take over from the weaver, retaining only a small commission for themselves.

The bigger shops practically employ the weavers, advancing them money and materials in return for their produce. There are also some newly started design centres, sponsored by the Handicrafts Board which give loans as well as a sense of direction to the weaver.

There is at least one exporting house that determines the designs and quality of silk and gold thread used by the weaver. They are using special colourfast dyes as well as gold-thread which is washable and does not tarnish. Apart from the traditional designs, which are being copied from museum pieces, new articles are being adapted to meet the modern needs and fashions.

The Banaras brocade market has a deserted appearance during day-time, when all the weavers who live in the suburbs or in the round about

villages, are busy working diligently on the loom. Sometimes the whole family joins in to help.

After sunset, the weavers with their black oblong boxes are hard at work producing a cascade of gorgeous sarees of great variety and a riot of colour—vivid reds, orange, peacock blue, mustard yellow, and rich emerald greens with interwoven designs and with paloos and borders heavy with gold. Lengths of brocades; heavy silks vying with those of gossamer thinness worked with lacy gold. Silks shot with contrasting colours and with just enough gold to set them off.

The designs are a mixture of the traditional and the new. The skill applied to the creation of these beautiful hand made textiles has come down from father to son over the years. The colours too, the subtle shades and tones, are largely the products of old recipes.

Review

THE STATE OF PAKISTAN. *By L. F. Rushbrook Williams. (Faber and Faber). 254 pages, 25 sh. Maps, Index and Illustrations*

REVIEWED BY SIR OLAF CAROE

SOME may feel this book to partake too much of the nature of a panegyric on the regime in Pakistan, but there was a balance to be redressed, and a book of this kind has long been overdue. It would be hard to improve on the short, sharp emphasis of an opening passage on the origins of the State: "It [Pakistan] stemmed mainly from the differences between the Muslim and the Hindu ways of life which the previous history of both communities had engendered: its precipitating cause was the British decision to hand over the power they had mostly taken from the Muslims to all the people of the sub-continent. Such power had never been shared in the past between Muslims and Hindus: the Muslims had been dominant until both were subjected to a third

force—the British. When the British threw in their hand, and it became clear that authority would rest where the counting of heads might set it, the Hindus failed to convince the Muslims that they would receive a fair deal under Hindu majority rule. Accordingly the Muslims, led by a man of genius, struggled for, and obtained, a home-land of their own.”

In these phrases, succinct as befits a *quondam* Fellow of All Souls, Mr. Rushbrook Williams sets out the reasons for the birth of Pakistan in 1947. Of course, like all generalizations, this too over-simplifies—there were for instance Muslims such as the Khan brothers, mentioned below, who thought otherwise, and Hindus who were anxious to compromise—but it is likely to bear the test of time.


As would be expected from one whose connexion with the sub-continent goes back almost half a century, the author has striven to escape charges of partisanship. That a part of his mind and spirit is engaged unto the India of today is clear enough from many passages, as, for example, his setting of Mr. Nehru's foreign policies against those of Pakistan. He is able to go behind this façade and show what lies behind the inevitable divergence of Hindu and Muslim thought in such matters. It is timely that this contrast should be drawn just at a moment when the realities of living in a dangerous world are breaking in on both successor-States. That no set of men or traditions—certainly not our own—is free of ambivalence Mr. Rushbrook Williams is well aware. In discussing the obvious contradictions between Gandhian philosophy and Indian action in (say) Kashmir or Goa, he cannot have forgotten the theme of Krishna's debate with Arjuna in the *Bhagavad Gita*. The same sort of comment might be made on the Pathan tribal incursions into Kashmir in 1947–48.

On his chosen stage of Pakistan's internal policies it may be felt that the tones of this book are too clear and sharp; there is much black or white, too little *chiaroscuro*. This, we are led to feel, is an epic with President Ayub as the hero. On any measure the President has great achievements to his credit, and all who know him acclaim in him a certain grand simplicity and forthrightness. (I use the word *simple* rather in the sense of the Persian *sāda* than in our own). There is a case for singing his praises in tones of ringing admiration. But not the least of his qualities is a true and engaging modesty, and it is questionable how far this is a virtue which can be adequately conveyed in any contemporary account.

Take one point at random. The Pakistani press is fond of describing the President *tout court* as a Pathan, and Mr. Rushbrook Williams follows this fashion. It is true that he is indeed of Tarin Afghan stock—the Tarins are of the same branch as the Durranis—settled in Mughal times in the lower part of Hazara. But the Hazara Pathans, living as they do east of the Indus, have long been assimilated to the language and customs

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of the north Punjab. It is precisely in this ability to interpret in his person the combined traditions of the Salt Range and the Frontier that there lies a great part of Ayub's strength. And that is why integration, and not separation, has become his watchword.

For the rest, this book contains a lively and sympathetic account of the system of Basic Democracies, and the use of that system to set up the Electoral Colleges entrusted with the duties of electing the parliaments at the centre and in the two wings of the country. This is perhaps President Ayub's main contribution to political thought: to those who hanker after direct elections on the Westminster model the answer might be that no representative system which does not have its roots in local affairs is soundly based, and members of local bodies who are *ex officio* electors to parliament will bring a lively awareness of reality down to the grass-roots. How secure, it may be asked, is the vast Indian adult-franchise electorate of over 200 million voters, electing direct to the legislatures? Is it made up of men and women with a grasp of the meaning and value of the vote, or is it a great congeries of flocks driven by the shepherds to cross sets of pre-ordained hurdles, or breaking in panic through their fences? President Ayub prefers a system of fixing responsibility for national elections on local notables, themselves elected, as more likely to secure an intelligent electorate, working "within its horizons," than any direct system. Mr. Rushbrook Williams does well to emphasize that this system too is based on one-man- and one-woman-one-vote, in the lower tier.

Other chapters of interest describe the *impasse* over Kashmir, the reasons for the failure of Pakistani politicians to work institutions modelled on Westminster, and the efforts, starting from scratch but remarkably successful, to build an economic element of industry into predominantly rural societies.

Some great Pakistanis seem to this reviewer to receive inadequate attention. Prominent among these are the Khan brothers—Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who for some reason disappears from the record after 1947 but is still very much alive to trouble Pakistani consciences as he did British, and his brother Dr. Khan Sahib, first Chief Minister of West Pakistan, courageous leader and man of honour to the death. On the other hand it is refreshing to find a fair assessment of Iskander Mirza, Pakistan's first President, as not only "a warm-hearted man, an excellent sportsman, and a generous host" but one to whose courage in making the break in 1958 it may be thought his country owes more than has always been admitted.

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
1. By lectures on current questions affecting those countries and publication of the same.
2. By providing opportunities for the free discussion of important questions affecting India, Pakistan, and Burma.
3. By promoting friendly contact between the peoples of these countries and of Britain through the medium of social and other gatherings.
4. Generally by the promulgation of reliable information regarding the countries named.

The Association is essentially non-official in character and has no connexion with any political party. It seeks to provide an open platform for the consideration of current problems relating to India, Pakistan, and Burma. It welcomes as members all those who are interested in their welfare and progress.

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
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
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
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The Sino-Indian Frontier Dispute*

By SIR OLAF CAROE, KCSI, KCIE

THIS is an extraordinarily difficult subject because several times I have had to think again during the last week, if not during the last day, about what I was going to say, but, in fact, what it amounts to is an analysis which has been overtaken by events. As our Chairman has said, I think I have a bird's eye view, not only of the North-West Frontier, where I used to be, but also of the North-East Frontier and, in fact, of the whole of India's perimeter. I dealt with these questions over a period of about ten years between 1936 and 1947, and hope to have kept up-to-date more or less since, going back to the Sub-Continent. I thought perhaps the best way of dealing with this question, this enormous question which has overtaken us now, would be to show you a number of maps, with a few pictures to give you an idea of the sort of terrain involved. I will go through the maps, explaining them as I go, and then when I have finished I shall put up a sort of general map and try and pick up the threads towards the end.

Part of my talk, I think rightly, ought to be historical in some sense, so as to give you the background of this tremendous question. Before I start showing maps I would like to say this: I imagine that there is not a single person in this room who does not feel deep concern over this assault on the integrity of India, not one. All of us, I think, feel deeply as if we were Indians, or Pakistanis for that matter. I think it is also worth saying that any assault on the perimeter of the Sub-Continent must be a matter which interests both the successor States of the British *Hukumat*, or *Raj* if you prefer to call it—it depends whether you are an Indian or a Pakistani. I think we all feel that.

Let us start by going through the slides. The first slide is a very general orographical picture of the Sub-Continent. It has got the external political frontiers in it; they are not very clear on this map because it is orographical—a pedantic word showing the mountains and the plains in colour. It is a Royal Geographical Society map, of pre-1914 vintage before the McMahon Line was drawn, but it does more or less show the frontier in this area according to the McMahon Line, proving that even before

* This talk was illustrated with a large number of maps presented on slides. It, therefore, contains a number of references to maps which it is impossible to reproduce in full in this transcript. The two maps published cannot fully cover all the references made, but an endeavour has been made to include in it the more significant place-names.

1914 the general attitude of British cartographers, at any rate, was that on that frontier, as indeed elsewhere in the Indian world, the frontier of India lies on the crest of the Himalaya. All of us, I think, as children—even as children—knew that the Sub-Continent of India and Pakistan was divided from the rest of Asia by the crest of this great mountain range—it is the greatest in the world—and we had that sort of general idea. We knew that on the other side Tibet was the country that was marked in our maps. Whether Tibet was part of China we certainly were not sure, but I think it is worth while making this point, namely, that everybody in this country from their earliest geography lesson has always thought of the Sub-Continent as divided from the rest of Asia by the Himalaya and, of course, up in the north it goes farther than the Himalaya up to the Karakoram and almost to the Kuen Lun.

The next slide is not orographical and is also a Royal Geographical Society map of 1912, that is, before the McMahon Line was drawn and it shows the frontier, not right down on the Assam plains, but starting from the north-east corner of Bhutan near Tawang, thence going along up on the mountains, very nearly up into the big bend of the Brahmaputra (called the Tsangpo in Tibet). It also shows this great belt, what is known as the Aksai Chin bulge, which China is now claiming and into which China has advanced.

The third slide is a map published by the Government of India in an atlas they produced not very many years ago showing the north of the Sub-Continent on a larger scale. You will see here certain shaded areas representing the claims of the Chinese. Here there is a tiny shaded area in what is still called the U.P.—we called it the United Provinces, now Uttar Pradesh—one or two little bits of shadow where the Chinese have also got claims and the enormous area between what came to be known as the McMahon Line (the external frontier) and the line at the foothills along the Brahmaputra river in the valley of Assam. The whole of that area represents a Chinese claim. (I shall put this map back on the screen when I have finished the slides).

FIRST ENCROACHMENTS


The first areas of encroachment, curiously enough, were in the little areas, Barahoti and another place called Nilang—I know this area, I have walked about in it—and there are a lot of passes between where the Sutlej breaks through the hills near Simla and the corner of Nepal, where the Chinese claim that Tibet used to extend south of the passes and they have certain claims in that region. And that, interestingly enough, is the part where the first encroachments—looked at from the Indian

point of view—took place in 1955 and 1956. The next encroachments took place when the Chinese built a road across from Sinkiang into Tibet; some of them came that way before they had built a proper road when they over-ran Tibet in 1950. Not only did they come from China proper, but they entered from the north also. Later they built a road on this alignment, probably starting it about 1956 or 1957, and very little got out about it. This is very high terrain, from 15,000 to 17,000 feet above the sea and practically uninhabited, but it has always been shown—as I will demonstrate later—on old maps as part of the dependencies of Kashmir which became part of India a long time ago.


Before I leave this map, I would like to make one other point, and that is that this frontier question is best conceived in four parts. First come the frontiers of Jammu and Kashmir, the northern frontier facing towards Sinkiang and the eastern frontier facing towards Tibet. A large part of the northern frontier as far as the Karakoram Pass is the frontier of Gilgit and Baltistan, and is in Pakistan occupation, in fact, regarded by the Pakistanis as part of Pakistan. This is area I. Then you get the part which is along the frontier of what we used to call the Simla Hill States, the Punjab and the U.P. (Himachal Pradesh is the old Simla Hill States). Then come the districts of Garwhal and Almora of the U.P. which run up to the part, as I said before, where the first encroachments took place in 1956. So that is Area II.

ISOLATION ATTEMPTS

Then you get Area III, the frontiers of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. Nepal, of course, is an independent State, but it is part of the Indian world, its rulers and most of its people are Hindus, though there are Buddhists, including people of Tibetan stock in the upper valleys, known as Bhotias. But it is a majority Hindu State and it is certainly part of the Indian world, of which the frontier has always been regarded as running more or less along the crest of the Himalaya. There are one or two deviations which I have not got time to go into now. Sikkim used to be one of the Indian States, as they were called, in the time of British rule. These, as you all know, were absorbed after the renaissance of the new India in 1947. But Sikkim, being a frontier State, still retains a certain status which is not unlike the old status of the Indian State in the British period. It is part of India, but it has a certain kind of local autonomy and it still has a Maharaja. Then there is Bhutan, which is in special treaty relations. It was in special treaty relations with the British during the time of British rule and that treaty was renewed by the Government of India after 1947, and roughly speaking the position is that Bhutan is a protected State, i.e.,



In these sketch maps the areas of Chinese claims are roughly indicated by shading. The frontier is divided into four sectors. Above: Sectors I and II. Right: Sectors III and IV. Sector III includes Nepal, an independent State but part of the Indian world.



its defence and foreign relations are an Indian responsibility. I will not be going to deal much with Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, so I want to say now that they occupy a very special relationship to this question because the Chinese have made a great point of fixing with Nepal a frontier which roughly corresponds with the traditional frontier, as it always has been known in this region, along the crest of Himalaya. They have made a very special point of doing that. In the case of Sikkim and Bhutan, when there was a joint committee of Chinese and Indian officials set up in 1960 and 1961, to see if there was any common ground between the different standpoints, the Chinese refused to discuss, in this committee, the frontier of Sikkim and Bhutan; they absolutely refused to do it. And, as you know, there have been negotiations between the Chinese and the Government of Pakistan for fixing the frontier of what we might call Pakistan-held Kashmir with Sinkiang, and the effect has been to isolate India. You see they refused to negotiate over Sikkim and Bhutan, they fixed a frontier with Nepal and Burma, and are trying to negotiate one with Pakistan, isolating India. As for Burma, the McMahon Line covers its northern frontier so that the Chinese have been quite inconsistent in their treatment of Burma as regards the frontier as compared with their treatment of the north-east frontier with India. The effect has been to isolate India, and I leave it to you to draw your conclusions over that.

A MISLEADING MAP

Area iv of this frontier is the McMahon Line along the north-east frontier where this very heavy fighting has been going on. Before I go any further I must take exception to a map which appeared in *The Times* on November 21st, which in my view is extremely misleading. The map, which was on the middle page, had the caption "Tibetan Frontiers before 1914." It showed the line at the foothills as the frontier of Tibet before 1914. Now it looks to me as though *The Times* has been indoctrinated by China. Of all the National dailies that appeared today—some of them have rather good maps, particularly the *Daily Mail*—not one of them repeated this error. Why on earth *The Times*, which has always prided itself on being so well informed on foreign correspondence, should publish a thing which definitely supports Chinese claims against a member of the Commonwealth, I think I must leave it to the audience to judge. The paper actually shows the frontier before 1914 down here; it never was. The Tibetans never penetrated this area, except for one or two monasteries right up in the north of it (Tawang was one of them), where monks levied certain monastic dues. The fact of the matter is that this area was a tribal, sort of semi-autonomous, area on the frontier of Assam, very much like,



An aerial view of a forward area near Bomdila in NEFA, showing the difficult mountainous terrain mantled by dense forests. The road on the right was made by the Border Road Organization.

in some respects, the tribal belt which I have so much cause to know about on the North-West Frontier where the Khyber Pass and so on are situated. The truth is really that it is only quite recently that the European, the Western, idea of a precise definition of frontiers has begun to correspond at all to actualities in Asia. There were right through the nineteenth century and even later areas which were not administered by one empire or another, one kingdom or another kingdom, a lot of tribal areas which maintained a factual independence to a large extent over which, as it was, only the shadow of the neighbouring imperial power extended. Such was the tribal belt on the North-West Frontier of pre-partition India and the frontier here. At the same time they were shown politically in British times as under British political control and represented by shading in maps.

This is a Chinese map and I put it in particularly because it is supposed to depict the maximum extent of China in the days of the Ching dynasty (that is the Manchus) who fell in 1911, the last of the Chinese dynasties before the revolution. This shows Nepal here as part of China. But even

this does not on the other hand extend China's frontier beyond the crest in the north-east. You see it runs along the crest of the Himalaya roughly, so that they cannot support their present claim to Nepal.

I think I ought to say something more about Nepal here because you cannot round off the picture without bringing in Nepal. In 1792 the Gurkha rulers of Nepal invaded Tibet and sacked a monastery called Tashilumpo near Shigatse, not far from Lhasa. The Tibetan Government of the time asked the Chinese to help and the Emperor of China sent a force which made a most remarkable march. It was mostly composed of Tibetans, and succeeded in crossing the Himalaya over a pass called Kirong near Katmandu and got down on the Nepalese side, after which the Nepalese made peace. This was before our war with the Nepalese—this was in 1792, our war was in 1815. They made peace with the Chinese and as a result of that the Nepalese Government every five years sent a mission with tribute to Peking which went on until the last mission in 1908. The Nepalese refused to go on sending it any longer after the fall of the Manchus in 1911. But the Chinese, basing their claim on this tributary mission, from time to time tried to imagine that Nepal was part of China. I think that is worth remembering in the current situation.

Here is another Chinese map and it is interesting because Kashmir is here and this is Tibet and this is Sinkiang. It shows roughly the Aksai Chin area, the great bulge over which the Chinese have advanced over the last six or seven years. There is the Pangong Lake, this river is the Indus and this is the Shyok, and this is the Chang Chenmo valley into which the Chinese have penetrated also. Chushul, the main Indian base is here, but it is interesting that this is an old Chinese map which itself shows the Aksai Chin area as part of Kashmir. Now the Chinese have started a new line, which is that Aksai Chin was really part of Sinkiang and not part of Tibet at all, because it has got certain Turki names in it. So they have started drawing an enormous bulge in Sinkiang to include most of Aksai Chin. The old Chinese maps do not show that; hence it is quite a new claim.

Now we get to the Assam side. I have put in this map because it is an old map before the 1914 McMahon Line was ever delineated. It is an 1883 British map, and it shows these tribal areas washed in yellow as they used to do on the N.W. Frontier in the old days. We had not got any precise external frontier in those days, but there were political relations with the Government of Assam and the tribes turned in this direction. They do all their shopping down on the Assam side and not in Lhasa, just as the Pathan tribes on the N.W. Frontier turn to Peshawar and Bannu and not to Kabul. So, long before 1914, this area appeared as part of the Indian set-up. The next is an extremely interesting map. I



Naik Rabi Lal Thapa (centre) being congratulated on his having successfully saved personnel from an abandoned post in Ladakh.

would like to say something about the 1914 Convention between India, China and Tibet when the McMahon Line was drawn. There were three plenipotentiaries, one from China, one from India, and one from Tibet. It was during the British period, so the India representative was McMahon. The representative from Tibet was admitted also by the Chinese to be fully empowered and of equal status. The map of the Convention was initialled by all three, or rather in the case of the Chinese actually signed. Here you see the map that was attached to the Convention, signed by the representatives, A.H.M. are McMahon's initials. Here is Ivan Chen, the Chinese signature in full, and here the Tibetan Lönchen Shatra, written in Tibetan characters as he could not write in English. The idea of this Convention was to divide Tibet into two bits, Inner Tibet which is the part nearest to China and administered by China, and an autonomous Outer Tibet which is the part round Lhasa ruled by the Dalai Lama. Tibet's outer frontier was shown by the red line, and the division of two Tibets was shown by the blue line. The red line was continued (this is

the same as the McMahon Line) to show the frontier of Tibet in the direction of India. The Chinese have recently tried to claim that all this was done behind their backs. But you can see from this map that this red line was actually revised, conceding one bit to China and agreeing that it was not part of Inner Tibet. At both ends of that revised line the signatures of the three plenipotentiaries are given. Ivan Chen is written at either end, so that Ivan Chen not only signed the thing, but he also signed alterations on the map, so he knew all about it.

INCONSISTENCIES

This is the same map, but the alteration that Mr. Ivan Chen wanted has been embodied on it. The Chinese, however, repudiated Ivan Chen's signature and they also repudiated the Convention as a whole. But in doing so they never mentioned this line on the Indian side—the McMahon Line—as the reason in any sense for their repudiation of the Convention. What they emphasized then was that they were not in general agreement about frontiers, and what was under dispute was these two frontiers towards China. The frontier towards India was never under dispute at all.

As the Chinese refused to allow their plenipotentiary to proceed with signature, the Indian Government—the British-Indian Government—and the Tibetan Government agreed between themselves to sign the Convention bilaterally and here are their signatures, there is McMahon's and there is Lönchen Shatra's for Tibet with his seal, and the British Government seal, and this is the map that was attached to the Convention and on which the McMahon Line rests. China is quite right in saying that they did not agree to it, but I repeat that at that time they never gave this frontier as the ground for not agreeing to it at all. More recently China has been even more inconsistent. With one breath in the officials' report she says that the Tibetans were quite incompetent to sign any frontier agreements and therefore the McMahon Line is invalid; in the next breath she talks about frontiers up here, which are not marked on this map, in the Barahoti region of the U.P. and in that region bases herself on Tibetan actions and Tibetan agreements. There is no arguing with so illogical an advocate as this.

The next map I show you is a map of the western part of the McMahon Line itself. Here is the tri-junction point between Bhutan, Tibet and what is now the N.E. Frontier Agency. This is the map on which we agreed, in detailed negotiations with the Tibetans at the Convention, to fix the McMahon Line, and it does show the terrain very well. This map covers only the western part of the McMahon Line and there are two places called Migyitun and Longju along by the river Subansiri, where there

was an early Chinese probe in 1959. Next we have the eastern part of the McMahon Line. This continues from the last map. Here is the Brahmaputra river coming round the big bend, and then Namcha Barwa, the great mountain nearly 26,000 feet high in the bend, rather like Nanga Parbat in the bend of the Indus at the other end of the Himalaya. The McMahon Line does not continue along the crest as far as Namcha Barwa; it leaves it and comes down and crosses the river called the Siang (this is called the Tsangpo in Tibet), it then becomes the Dihang down here, and joins the Brahmaputra. The line then goes along subsidiary crests and reaches the River Lohit, which people in Assam regard as the true Brahmaputra. There is a very sacred place called Brahmakund just where the Lohit comes out of the hills. As the Lohit is in a direct line with the Brahmaputra, the Assamese never thought of the Siang or Tsangpo as the Brahmaputra really. The Lohit is a tremendous river and Walong is just here. Near Walong there is the place called Menilkrai, and Rima is just a few miles across the McMahon Line. The McMahon Line goes on beyond quite a long way and forms the frontier of the northern part of Burma. It ends on a pass between the Irrawady and the Salween called the Isurazi. As I said before, the Chinese have agreed with the Burma Government to adopt the McMahon Line roughly speaking, with I think one deviation, as the northern frontier of Burma.

AN OLD INDIAN FRONTIER POST

One of the things I was going to say a week ago, if this war had not developed, was that it is quite false to imagine that the whole of this terrain is between 10,000 and 15,000 feet and, therefore, impossible to operate over in winter. Along here (indicating Walong) it is about only 4,000 feet above the sea, and I think when you cross the frontier it is less than 5,000 feet above the sea, so fighting here in this gorge—actually it opens out a bit in Walong—is possible at a reasonable altitude even in the winter. Another point worth mentioning is that there is another route from Tibet by a branch of the Lohit, called the Delai river, which comes from a place called Dre up in Tibet, and it might be very possible, I imagine, to cut the Lohit communications by coming down this way. I should add that there was a Sappers and Miners road built in 1912 before the McMahon Line up as far as Menilkrai, just short of Walong. The Assam Rifles post at Walong was occupied in 1944 when I was Lord Wavell's Foreign Secretary and I had something to do with it. So there has been occupation up there for some time. Then came the 1950 earthquake. I do not know if any of you knew Kingdon Ward the botanist; he was up there at the time of the earthquake which shattered all the

communications, and there may be those among you who would be able to tell us more about the present state of these communications than I possibly can. But it is worth mentioning that there has been an Indian post right at this frontier for quite a long time.

Here is another Chinese map. You can see the frontier of Nepal, then there is the Chumbi Valley and through the Chumbi Valley the main communications from India to Lhasa run and it is south of the main watershed. It is one of the few places in which the old Tibetan frontier came south of the Himalayan watershed. Then there is Bhutan, giving Bhutan as India as it should be. Then we come right down to the plains and the Chinese show their frontier right along the foothills a few miles from the Brahmaputra. And here is yet another Chinese map on a larger scale showing the Chumbi Salient, then Sikkim and the corner of Nepal, and here is Bhutan and there again the map comes right down on to the line of the Brahmaputra in the foothills. For members of the audience from Pakistan I should like to say it is as if the Afghans were to show the frontier of Afghanistan at Jamrud at the Peshawar end of the Khyber Pass.

I will now try to pick up the threads. The only real occupation of Tibet that took place before 1950 by the Chinese was for two years between 1908 and 1910, when the Manchu Dynasty was just about to fall and Chao Erfeng, their general, occupied Lhasa by force. (The Chinese were turned out in 1911). Previous Chinese occupation of Lhasa had always been to help the Tibetans and they never interfered with the Tibetan way of life. Now, the Communists, as you know, have uprooted the Tibetan way of life and a large number of Tibetans have fled to India. Tibet appears on the maps, not as Tibet any longer, indeed it hardly appears at all. Even on this Indian Government map you see China, and there is no word Tibet at all on it, and I would like to say at this point that the Russians have followed the Chinese in showing the Chinese frontiers according to the Chinese claim. All the Russian maps agree with the Chinese-claimed frontier, so perhaps it is a little optimistic to hope that the Russians will be impartial in their attitude to this question since they have already committed themselves, cartographically anyway, to supporting the Chinese claim. That, however, was before the Chinese had taken physical steps to occupy any part of this territory.

In 1954, as a result of the occupation of Tibet, came the Panchshila Treaty between China and India. The actual subject of the treaty was comparatively unimportant. It dealt with the rights of Indian traders in going to Tibet, in what is now called the Tibetan region of China, and *vice-versa* of Chinese traders going in the other direction. But the treaty was important for two reasons: (1) that it enshrined the Panchshila, the

five principles, and (2) that it contained an admission by India that Tibet was part of China, a very important admission, never made by us.

As for the Panchshila itself—I find it so abstract that I can never commit it to memory—the first principle is Mutual Respect for Territorial Integrity; the second one is Mutual Non-Aggression; the third is Mutual Non-Interference in Internal Affairs; the fourth is Equality and Mutual Benefit; and the fifth one is Peaceful Co-Existence—a magnificent reduction to ideological terms of what the principles of international life ought to be, but perhaps not a very good guide for living in a dangerous world. I suppose you could say these principles were broken by both sides. Certainly there has not been mutual non-aggression on the Chinese side, and the Chinese argue that the giving of asylum to the Dalai Lama and to a large number of Tibetans in 1959 was a transgression of the principle which lays down that there shall be mutual non-interference in internal affairs. The Panchshila Treaty was not renewed after the first eight years; it lapsed in 1962, in this current year.

P R E S S U R E S

In 1958 and 1959 probing operations started really seriously. The Chinese came a long way in the Aksai Chin area and there were many protests, but nothing really very much happened. In March, 1959 the Dalai Lama fled to India and the Chinese attitude at once became very much tougher and sterner. They wrote an extremely rude letter in which they accused India of not observing the Panchshila and said that India must not be, as they termed it, double faced; either you follow the Panchshila or not. The acceptance of the Dalai Lama and many other Tibetans was, they maintained, a breach of the Panchshila, and perhaps more important than that, very important advances began to take place in the western area. There was bloodshed, Indian patrols were ambushed, I think ten *jawans* were killed and quite a lot captured, and Indian prisoners reported that they had been much ill-treated and a great many objections passed in both directions.

I would like to go back a little and say that when the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, came to talk to Mr. Nehru, he is on record, I think, as having stated in 1956—I may be open to correction—that there were a few small border troubles, but that China was probably going to accept this McMahon Line as the frontier with India as they were ready to accept it with Burma. However, in 1959 a long letter arrived in which they repudiated the whole thing and in effect advanced claims to the whole of these shaded areas and also they proceeded to do what I have already explained, to isolate India and make the settlements with the

other countries along the North Frontiers. There is a lot of interaction between the Western area and the Eastern area. In the West the Chinese had occupied a considerable bit, about 10,000 or 12,000 sq. miles; in the East except for a few little probes they had, before this last month, done very little—there was the probe at Longju opposite Migyetun and one at Khinzemane, which is near the place where the Dalai Lama crossed the frontier. On the whole, before September, 1962 they had respected the McMahon Line, as they had not respected the frontier in Ladakh. The events of the last few days have rather confirmed my opinion that the Chinese underlying policy was to bring pressure on India to trade what they had lost up in Ladakh for a Chinese admission of the McMahon Line. I think there is a good deal to be said for that, and I rather think that this cease fire, in the way it has been put forward, tends to establish that point. There are other considerations too. One is undoubtedly that Chinese military success in this area is going to upset the nerves not only of India and of the Commonwealth as a whole and of America, but of all these other in-between areas here, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. If the Chinese really came down on to the plains of Assam, what would be the position of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan? I think there is very little doubt that that is a consideration which works in. I hesitate to make any prognostications, but my own feeling has been for some time, and I have not yet been upset in it, that the Chinese do not really wish at present to occupy any parts of the Sub-Continent beyond their claims in the Himalaya. They might, no doubt, wish to seize the whole of the areas shown shaded on the map, which would bring them right down to the plains of Assam. It is as if the Afghans, supported by the U.S.S.R., were to occupy the Khyber Pass and have their frontier post at Jamrud. That may be a consideration, but I have a feeling that it really is tactical, a combined tactical and military operation, somehow or other to expand the frontiers of China to what they think they ought to be.

People have often asked me why the Chinese wish to do this kind of thing. Why did they wish to occupy Tibet? Why do they wish to encroach on India? I do not know very much about China—I have read a certain amount—but I have a feeling that what Hugh Richardson says in his book about Tibet, a book very well worth reading, has a great deal of sense in it. What is the Chinese motivation? I think it is probably the profound regard of the Chinese for history, not history as a scientific study, but as a cult akin to ancestor worship, with a sort of ritual object of presenting the past, favourably touched up, as a model for current political action. So in spite of the adoption of Western political ideas, like Marxism and so on, the Communists continue to be influenced by the traditions of their ancestors. They have inherited the same peculiar historical perspective

and they were the first Chinese for a very long time, many centuries indeed, to have the power to convert these atavistic theories into fact. In Tibet they saw their opportunity, calculated that no one was likely to oppose them and acted, and may it not be the same in their movement beyond what India claims as her frontiers? That, I think, is probably not at all a bad psychological description of what—based on Chinese history and on Chinese attitudes—may go some way to explain this extraordinary ‘burst out,’ as it were.

It is very difficult to see exactly what is going to come of the latest report of the Chinese cease-fire and all the rest of it, but I think there is one thing I must point out and it follows from what I have already said. They say they will withdraw not only from the McMahon Line, which they call the line of actual control before November, 1959, and that they will go 20 kilometres, which is roughly $12\frac{1}{2}$ miles behind it. They also say they will do the same in Ladakh, but you see in Ladakh the line of control is not the frontier claimed by India as it is with the McMahon Line, but is about here, more or less on the line that has been occupied. So that if India is going to accept this, it means that the Chinese are left in occupation of a large part of Ladakh. That I think is a very important consideration indeed.

I should like to finish by repeating what I said in the beginning, that we in this country, as the debate in Parliament shows, are united—all parties I think—in feeling the deepest concern for India over this. And it is quite obvious too from what is said that we feel it is very important that both India and Pakistan should recognize that this is a much greater thing than the admittedly large divisions of thought and practice within the Sub-Continent could ever be. It was nice to find Miss Jenny Lee and the Prime Minister saying the same thing in Parliament. Miss Jenny Lee said “Is it realized that Soviet Russia has a common interest with India and Britain in trying to see that China does not benefit one inch from their aggression?” and the Prime Minister said “Yes! What we want to do is to produce the result that an aggressive policy should once again be shown to be a failure. We (the British) have suffered a great deal in trying to enforce this policy in the past, but we must not shrink from it again.” And, of course, that should apply to the rest of the Commonwealth, and there are lots of other things that can be done besides what is being done, I should imagine. For instance, I think Canada is sending a lot of grain to China and things of that kind, and there are trade pressures that could be brought to bear. But I am sure all of us here feel most anxious that we should, in this country, do something effective to assist India in her trouble.

A Visit to India after the Chinese Invasion

By JOHN TILNEY, MP, TD

Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations

IT really is an impertinence for me, having spent five days in the Sub-Continent, to be up here on my feet, when everyone in this room knows infinitely more about India and Pakistan than I do, but I would like to say that it is an honour to be here. I am afraid that you may put me in the same class as a Merseyside schoolboy who was learning chemistry, and when asked what copper nitrate was replied: Overtime for policemen. But I am still very much a new boy, as was brought home to me after I had been at the Commonwealth Relations Office only a short time. I staggered up with two brief cases—I had been told that I would have to have my photograph taken for various agencies abroad and I had to be there at a certain hour—up the steps of the C.R.O., and nobody paid the least attention to me. I thought that sooner or later one of the very nice old gentlemen who stand in the hallway might come and take one case off me, but ultimately one approached me and said: “Are you another of those so and so photographers?” I must say that I wished that I had some photographs and slides with me today because a talk like this can be pretty dry.

I hope you will all forgive me, however, if I start talking to you not about my visit to India two weeks ago, but of my visit to China two years ago. I was then Chairman of the British Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and we had an annual conference in Tokyo. Mr. John Temple, the Member for Chester, and I, thought that a most interesting way to go there would be via Moscow, then across Siberia, through Outer Mongolia, and then down to Peking—which we surprisingly managed to do. I did not spend a great deal of time in China, but I came back with some very deep impressions of what might happen from that great country. We were only going there unofficially, and as you know Western Embassies in Peking are really out on a limb. They only see each other, and they are never quite sure, with Chinese soldiers at their gates, whether they will be able to meet any Chinese. And when we arrived, although we had got our visas our Chargé d’Affaires told us that he was not at all sure whether the Chinese Government were going to pay any attention to us or not,

so we all planned to go off and see those gorgeous Ming tombs on a picnic. We were in our picnic clothes having breakfast when the telephone rang and a message came through that we were expected to report at 9 o'clock, and were to visit an iron and steel commune, an agricultural commune and then were to dine with the Institute of Foreign Affairs; in fact the whole programme of our stay in Peking had been very carefully mapped out, and it was one which interested me immensely. We also went for 48 hours, by train from Peking, down to Canton at a time, which you will remember, of considerable famine in China, and I saw various things you cannot help seeing from a train window. I saw about 30 Chinamen fighting for the last bun in a kind of great washing-basket of buns that had been brought along to one of the platforms and that had run out; there was a tremendous scramble for the last bun under my window. I saw, as the train chugged by, a whole village marshalled on the hillside with the political commissar putting the people of the village into the picture. We were taken round the great People's Hall, built, I gather, by about 14,000 people working night and day, and were astonished, as some of you may have been, at the immense size of the square where, I think, half a million people can come on parade watched by a million. One of the great surprises of Peking to me was this immense square; it dwarfs the Red Square in Moscow. We saw a bit of the army preparing to take part in the great National Day in Peking. Their kits, their tents and their layouts were all very good, I thought, and showed good discipline. We saw all the people—be it in threes, nines or in a battalion, or even a band, 900 strong—all marching about and having a job to do.

A WORRYING THOUGHT

My colleague, the Member for Chester, had been there in the late thirties, and even in this recent time of famine he had to admit that the bulk of the Chinese he saw were better off than formerly. And, of course, in this last year they have had a better season. But what frightened me was talking to their leaders. In the Institute of Foreign Affairs we had a dinner and a discussion which went on for three or more hours. They talked openly of their hatred of the United States of America, of the West which to a large extent refused to recognize them, of all their works of art which had been taken off by ship to Formosa, of how—looking at the future—a few million or so lives did not matter all that much; and yet one of the heads of the Bank of China said to me something which I shall never forget. He said, "We in China are short of labour." When you think there may be, by the end of this century, a thousand million of them, that is a very worrying thought, and I came away thinking—and I have

said so constantly during the last two years—that I do not believe that the free world has a clue what is going to hit them from China. I think, it is a mixture of Nazidom and Cromwell's England.

I remember trying—people in Moscow accept tips quite readily—to give presents to the people in the train, little silver spoons with Cheshire Cat and Liverpool Arms emblems, and things like that; you would have thought that it was a reasonable present to accept for kindness, but no-one in the train would accept anything from us. They would not take the extra food that we had from our Embassy, although many of their families must have been as hungry as the people I had seen under my carriage window, and when we left our food in the train at Canton railway station, they came running out with it to us in our taxis saying: "You have left your food behind." The only way we could get rid of it was by giving it to a nationalized hotel. It reminded me, to some extent, of the Praise-God-bare-bones England of the 17th century and, of course, much of what we saw was tremendously backward. The great steel works were a mixture of pre-Dickensian England and a modern rolling plant: yet all muddled up. Even then, nearly all the Russian technicians had gone. But despite all that inefficiency, one got the impression that something pretty sinister was going to come out of China, and all I can say is that it has happened earlier than I expected.

ABORTIVE DISCUSSIONS

I should like to speak now about the past between India and China. During the decade of the fifties India took China on trust following the lines of Great Britain for many decades, when we, helping India open up railways and roads, were always looking towards the North-West and not to the North-East. During those fifties China consolidated her hold on Tibet and lulled India by signing the Five Points of Co-Existence. It is worthwhile just reminding ourselves what those five points were:

First: Mutual Respect for each others' territories, integrity and sovereignty.

Second: Mutual non- aggression.

Third: Mutual non-interference which each others' internal affairs.

Fourth: Equality and mutual benefit, and

Fifth: Peaceful co-existence.

And the Indians were lulled by that. However meanwhile the Chinese were building the road through Ladakh—the Aksai Chin road. In 1960 India reacted, realizing what was happening in Ladakh, and pushed her posts forward, possibly leapfrogging the Chinese in that wild and difficult territory. I will not go into the problems of the 1959 Line which is really

the 1960 Line. What is the line of control which is really not the line of control, or even what is the 8th September Line? But you will find some of them on the maps which I have brought which are the most up-to-date that I can find, and which I thought you might like to see.

All this time there were abortive discussions between the two Governments, and then on the 8th September of last year, the Chinese crossed the Tangla Ridge in NEFA. Between the 8th September and the 20th October there was a kind of phoney war, but on the 20th October—and it is interesting that on the 19th the strike on the Brahmaputra had, I am told, been settled, but that two pseudo-Trade-Unionists, Communists perhaps, arrived and the strike began again on the 20th October, the very day that a major offensive was launched against Tawang. This resulted in Mr. Krishna Menon's resignation and in a request for military aid from the West. And I am glad to say that the first consignment, I believe, of F.N. rifles and ammunition came from the United Kingdom, and was followed very quickly by others from other Western allies. Then came drama, and drama in a big way. On the 14th November, there came the attack in NEFA which was in far greater strength than anything that had been seen before and that led to the fall of Walong, to the turning of the Se La Pass, to the fall of Bomdila and to the approach of the Chinese armies to Tezpur. At the same time the offensive in Ladakh was kept up. All that resulted in a cry for immediate and heavy help. And it resulted too in major administrative changes both among ministers, in the military command and among officials in the ministries of Defence, Production, Military Organization and others. I am told that there was an immense change in India's thinking and outlook compared with say, three months ago. Then came the ceasefire offer and the unilateral decision of the Chinese to withdraw.

So what is the present position? I think there are about eight points to remember; First I think that everyone is aware that China, after great preparation, attacked in force an apparently friendly country to decide, by arms, what was under discussion. That is a fact that I do not think anyone should forget. They did that against the views that have been accepted by the majority of nations for the last forty years. The second is, regretfully, that India has suffered a defeat. One must remember that even the line of September 8th is a compromise line. The third fact is that China's ideas and statements have been full of complexities, probably on purpose, and I just wonder whether she is as sure of the rightness of her cause as she pretends to be. At any rate clarification is vital, and I am worried by some of the phraseology that greeted me in, say, the press release on 3rd January, from the Office of the Chargé d'Affaires of the People's Republic of China. I will take some of the phrases at random,

because I think one has got to remember this in the context of other so called " pacific noises " elsewhere: " This memorandum once again shows that the Indian Government is deliberately creating side issues, reversing right and wrong. Concerning the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, it has always been under China's effective jurisdiction. This is an immovable fact that the Indian Government can by no means overthrow by sheer fabrication. The Indian Government later fished out some spurious historical evidence and tried in a far fetched way to describe this area as belonging to India. Such an absurd and ridiculous way of argument certainly cannot be regarded as serious." Then again: " No matter how it haggles, the Indian Government cannot deny that its deliberate crossing of the illegal McMahon Line and occupation of the Chedon area north of the Line were an undisguised act of aggression and provocation. The Indian Government is indeed arbitrary to the extreme in some unscrupulous and wilful distortion of Premier Chou En-Lai's letter in order to justify its own unreasonable stand. Concerning Wuje a similar trick was played by the Indian Government. The Indian side has not only continued provocations along the border and stepped up its arms expansion and war preparations, but adopted a series of measures deliberately aimed at poisoning relations between the two countries. The Indian authorities have subjected the Chinese nationals in India to ruthless persecution. A difference between the positions held by Indian troops prior to September 8th, 1962, and the line of actual control on November 7th, 1959, was precisely created by India through perfidious armed encroachments on Chinese territory in the past three years by taking advantage of the Chinese frontier guards cessation of patrol."

FRIENDLY HELP

It all reminds me of remarks made in another continent two and half decades ago, and I think one has got to bear that very much in mind. The fourth point, and this is an encouraging one, is the resurgence of India's national purpose and her unity. I heard from Miss Barbara Ward, Lady Jackson, who was staying with the High Commissioner when I was there, how she came up through Gujarat and from the West and had seen in village after village people giving virtually all they possessed—their bangles and their gold jewellery—in order to help India's fighting fund. The fifth point is that the squabbles, the family friendly squabbles between this country and India seem to have been completely forgotten due to our quick response in sending arms by air and by sea. I do not think it would be right now to go into any details of the military hardware that we have had to produce. But we have shown to a fellow member of the

Commonwealth friendly help in a time of need. There is another point, and this is a sinister one in long term. All this will mean a continuing and expensive drain on military and economic aid and also on the already over-strained general economy. The fact is that this country had given £95 million, I think, to the third Five Year Plan before this new call happened. There is a final and major point about the present situation, and that is the fear, the natural fear, in Pakistan, of the build-up of arms in India, even though we in the West say that these arms are only going to be used against China. What real trust, in the long run, can Pakistan put in what they may regard as just a scrap of paper or a purely verbal agreement? One must bear in mind the feeling in Pakistan of a great build-up of potential force in a country which, unfortunately, has not seen eye to eye with Pakistan since both became independent. Hence, in my opinion, the immense importance of settling the problems between those two great countries of India and Pakistan. Without that the threat to the whole sub-Continent becomes very much greater.

May I now come on, as I see them to what the objectives of China are. I think one has got to produce the caveat that not even the Chinese people, in a great Communist autocracy such as China, are told what they in point of fact are fighting for. It is not, therefore, all that easy to guess what their ultimate objectives may be, but in short term obviously they wanted to secure the road to Ladakh from Sinkiang. In medium term I guess it is to continue to humiliate India through fear, to some extent, of India's economic success under democracy; secondly to keep India and Pakistan apart; thirdly to lead Asia by frightening the small little countries: Nepal, Burma, Bhutan, etc.—there may well be others—and possibly a fourth point, to snub Moscow as the font or engine of the Communist faith, and to show that in line with the ancient communist teaching violence may pay better than co-existence.

And for the long term objectives, your guess is as good as anyone's. Is it China *irredenta*? Is it to surround, as many of the Indian leaders think, China with certain satellite Communist states such as surround U.S.S.R.? Are they going to stop at the ancient maps? Is it just going to be a Sudeten Line, or is it going to be much more? As in past wars of religion, nationalism and faiths get a bit muddled up, and in my opinion the former is the more dangerous.

Now why did China stop? Her short term and her medium objectives had really been fulfilled. She has lots of time. Was it winter? Was it fuel? Was it the great long haul from the eastern part of China over very difficult country, or was it the reaction of the West and the danger of escalation of war? Or was it again just India's unity? I suppose we will have to wait for history to tell us.

WONDERFUL RECEPTION

Now I at last come to what I did in India. My Secretary of State, as you know, was suffering from a thing called "Devil's Grip" and I saw him looking, I thought, very ill in bed the night before I left with the C.I.G.S. We had a very exciting journey because, first of all, one of the engines of our aeroplane packed up and we had to jettison our fuel over the English Channel and come back, and then something went wrong with the next one we got into, and we were going at 100 miles an hour on the runway when the pilot had quickly to dethrottle. One wondered whether one was going through the end of the runway or not, but ultimately we got to India twenty minutes ahead of the Americans. We had a most wonderful reception. General Chowdry came out to meet us and I had one day seeing Mr. Nehru, Mr. Desai, the Foreign Secretary, and Mr. Chavan, the Minister of Defence. We had a working lunch with the American team under Mr. Averill Harriman and I saw Mr. Kera, the Secretary of the Cabinet. We met other people in the evening at dinner. Then the devil lost its grip on my Secretary of State, who at 5 o'clock the following morning arrived at the airport at New Delhi, and together we had the privilege of seeing that remarkable man, the President of India.

I would like to pay a tribute now to my Secretary of State who, having suffered from a severe, although I am glad to say short, illness did so much in flying backwards and forwards between New Delhi and Rawalpindi in those few days to try and bring Pakistan and India so much more closely together. Yet we in Britain cannot interfere. It is not right that we should do so, even if we could. We are great friends with both countries and it is naturally our hope that some of the difficulties which have plagued both countries for so long and that undermine their economies to such a large extent should be, if possible, now eliminated. I was able, because my Secretary of State had arrived, to spend two days in Calcutta taking a lift in the C.I.G.S.'s plane; he was going on to Sikkim and to Tezpur, and we flew to Calcutta with the American General Adams and his team and with the D.M.O. of the Indian army. At Calcutta, I said goodbye to them, because I particularly wanted to see those who had been evacuated from the various tea estates, and to talk to the business community.

I would like to pay another tribute to the great work of the Indian Air Force. Everyone whom I saw was loud in his or her praises for what the Indian Air Force, backed up later by the Royal Air Force, had done in the evacuation. There is a problem, of course, in another country, of how much preparation an outside country like the United Kingdom can make, but our Deputy High Commissioner spent, I think, about eight days up in Assam in advanced headquarters and did, I thought and from all accounts,

a magnificent job. All the women, children and people that I saw who had come down to Calcutta praised what efforts had been made. I saw a lot of the business community. I started with a working breakfast and two of Mr. Norris' friends unfortunately for them had to come and talk to me while I changed to catch the aeroplane—so it was a very full day! We were discussing then, of course, the strike on the Brahmaputra that was holding up, I think, something like fourteen million pounds of tea and four million pounds of jute. As you know much better than I do, the Brahmaputra really is the jugular vein of Assam, and so, with the railway gauge altering and the road transport held up at the road ferries, it is impossible to move that immensely important export from Assam except by water down the Brahmaputra.

Finally, India's problems as I see them. Public opinion may not be prepared to allow any Government to accept the existing line. It is apt to forget that the army has suffered, possibly quite severely; it is apt to forget that the Indian cities are wide open to any bombardment, and I think we have got to remember that the September 8th line is already a compromise. It is, therefore, not all that easy for India or any Government of India to give way any more to either China or to Pakistan. Great statesmanship on every side is needed, and this will mean more money, immediately and in the long term, for both military and general economic aid. It is vital that the standard of living of the country is kept up; as we all know, the national income is very low indeed compared with anything that we have experienced in the West. This reminds me of the silly story of the small boy who had 3d. in one trouser pocket and 19/5½d. in another, and when he was asked what he would have he replied: "Someone else's trousers." That does apply economically very much to the rich West and the comparatively poor sub-Continent.

We in the West have these problems: Are we going to keep the frontier of the free world on the Himalayas? If so, it is vital to get some understanding between Pakistan and India. Otherwise there is bound to be a dissipation of effort, so in the end we come down to the need for great personal efforts of statesmanship. It is going to be expensive whatever happens. China, remember, is not part of the world community, and yet the Scales of Justice are vain without her Sword; we have got to be sure that the sub-Continent is to be kept within the free world, and that that sub-Continent is safe. We must therefore liaise with all our allies. We must not interfere as some of us might like to interfere, because this is, in the end, a decision for the Governments of India and Pakistan. I believe that what we can do is to be friendly and helpful in the background, and if successful the prizes of containing aggression and getting world peace are very great indeed.

Crisis in South Asia

By Sir PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS, CIE

THERE must have been very few dates in modern history more dramatic than the 20th of November. On the 19th of November everybody took it for granted—and when I say everybody, I mean officials, non-officials, Indians, and British took it for granted—that Assam up to the river Brahmaputra was gone, and that it was more than probable that the Chinese would go beyond that river and overrun a great deal of the south bank too. Then on the 20th, when these gloomy thoughts were all in people's minds, there suddenly came that dramatic announcement of the cease fire—about which I shall have more to say presently—and the whole atmosphere changed: India breathed a sigh of relief, and the people concerned with the great tea interests and the oil interests in Assam suddenly realized that they were not going to lose those tremendously important and valuable properties. There are not many dates in history which can supply a parallel to that degree of drama. In fact, when I was trying to think of one the other day my mind went back in history 1,500 years to when the Huns were moving on towards Rome and they had reached the town of Aquileia and for reasons which have never been explained they turned back. That is comparable in dramatic intensity to the 20th of November last year.

In Pakistan too there was a sense of drama, and a sense of tension though in rather a different way. In the early part of November the political struggle, the struggle between the President and those who oppose his constitution seemed to be mounting. It looked as though a crisis was at hand, everybody felt that crisis was certain to burst when the assembly met as was then planned in Dacca at the beginning of December; and then suddenly China came down into the Assam Valley and thoughts and feelings in Pakistan switched overnight from domestic politics to international affairs. Pakistanis began to think at once what effect this would have on the dispute about Kashmir, and what their relations with India would be, what British aid to India might portend for the future, and for the time being domestic strife disappeared. It soon came back again, the disappearance was very temporary, but for the moment there was a dramatic change.

I was extremely lucky in the timing of my tour. I was as I said in Pakistan when these dramatic changes were taking place, and then I

went on to Delhi where I was staying with the High Commissioner when the Chief of the Imperial Staff and the Secretary of State arrived there to consider the problem of helping India, and then I was in Calcutta when many problems arising out of the evacuation of planters, both British and Indian were under consideration; and then I went up to Assam, I was lucky enough to go to Digboi, Tezpur and all the intervening country. It was a strange experience in some ways because the ladies, wives of planters, wives of people in the oil fields had all been moved away, and you found yourself in a completely bachelor Assam Valley. The ladies will be delighted to know that the men were getting thoroughly fed up, I don't think they minded their own wives being away, but they disliked the absence of feminine society from the place as a whole.

Well I am going to try and talk in some detail about what gave rise to these various dramatic events and incidents, but of course when we are talking and thinking about them, we must not forget the undramatic, we must not forget that all the time unspectacular developments were going on. Industry was still developing, all the ordinary economic processes are still at work and we must not yield to the temptation of forgetting those things in order just to concentrate on the dramatic, but we will begin with the dramatic, and we will begin, of course, with the Chinese attack on India.

CHINESE IMPERIALISM

I don't propose to go into the history of what happened because that is too well known. I want to make some rather more general comments, and my first comment is this, that there was nothing surprising at all about the fact that China attacked India. There was much that was surprising about the timing, there was much that was surprising about her relatively easy success on the Frontier. But to those of us who have been wandering round south and south-east Asia for some years we have been conscious for a very long time of the build-up of Chinese imperialism. You go to Burma for example and whatever the Government may say about their friendship with their great Chinese big brother, if you talk to any educated man in Rangoon and see what he thinks about the Chinese big brother, he is terrified the whole time, and you go to Indonesia and there too you find the same kind of feeling all the way through, that China is in an expansionist mood, and that by one means or another, either military or commercial she has every intention of stretching out her tentacles to control south and south-east Asia. When I make a forecast which I very rarely do I am nearly always wrong; I am particularly pleased when I find one which was not wrong. I've got a son in Calcutta; when I was in

Calcutta this last time he produced a piece of paper which I had written in 1952. He had apparently said to me then, "What do you think of the future of India from the point of view of a young man in business?" and I put down the bull points and the bear points, and I notice that at the end of my bear points I put down, "In my judgment the greatest danger to people like yourself in the future is Chinese imperialism, because I have very little doubt at all that sooner or later there will be a great struggle between China and India." Well if I just thought about that now and had not had this evidence I should have believed I was making it up, but this was produced by my son, and it is a very rare thing for a son to tell his father that he was right. But the only point really is that I think many of us have been conscious for a long time that this imperialist attitude was being built up.

It is not surprising that it should have been so. I suppose history suggests that revolutions very, very often breed an expansionist imperialist spirit, and when the revolution happens to be a communist revolution, then the particular philosophy underlying it makes it even more likely that that spirit will develop. And then I suppose too China must have been looking at India with a very jealous eye because India has been providing the one non-communist example in Asia of really first-rate industrial progress, and as it is part of the communist theory that you can only achieve this rapid progress under a communist system, so it is not unnatural that China should have regarded India with a good deal of distaste.

CHINESE AIMS

Although I have said that I think that the long term characteristic of China is imperialism and expansionism I do not mean by that that in 1962 she set out to conquer India or even to make a massive invasion of India. I do not think anything could be further from the truth. I think that if China had begun with the intention of a massive invasion of India the one route she would not have chosen would have been the route through the North East Frontier Agency. It is an extraordinarily difficult route, there are many easier ways into India than that particular one. I think her immediate aims last year were very much more local. I think her first aim was to take what she claimed—let's put it as simply as that, and you will remember that there were two areas, two important areas—really there were three areas, but we can for the moment forget the central one—there were two important areas in which there were territorial disputes between India and China. First of all there was Ladakh, where as far back as 1956 the Chinese had put forward certain claims. They had then in the next two or three years moved steadily into Ladakh.

Then in 1960 they put forward an additional claim, and in the following two years they moved still further forward. Ladakh of course was important because it was a wedge between two Chinese controlled territories and because it contained the Aksai-Chin road. On the other side of India there was the dispute as to the boundary of the North Eastern Frontier Agency, and the dispute at different times has taken two forms. There was a time when the Chinese began by denying the validity of the MacMahon line—they pointed out that the treaty never had been ratified by China, in fact it had been repudiated by China, and then apart from denying the validity of that conceptual line they disagreed with India as to where that line came on the map. I do not think that the North East Frontier Agency dispute matters to China or looms large in the Chinese mind in the way that Ladakh does. It is quite true that it would be very nice to walk into Assam and have the Digboi oil fields, but I have very little doubt that what China is really concerned with is Ladakh, and that the real importance from her point of view of the advance into NEFA was to strengthen her bargaining position with regard to Ladakh, and as she would put it rather offensively, to teach India a lesson. I am pretty clear too that her second object was to inflict a humiliation on the one country which might be her rival in the struggle for the mastery of Asia. I start from the thesis that China does intend sooner or later to be the master of south and south-east Asia, and the one country whose resources and might and ability might stand in the way is India. Linked up with that desire to humiliate India was the desire to dislocate the Indian economy by diverting resources away from the third five year plan to the very much less profitable business of defence. If you accept that these were the objects China had in mind, then her sudden cease fire at a time when Assam was within her grasp—at a time when as an alternative she could have walked into Bhutan and come down into India over that very much easier frontier—her retirement at that time makes sense because she had in fact achieved what she set out to do. She had taken what she claimed, she had inflicted on India through the army a very humiliating defeat, and she had made it absolutely certain, whatever the politicians may say, that a very considerable proportion of India's resources will in fact have to be diverted from the third plan to the business of building up defence. Having done all that she put forward proposals which were clever because they sounded reasonable; she said "We will go back twelve and a half miles. In NEFA we will go back behind the 1959 line, in Ladakh we will go back behind the September line; we will retire; you also get twelve and a half miles back behind these lines and then we can leave the situation as it is while we talk it all over." Of course in practice it is not as simple as that sounds; the proposals meant that India would lose her forward

posts in Ladakh, and that she would not have the Tangla ridge which is of considerable strategic importance in the North East Frontier Agency. It was cleverly thought out and from China's point of view she had nothing to lose by that withdrawal at that time; because quite apart from anything else massive aid was beginning to pour in from Britain and America. It was very, very impressive to be on some of the air fields of India at that time, and see these great Hercules aircraft pouring in carrying military stores of all kinds; you had a very impressive ocular demonstration of the way in which Britain and America were springing to the rescue; and it must have become pretty clear to China that Britain and America had no intention whatsoever of letting India be defeated. China had everything to gain having achieved her tactical objectives, by withdrawing.

INDIAN REACTIONS

Well now what were the Indian reactions to all this? I suppose the first reaction was the inevitable one of shock, of a sense of humiliation. We in this country have had experiences of the same kind of thing when we suddenly discovered that our defences were not adequate for the job, and as you went about India you felt that this was weighing on the mind and the conscience of all kinds of thinking Indians. They knew that the Indian Army had had great traditions, they had great faith in it and suddenly they found that it had not been able to defend this important frontier—the shock was profound. When a shock is profound you generally want to find somebody else to put the blame on, and you look round for a scapegoat, and so Indian politicians were very quick to find in Mr. Krishna Menon a very suitable scapegoat. Now it is not for me as a foreigner to express judgment on the accuracy of their choice, but I have no intention of springing rapidly and fervently to Mr. Krishna Menon's defence. At any rate let us leave it at that the Indian Congress Party decided that Mr. Krishna Menon was the scapegoat and Mr. Krishna Menon must go. And of course Mr. Krishna Menon did go, but the shock to the Prime Minister was very great, and for a time you could say that Mr. Nehru's own position was to some extent shaken. There were people talking in a way that they would never have talked before—along the lines that perhaps the Prime Minister was a man of peace, and was therefore perhaps not the right man for leading India in war, that perhaps he was getting on in years and ought to make way for somebody more vigorous. You could never have heard that kind of talk in the circles in which it was being bandied about a year before, and for a time it was not at all certain that Mr. Nehru would not in fact find it necessary to go. That soon passed. The danger receded, tempers quietened

down a little bit and people began to realize how much they depended on Mr. Nehru, as the focal point, the uniting influence of the masses of India and they concluded that they really could not do without him.

And then I think the next reaction was the extraordinary spontaneous way in which India turned to Britain and America for aid. Britain's response of course was magnificent. Mr. Macmillan's statement that India should have what she needed and the fact that there was no arguing about money, and that arms, military stores, equipment were poured into India without even any discussion as to how they were to be paid for or if they were to be paid for; all this of course did make a very great impression on the Indian mind. And then out came the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to assist in advising India as to what their needs were, and no doubt to discuss with them the plan for dealing with the Chinese attack if it were repeated. A year ago it would have been quite unthinkable that the Chief of the British Imperial General Staff should be asked out to Delhi, and should go there to assist with them in concerting plans for defence. There is no doubt that this did a good deal to cement relationships between Britain and India. But all my life I have been tremendously nervous of ever taking good relationships for granted; one must never assume that because something good has happened, that because there is a sense of gratitude that that will last unless the sentiment is very, very carefully nurtured. And there are at work other factors which might upset some of this overflow upsurge of goodwill in India towards Britain. One of those of course is the part which the Secretary of State found it necessary to play in trying to persuade India and Pakistan to come to a settlement of the Kashmir issue. I will come back to that point a little bit later, but you can quite understand that kind of thing might well be an occasion of stress and strain and that if we were not careful it might undo some of the goodwill which had been generated by the spontaneous aid.

I think the third reaction in India was an extraordinary feeling of solidarity—people who had been fighting about all kinds of things suddenly began to get together; the Sikhs began to put aside their claim for a Sikh State for the time being. The Dravidians, the D.M.K. down in the South began to say openly that this is no time for arguing about such things; we will postpone all our talk about a separate Dravidian State. The only people who were really confused were the Communists; they were confused because they were split into two parties—one group who condemned China outright and the other group who preferred to preserve their Communist character by not condemning the Chinese. And then there was an upsurge of public feeling against the Communists, and shortly after the critical day many of those Communists who did not oppose

Chinese action found themselves in gaol. They were not put in gaol¹ by the Central Government, they were not put in gaol even on the advice of the Central Government, they were put in gaol by several separate States acting almost independently because those States were reflecting public feeling. It was a feeling of anger against the Communists. Well again this change too may be transient; the most difficult of all times in a war is a long period with nothing happening. We know that in this country; and it is in such a phase that this solidarity might begin to loosen up again.

These effects may be permanent or transient, and one cannot help asking the question as to whether there is to be any permanent effect on India's policy of non-alignment. Now that India has Communist China as an enemy will she pursue the policy of non-alignment? Well I would like to make one point first. I do not think that from our point of view or from the point of view of anybody in the world there would be any value whatsoever in a renunciation by India, a sudden renunciation by India of the policy of non-alignment. That policy, though for a long time it was a source of embarrassment to our American friends, has in fact had very great advantages. It has enabled a number of other countries—Asian and African countries to be brought together under one umbrella, and if India had not had that non-alignment policy there would not have been any umbrella under which they could have been all brought together to some extent outside the Communist fold. So don't think for one minute that I want to see India get up and make speeches and say we are joining the Western Bloc, we are abandoning our policy of non-alignment. But I think a very great change has come over the minds of the educated Indian public. Mr. Nehru himself I think still clings very passionately to the theory of non-alignment, I think he still looks very anxiously towards Russia for help of one kind or another. My impression is that the ordinary educated Indian, certainly in North India says that non-alignment may be a useful label to apply, but it does not really mean anything at all now, because we have in fact seen who our friends are. And I have heard a great many Indians say during these past few weeks, "It is Britain and America who came to the rescue, what did Russia do for us?" And so although non-alignment will be maintained as a public policy, I think its content is quite different from what it was before.

THE ADMINISTRATION

Well now passing on from policy to administration—who is running India today? There has been an agitation—I do not use that word in

the bad sense—in some quarters for the setting up of a war Cabinet definitely charged with the business of running India while the Crisis lasts. That has not been done, but it has not made very much difference because in practice there are really six people who really count in the Central Government. There is the Prime Minister himself, there is Mr. Morarji Desai, there is Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri, there is our old friend T.T.K., there is Mr. Nanda, and there is a newcomer, Mr. Chavan. Mr. Morarji Desai I think has grown in stature very considerably in recent years; he has got far more command of his own ministry than at one time he had and he is an extremely good administrator. He has not I do not think built himself up in the parts of India where he is not known in the way that one hoped that he would, and I think he has not altogether recovered from the damage he did to his own position and reputation in Gujerat by his intervention in local politics there last year, but he is nevertheless a man of considerably increased stature in his own job.

Lal Bahadur Shastri is not an administrator; if one met him for the first time one would think he was rather a timid, meek man, but his influence inside the Congress Party is very great indeed and is growing all the time, and it is still the case as it was two years ago that if trouble arises anywhere, if there is a quarrel he is the one man who can be sent to settle it in the knowledge that all those concerned will respect what he says and carry it out. T.T.K., our old friend T.T.K., an old friend of a great many of us here; I do not think he is in the right job, he is in a job which really means co-ordination of defence production. Well now T.T.K.'s great gifts are, not so much co-ordination as dynamic. I think he would be very much happier running something himself rather than trying to keep together a number of different ministries which may have their different ideas. The really interesting member of the team is the newcomer, Mr. Chavan. Very few of us know him very well; I personally had hardly met him until we had a session together in the British High Commissioner's House in Delhi some time in November, but he is a man who impresses you straight away as being practical minded with his feet on the ground, and he has, of course, come from Maharashtra with a very considerable reputation. In fact, there are a great many people who say that if Mr. Nehru were to go that Mr. Chavan would be as likely as anybody to succeed him. It is not much use making guesses about that; there would I suppose be three potential candidates—Mr. Morarji Desai, Mr. Lal Bahdur Shastri and Mr. Chavan, and what would happen, which of them would be chosen would, I suppose, depend very largely on the circumstances of the Prime Minister's going, and the time when it happened. They are the three chaps whom people generally tip off as being likely successors. The President is, of course, a man of very great

distinction, a very great man indeed. And I think it is very obvious that his authority is growing all the time. I think his advice will count for more and more as the years go by. Many people think that when in due course Mr. Nehru does go then if Radhakrishnan is still the President then his authority will be very great indeed. But in spite of all these first class men, there is something wrong in the administration in Delhi—there is no directing will. You are conscious of a great many good men working separately and nobody pulling them altogether. You are conscious of fifteen or sixteen, or whatever the number may be of different ministries going their own separate ways; you are conscious of the fact that there is hardly a thing you can call the Government of India. There are sixteen jolly good ministries, and it was borne on me very much this time by one's attempts to get orders passed over particular things. You get one order from one ministry and another order from another ministry; and this with regard to subjects directly related to the Chinese aggression. And I feel that somehow or other there has to be a rehabilitation of the whole setup in Delhi—somebody has to take control, there has to be once again a Government of India and not just fifteen or sixteen ministries.

THE EVACUATION OF PLANTERS

Now let me pass from that to the area where the fighting took place. Here again I am not going to talk about the fighting and the events concerned with it, but very briefly about some of its repercussions. When the Chinese were approaching Tezpur and it was pretty obvious that if they chose to come on there was nothing whatsoever to stop them from getting right down to the Brahmaputra, the Governor of Assam gave directions—or perhaps we had better call it advice because there was perhaps no statutory power to direct—but he gave either directions or advice that the planters and their wives should get out from the Brahmaputra valley while there was time. That order did not in fact reach the North bank when the crisis supervened, but a local military Officer, Brigadier, General Staff, a man of courage who was prepared to take decisions sent for the Chairman of the Branch Association and said, “Mobilize your women and children; you must be ready to move out tomorrow morning.” Tomorrow morning came and the aeroplanes were there, and the Brigadier, General Staff said, “Get out now, for God's sake while there is time.” It was a perfectly sensible and right thing to say. But I rather want to emphasize it because since all this has been over, since the danger and the excitement has died down there have been people telling rather different stories; there have been people with ends of their own to serve who have been saying that the planters went out of their own volition because they did

not think it was safe. Well now I have been able to document this very carefully indeed and I would like to place on record, and I am going to use quite blunt language here, that any statement that the planters went out of their own volition and not because they were told to is a lie; there is no other word for it at all. It is documented up to the hilt and there is no room for doubt about it at all. I think it is important to nail that lie once for all. Another point I would like to make is that this was not a matter of race, it was not the British planters, it was the planters, the British planters and the Indian planters and their wives were all told to go for the perfectly good sensible reason that if the Chinese had come down into those valleys they would not have been very interested in oppressing the labour force, but they would have been interested in breaking the influence of the management classes. It is the same sort of policy that the Japanese followed when they invaded various parts of the Far East during the war. So the advice given by the military authorities was sensible, it was right and it was carried out. But so often when these dangers are over people, who in some cases have not been too conspicuous for their own gallantry begin to say that other people should not have run away. And some of the people in Assam who began to talk like this were not conspicuous for their own particular gallantry in the critical moment when the danger was there. And I think it is very important to place this on record. The planters went back extremely quickly; on the North Bank for example the move out took place on the twentieth, the cease fire began that night and on the twenty-second the first batch of planters went back to the North Bank; bit by bit they trickled back and their wives went back as soon as they were allowed to. We had a lot of trouble over some of the ladies because they were determined to go back even when the order was that they must not do so. One or two went as far as the airport and had to be pulled off aeroplanes and told "You can not go back now because the Government order is that they do not want you back yet." The Government were quite frank about this, they said that the presence of ladies and children who would have to be looked after would embarrass the fighting forces if there were a comeback of the Chinese; but planters wives, whether they are Indian or British, are people of spirit as a rule, and it was quite difficult to stop them from going back.

The actual physical business of the evacuation was done extraordinarily well; first of all by the Indian Air Force, who did quite a magnificent job over it, and then their efforts were supplemented by a certain number of Royal Air Force planes which, with the permission of the Government of India, were brought over from Singapore for this particular purpose. But I would like to pay a very high tribute indeed to the work done by the Indian Air Force under rather difficult conditions. Labour on the

tea gardens behaved extraordinarily well. When the planters went back they found there had been no looting, there had been no breaking down of the bonds of discipline; people had carried on quietly and they were very soon able to take up their old established places. In most places they were welcomed back, and when the ladies went back they were welcomed even more; so that labour behaved with extraordinary steadiness and deserved very, very great credit indeed.

ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CHINESE AGGRESSION

Well I have not time to talk any more about the very colourful incidents connected with the Chinese attack, but it is worthwhile spending a minute or so on considering the possible economic aftermath of this attack. India obviously has to go in now for very considerable defence—defence on a massive scale. Now what is that going to entail? I suppose in the first place it will entail some increase in taxation; it is a very unpleasant and unpopular thing to suggest, but I think it is pretty clear that if India has to meet this additional expense over and above what she had in mind for the Third Plan some increase in taxation will take place. And the important thing I think is that the increase should be put in the right form; there has been a growing volume of opinion amongst people who study economics and business in India of late that direct taxation has perhaps reached very nearly a maximum. There is hardly any scope for more personal direct taxation, there is not much—in fact there is not any scope for more Company taxation if the Companies are to plough back their profits into reserves and build up for the future. And I think that it is perfectly right to say that if there has to be an increase in taxation it has to be in the form of indirect taxation. The National Council of applied economic research did give some indication some little time ago that that was its view too, that it was in that field that any increase of revenue would have to be found.

I think another effect of all this defence business is going to be that imports are going to become tighter; the foreign exchange position is bound to be strained more than would otherwise have been the case, and India is bound to look with a more jealous eye upon all use of that foreign exchange. People carrying on industries in India will find increasing difficulty in getting their imports. That of course will pose a very difficult problem for the Government of India; if you have a time when there is inadequate foreign exchange for all the needs of existing and new industry what do you do? Do you let existing industry run short so that some new industries can start or do you look after existing industry and be very niggardly about granting permission to new industries to start?

I do not know which of those lines will be taken it is a difficult problem; I myself would take the view that consolidation is even more important than new development, but that view may be wrong and I am not putting it forward dogmatically. But I suppose it is clear beyond doubt, although no politician will yet admit this, that there has to be some modification of the Third Five Year Plan. Even before the Chinese attack the Third Five Year Plan was beginning to run into financial difficulties. India's export earnings were not increasing as rapidly as had been hoped, and it was pretty clear from the last figures that I saw that her export earnings during the period of the Third Five Year Plan would fall very considerably short of the target figures set up by the planners. There is nothing surprising about that, it has always been clear to a good many of us that there is not the scope for a rapid sensational increase in India's export earnings. I wish to God that there were, but there is not; and one felt all along that they would fall below the target, and they are in fact doing so. And now on top of that defence has to be financed; well nobody yet knows how much it will be possible for the rest of the world to do. The Consortium will be meeting again—the Consortium that deals with foreign aid to India will be meeting again perhaps in March, and I have no idea how much it will be possible for the Countries concerned to put up. As far as we who are friends of India's are concerned we go on pressing the whole time on our own Government for the maximum possible help that can be given to India and to Pakistan, which I will come to presently, must be given, but what that maximum is I do not know. My own guess is that with the extra foreign exchange needs for defence India will have to draw in her horns in the matter of the Plan as it stands. So I would guess that there will be some modification of the Plan.

POLITICS IN PAKISTAN

Now I am going to switch quite inconsequently from India to Pakistan, and I am going to begin by talking about Pakistan's Internal Affairs. When I spoke some months ago on this subject I had the temerity to express some regrets that the President had found it necessary to move away from the system which it seemed to me had served Pakistan well for three years, and I expressed some doubts as to whether the halfway house between Presidential rule and democracy would in fact work. I must say that my recent visit to Pakistan fully confirmed me in those doubts. There have in fact already been some changes which make it very clear how difficult it is to maintain the halfway house that the President tried to establish. One of the most important changes was with regard to the relations of Ministers to the Legislatures. The President's plan was

to keep the Ministers free from the pressure of public opinion, to keep them as his men, and for that reason it was his intention that they should not be members of the Legislatures at all. He had to give way over that very soon after the new Constitution came into force, and he agreed that Ministers could be members of the Legislatures. Then again the President's original view was that things should not work on the party system; you remember his theory of Basic Democracies—everybody should be elected on personal grounds, politics in Pakistan should not get back on to party lines. That may have been an impossible dream; I do not myself believe you can have even a faint imitation of the parliamentary system without having parties working. There too the President before very long had to recognize that it was not workable and parties are in fact operating in Pakistan today. Then again the President's view was that the Legislature itself must be the sole judge as to whether the law is right and proper and is in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution or not. He was basically opposed to the idea that the Law Courts should pronounce on the validity or otherwise of Parliamentary Legislation. Well he has had to say already that he will agree under certain circumstances that Legislation shall be justiciable with regard to its constitutional validity. And all this means that the Constitution is changing—that the pattern we have now is something quite different from the pattern that was in the President's mind when he set out to frame the present Constitution. I said that parties were operating—just a few words about what those parties are. Soon after the new Constitution came into force the Moslem League Convention decided that it would support the Constitution, it would support the President. That view was not regarded with favour by a great many people in the Moslem League, and so a separate body, the Moslem League Council came into being in opposition to the Convention, and it built its programme round the idea of opposing the Constitution, refusing to take office until the Constitution was amended and demanding that everything should be based on direct election. And a very old friend of yours, Sir John, and of mine Khwaja Nazimuddin, was brought in as the Head of that Council. Khwaja Nazimuddin was a very much respected man. He was at one time Governor General and at another time Prime Minister, and is respected for his tremendous integrity; he is an old personal friend of mine and I think he would not mind my saying that I doubt very much whether he is up to the subtleties of some of those with whom he will have to work in the Moslem League Council, but he was at any rate a very respectable figurehead.

Then Mr. Suhrawardy, as soon as he was released from his detention became very active indeed in political organization. He is a remarkable man is Mr. Suhrawardy. Many of us here know him, I remember saying

here some four or five years ago that the last chance of democracy, parliamentary democracy, working in Pakistan would be if Mr. Suhrawardy, who was then Prime Minister and the President who was then General Mirza, could get on well together—well they did not, and the thing came to an end. But Suhrawardy is an extremely remarkable man, very dynamic, lives for nothing but politics and work, and he has set up a body called the National Democratic Front. It is not a party in one sense, it has not got a particular policy for the future, it is a collection of those people, other than the Moslem League Council, who are opposed to the present Constitution and are determined to get back the full form of parliamentary government. Recently Mr. Suhrawardy has been taken ill, but before his illness he was stumping the country using all that dynamic energy of his to stir people up against the present state of things and to try to force the President's hand.

In the National Assembly itself you have the rather piquant position that the Opposition is led by the President's brother, Sardar Bahadur Khan, who is at the Head of a group known as the People's Coalition. But the real strength of the Opposition is not inside the Legislatures—because you remember that many of the most important political leaders in Pakistan are still disqualified from membership of the various assemblies. They are running things from outside; and the real strength of the Opposition is outside; and that of course is a basic weakness of the present position, that many of those people who are the natural leaders of politics in Pakistan cannot at present hold seats in the Assemblies because of the electoral Bodies Disqualification Ordinance which still operates against them. Now the President is very, very determined not to remove these disqualifications. He said, and I think he said rightly that the whole object of the exercise was to get rid of corruption in Pakistan and I will not have back the people who led Pakistan into the parlous situation that it occupied in 1958. On the other hand you have a very unreal situation—if all the real political ability is outside the Legislatures how can you run a democratic system? At present the real leaders are represented by (I do not use the term disrespectfully) by stooges inside the various Legislatures. This is a point on which there will be a trial of strength in due course between the President and those who oppose the present Constitution.

There are in fact three main issues: first whether the various legislative bodies and the President himself are to be elected by the Basic Democracies or by direct suffrage; second whether there is to be responsible Government in the technical sense, are the Ministers to have to go on an adverse vote in the Legislature? or are they to be the President's men kept there just as long as he wants them?; third, are the financial powers of the Legislature

to be as restricted as they are at present or are they to be financially omniscient like Parliament here? Now all this really boils down to the question, Who is to be the boss? Is the President to be the boss or is the National Assembly to be the boss? This is a strange position because nobody wants the President to go—the President is tremendously respected, tremendously popular, and even those who are fighting hardest to try to make him give way on these Constitutional points would be extremely worried if he were to decide to go. They want him there, but they want the power in their own hands, and that had produced a sort of situation in November last which was getting pretty explosive. The general feeling of competent observers then was that it could not last very long. As I said earlier, the expectation was that boiling point would come when the Assembly met in December. Well that did not happen, because when the international situation began to dominate everything the President decided to call the Assembly in November; a session was held which began with a day's secret session, and at that session both the secret session and the open session were devoted almost entirely to international affairs, which means very largely relations with India. And so for the time being the crisis was put off. But it has only been put off. I think there are signs already that people's minds have begun to turn back again to domestic issues, and it will not be very long before the whole question is fought out again.

PAKISTAN AND INDIA

I have said that people's attentions were distracted to international affairs—well international relations with Pakistan means one thing, and one thing only really or rather two things, it means relations with India with regard to Kashmir, and it means the Afghanistan problem. As far as Kashmir is concerned it is the keypoint always to the feeling between India and Pakistan. When Kashmir comes into prominence, perhaps because it is raised again at the United Nations, feeling begins to mount. Kashmir you remember was raised again before the United Nations last year, and in the middle of the year feeling in Pakistan was beginning to rise, Pakistanis were beginning to feel more and more that this issue must be settled, and when they begin to feel that then of course they meant that India must give in over it—just as in India when people say the issue must be settled they say that Pakistan must give in over it. Well this feeling began to mount. Then came the China episode and India was in difficulties, and there were certain irresponsible people in Pakistan who said this is grand, this gives us our opportunity, let us deal with India while the going is good. The President of course does not give in to that

sort of talk. He is a man of sound common sense and balanced judgment and he kept his head all the time, and he would have nothing to do with that kind of approach. And then a rather more difficult situation arose because people in Pakistan began to be quite genuinely alarmed at the British aid to India for use against the Chinese. They began to say that aid may be given to India for use against the Chinese, but in due course it will be used against us. There is a conviction on the part of a great many Pakistanis that India is determined to attack Pakistan, and this time I stayed in the houses of quite a number of my Pakistani friends instead of staying with officials, and met dozens and dozens and dozens of educated Pakistanis and found 90 per cent of them obsessed with this idea that some day India will attack us. Now I do not believe that idea to have any foundation at all, but I think it extremely important that my Indian friends should realize and should believe that that idea is genuinely entertained by most Pakistanis. So they began to say when Britain supplies arms to India without settling our quarrel she is endangering us and she has no right to do it. I do not accept that view at all. I think it would have been quite wrong from every point of view on Britain's part not to give prompt aid to India when India was threatened by China. Let us suppose it had been the other way round. Supposing Pakistan had been threatened by Russia through Afghanistan, would my Pakistani friends think that Britain should have said we cannot help you because you have a quarrel with India? It is unthinkable, and the one possibility at some time or other might be just as real as the other. I think whether India or Pakistan is threatened by a Communist power there is no question about it at all, Britain has to come to the rescue, and I would have been ashamed to stand here today if Britain had not come to the rescue. And I do ask my Pakistani friends to do their best to make this understood by their compatriots in Pakistan. Britain has no choice—India or Pakistan must have assistance from us in defence if they are threatened from outside by a Communist power.

But of course the whole situation has been to some extent complicated by what you might call Pakistan's China line, by the increasing ties of friendship between Pakistan and China. I am not criticizing Pakistan for building up those ties of friendship—it is a good sensible thing to do—if you have a powerful neighbour next door and you have no particular quarrel with him, well obviously you ought to build up friendship to the greatest possible extent. But of course it did complicate things coming at that particular time because it was regarded in India as a deliberate move against India. It is a curious situation. You have India today very strongly anti-China, but her Prime Minister still very disposed to try and keep in close with Russia; and you have Pakistan worried about Afghanistan and

therefore nervous of Russia, but building up a friendship with China. It is a curious reversal in the one country of the situation in the other. And it is a situation which might become delicate, and even dangerous. None of us know how real the rift is between Russia and China. We guess about it but none of us really know. If that rift were real it would be a very serious thing if we found Pakistan in alliance with China, India very close to Russia, and Russia and China disposed to have it out with one another. I only mention that to show how delicate the whole of this business is, and how extremely careful both India and Pakistan need to be

KASHMIR

Now there is one subject about which you will expect me to say a great deal, and about which I am going to say nothing, and that is the subject of the forthcoming Kashmir talks. Or I will correct what I have said—I will not say nothing, I will say one thing, that in the judgment of everybody who has watched these things carefully some kind of settlement between India and Pakistan is absolutely vital. I do not believe that, on a long view, in the absence of a settlement of that kind India can defend herself against China. And I do not believe that if India were to fall a victim to Chinese aggression that it would be very long before Pakistan fell too. I do not believe that alliance between Pakistan and China would count for that much if China once found herself in possession of the Assam valley. I cannot imagine the Chinese not taking East Pakistan if they were in possession of Assam. And as I see it therefore a settlement of the quarrel between India and Pakistan is absolutely vital to both countries. It was for this reason that the Secretary of State, Mr. Duncan Sandys, took tremendous pains and trouble—he spent two whole nights without sleep to my knowledge in the process—trying to persuade both countries that they must get together and settle their quarrels. Being a wise man he did not try to tell them what the settlement should be. He tried to impress on both of them that a settlement was essential and to beg them to get together for talks. Well the first two rounds of those talks have already taken place, and as far as one can tell there is not very much information available about them yet—as far as one can tell there has not been a very great deal of progress made. But everybody who cares about both countries must hope beyond everything, that at the next round an attempt really will be made to find some way of settling this tremendously important problem. We cannot afford to have a row between the two countries in that place right up where Sinkiang comes in, where you have China on one side and Russia on the other side, you simply cannot afford to have a bitter quarrel going on between the two countries about that particular

area. But as I say I am going to be thoroughly mean, I am going to express no opinion whatsoever as to what the settlement should be. I expect after I have sat down someone will get up and ask what I think about the rights and wrongs of the Kashmir question and I shall have to invent my twentieth different reason for saying why I won't give any opinion at all.

But I would like to end on this note—I am not going to stop today to talk about the economic affairs, there is not time—but I would like to end on this note, that to us in this room both India and Pakistan matter tremendously, and because they matter tremendously I think there are few things that we want in the world more than to see them get together. They cannot afford not to get together. The issue which separates them is one which it ought to be possible to solve and the whole needs of the West democratic world, not the Western world only but the democratic world including India, demands that this cause of friction should be brought to an end. I am afraid I have talked at some considerable length. Even so I have left out many things that I would have liked to have said, but I think you will agree that I was extremely lucky to be in India and Pakistan at this particular time, and I think you will also agree with me that it was one of the most dramatic moments in history, I will end as I began by saying I wish you could have had a really first class journalistic reporter to convey this sense of drama and tension to you.

The Sino-Burmese Border Agreement

SIR. The author of the article in the January issue of the journal on the Sino-Burmese frontiers thinks it a mystery, and a great tribute to China, that she has made a generous frontier settlement with Burma. What can be the reason, other than China's magnanimity, is the question asked. The question is, perhaps of design, naïve.

The answer is that Peking is determined to isolate India by showing how 'reasonable' the Chinese can be to other neighbours with frontier questions to settle. With this in view a settlement has been made not only with Burma (along the very McMahon Line in the north that China will not accept for India), but with Nepal also along the Himalayan crest (which again China will not accept for India). Not only that, but China has it seems, now made a settlement with Pakistan west of the Karakoram

Pass when she is opposing India in the same terrain east of the Karakoram Pass. Nor is that all. China will not agree even to discuss with India the frontiers of Sikkim and Bhutan, cis-Himalayan regions whose defence is India's treaty responsibility.

To the critic who might say, "But China's action with these others shows that India only has to negotiate to get equal reason bestowed on her," the reply is that, while China accepts principles of settlement with them such as the Himalayan crest, she will not accept them for India, but uses force to defeat them. And further than that: Burma, Nepal and so on have not finished with China, having agreed on a frontier. Evidence is accumulating that it is not enough to say that China has agreed on a border demarcation with the Burmese Government. There are reports of Chinese infiltration among the Kachins, for instance, and of China sending in agents to the Nagas and so on. In Nepal we know that China is building a road to Katmandu and supporting the King against popular movements. There are whispers, too, of a need for a confederation of Himalayan States advanced during the last few months, and evidently directed at Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan.

It is to be expected that the next round of the Sino-Indian contest will not be a military one. It will be directed by means of subversion and infiltration of the central Himalayan region (Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan) and ostensible friendship combined with infiltration round the flanks (Burma and Pakistan).

For all those to whom Chinese overtures now appear reasonable the wise motto is: Beware the Trojan horse! (. . . *equo ne credite, Teucric, quidquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*) which may be translated:

There was a young lady of Riga
Who went for a ride on a tiger,
They came back from that ride
With the lady inside
And a smile on the face of the tiger!

Yours faithfully,

OLAF CAROE.

Lecture Discussion

The Sino-Indian Frontier Dispute

SIR OLAF CAROE, KCSI, KCIE, addressed a joint meeting of the East India Association and the Royal Over-Seas League on Wednesday, 21st November, 1962, at Over-Seas House, St. James's, s.w.1. The Rt. Hon. Lord SPENS presided and introducing the speaker said: As usual when I preside at these meetings of this Association, I never have to say anything about the person who is going to lecture because he is, as a rule, far better known to all of you than he is personally to me. This time I hope to be able to claim to know our lecturer as well as anybody here. I never had the advantage of serving with him in India, although I have once or twice been entertained by him there, which perhaps is better than serving with him, but Sir Olaf Caroe needs absolutely no introduction to this audience at all. We are exceedingly fortunate at this particular moment to have got someone who knows the Frontier as well as he does, and who not only knows the Frontier physically, but has been in the history of the Frontier for a large number of recent years and knows a great deal about the negotiations, and the claims, and so forth. At

this particular moment a talk from Sir Olaf, I believe, would have as great value as a talk from anybody who has appeared on the B.B.C. or anywhere else, or has written to *The Times* or any of our great newspapers.

DISCUSSION

Dr. BRAMLEY: Referring to your remark that Canada is sending a lot of grain to China, surely it is a very good thing because if you feed the population rather than starve it they may not have an aggressive future. If you feed them and house them, then there will not be a revolution.

SIR OLAF CAROE: There has been a revolution already. I do not think I can answer that effectively. I do think it should be considered in Canada, at any rate, whether Canada should send grain.

Mr. LIONEL JARDINE: Is there any special significance in the date March 1962, which I think the Indian Government has adopted, rather than November, 1959.

SIR OLAF CAROE: I think it is September 8th, 1962, that was the beginning of the Chinese offensive on the McMahon Line. It started

really on September 8th, and what India said, in effect, was that the Chinese must vacate the gains made since then before India could talk. The difference is that the Indians cannot contemplate going back in what they regard as their territory, and the Chinese say that both sides must go back. As regards the McMahon Line, as I tried to show, this question does not only concern the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, but also Ladakh. The two things act and interact the whole time and the Chinese would be left in occupation of even larger parts of Ladakh if the Indians were to accept this, even if it meant that the Chinese went back behind the McMahon Line.

Mr. H. H. HOOD: Would Sir Olaf tell us a little more about the Ladakh area, which is featured a good deal in the newspapers? For instance, the total area and what would be the advantages to China by taking possession of that territory.

Sir OLAF CAROE: To take the last point first, the advantage to China is that the road from Sinkiang into Tibet crosses that territory. The territory itself, except for its value in communications, is almost completely valueless. If you want to know something about the history of why India is in Ladakh, it is roughly this. The Mughals, as you know, took Kashmir in the time of Akbar towards the end of the 16th century when Queen Elizabeth was

on the throne here, but they never penetrated into Ladakh at that time. Ladakh appears in later local records in Aurangzeb's time a century later as paying tribute to the Governor of Kashmir, about 1690. When the Mughal Empire began to break up on Nadir Shah's capture of Delhi in 1739, the founder of Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Abduli, the Durrani, took Kashmir in 1752. The Durrani held it over 50 years, but they never got up into Ladakh. Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab, conquered Ladakh again for India through his feudatory, the ancestor of the Marajahs of Kashmir. Gulab Singh was his agent in Kashmir, and one of his generals, his name was Zorawar Singh, took Baltistan and Ladakh and made them dependencies of Kashmir. Zorawar himself was killed when he invaded Tibet. Then there was an agreement in 1842 between the Sikh Government of the Punjab in Kashmir and the Chinese and Tibetans—the Tibetans were under a vague Chinese suzerainty—which laid down the frontiers of Ladakh between Kashmir and Tibet. That was in 1842, before the Sikh wars and before Kashmir came under British suzerainty. In 1847, after the first Sikh war, when the British became the suzerains of Kashmir, they asked the Chinese "What about this frontier between Ladakh and Tibet?" And the Chinese said: "We will stand on the 1842 agreement made with Ranjit Singh's Government and the frontier is very well known and that shall be

the frontier." That is roughly the position, and since then any one of you who has been in Kashmir—and some of you, no doubt, have been to Leh, the capital of Ladakh—will know that Ladakh was a dependency of Kashmir.

A MEMBER: May I ask about a report I read in the British Press that the Chinese had an arrangement for building a road from Lhasa to Katmandu and that it was due to be completed in October. Is this a fact?

Sir OLAF CAROE: I would not know the details. I do not know whether any of our Indian friends here, or anyone from Nepal, can give us actual information on the state of that, but certainly the work on the road has been begun and it is part of the understanding between China and Nepal reached as a result of their frontier demarcation. The Nepal situation is very interesting because when the Ranas who ruled Nepal for over 100 years were pushed out in 1950, the watch-word was representative Government rather on the lines of India, and the King was the person under whom it was expected that this result would be attained. But as we have all seen, once the King had got his power back—during the time of the Ranas he was only a puppet—it was not very long before the King himself got rid of representative Government in Nepal and he is strongly supported by the Chinese and by the Russians. You have the very odd situation

of a King being supported against his people by the Communist Powers.

Sir CYRIL JONES: A big question mark which some of us feel in trying to interpret what lies behind recent Chinese actions is whether they are indicative of a deliberate policy of expansionism on the part of China, or whether it is, as the Chinese have persistently maintained, a question of frontier rectification. The encroachment into Northern Assam seems to indicate a deliberate policy of expansion. Would it be legitimate to assume from this recent Chinese withdrawal offer, which I think Sir Olaf said indicates a willingness on the part of the Chinese to trade in recognition of the McMahon Line on the East with securing a position in Ladakh on the West, that the latest of their actions is in fact frontier rectification and not a policy of expansionism?

Sir OLAF CAROE: I wish I knew China better. I spent 34 years in India and two days in China, but I think Sir Cyril Jones's questions are so pertinent that I feel he could probably give you a much better answer than I can. I still feel that what I tried to describe as a certain atavistic attitude to history is probably at the root of Chinese minds, and it may be good tactics at the moment to persuade the world, especially India, that this is only frontier rectification and that all that the Chinese really want is the chunk of Ladakh where their road is.

But I would not put it past them, when they have won the first round, to work for a resuscitation of all the shaded areas on the map—all the shaded areas together are about the size of England—that surely must be termed expansionism.

MR. W. E. R. GURNEY: You told us that China may well be playing a diplomatic game in attacking India through Assam, and she might well be willing to recognize the McMahon Line in exchange for the chunk of Ladakh which includes Aksai Chin. Apart from that, you have also said that this is a much greater question, which it obviously is, and I would like to ask: If you get a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, would Field Marshal Ayub Khan's suggestion that Pakistan and India have a common defence policy for the Northern Frontier help things along? In that case medical supplies could go through Pakistan, and so on. Also the question arises whether this part of Ladakh is of very much use to India. The United Nations proposal is that there should be a plebiscite in Kashmir. If there was a plebiscite it is quite possible that the Ladakhis who, I gather, are ethnically Tibetans, Buddhist by religion and speak Tibetan, might very well elect almost unanimously—if they were allowed to make the choice—to go to Tibet, in which case Mr. Nehru would not have to give a portion of India away to China, but would make a virtue of self-determination.

SIR OLAF CAROE: I have never heard anyone else suggest that there should be a plebiscite in any part of Kashmir to allow any part of Kashmir to go out of the Sub-Continent altogether. It is quite a new idea, and I would have said it was an idea which neither India nor Pakistan would look at for a moment. If you will forgive me, I do not propose to get into a discussion on the Kashmir question or a settlement of it. I would like to put forward one constructive idea, if I may, on the frontiers generally which springs out of this premise that any assault on the perimeter of the Sub-Continent is a matter of equal interest to both States. That is that. If India could say that the frontiers on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line are as vital to India as they are to Pakistan, in fact vital to the security and survival of both States, and Pakistan in return could say that the McMahon Line is of equal importance to them as it is to India, then they could be as one absolutely on the sacrosanctity of the frontiers of the Sub-Continent. I believe that is an approach which would be really constructive.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR THOMAS HUTTON: I have only two points to make, on one of which I feel rather strongly. I have met a few people—I am sure there are none of them here today—who have been very critical of India in regard to its policy in the past of non-alignment, neutrality or whatever you like to call it. They

have said almost, in so many words, "It serves them right!" I would ask if you meet any people like that to ask them to read certain memoirs which are now appearing in *The Times*, to visit, if they like, Grosvenor Square and see the 'Ban the Bomb' people, or else, if they are of my age, to cast their minds back to the peace campaign which was so fervent in this country between the wars. We have also gone through our period of neutrality and non-alignment and we paid the penalty, and we ought not be critical of other people with similar ideals.

Finally, I want to do my duty quickly and to pay a tribute—with which I am sure you will all agree—to our speaker's amazing knowledge of this subject. I do not think I could stand up and remember even one of those names, let alone numbers of them. He has made the whole thing extremely clear to us, he has shown that he has an encyclopedic knowledge of it, and I am sure we have enjoyed his talk today as much, if not more, than anything we have ever heard.

A Visit to India after the Chinese Invasion

Mr. JOHN TILNEY, MP, TD, spoke at a joint meeting of the East India Association and the Royal Over-Seas League on Tuesday, 8th January, 1963, at Over-Seas House,

St. James's, S.W.1. The Rt. Hon. Lord SPENS, KBE, presided.

DISCUSSION

Dr. BRAMLEY: You passed through Russia. Now all this is very serious not only for the West, but I think for Russia. Do you think that the Russian Government will acquiesce if the Chinese Government think it fit to do what they like to do? Do you not think that perhaps the great Comintern of Russia will help in the freedom of the world?

Mr. TILNEY: I wish I knew. But I am reminded that when I was in Moscow, when I was asking questions about China, the conversation was immediately turned to something else, and when I was in Peking and asking about Russia, again the conversation was immediately altered.

Dr. BRAMLEY: It seems extraordinary that the Indian Government did not have enough military intelligence to know what the Chinese were about to do, and they seek aid and arms at the last moment, when it is almost too late nearly. Why did they not fortify themselves a year before to be ready for this catastrophe?

Mr. TILNEY: I imagine that it is not all that easy to know what is going on in China and certainly up in Tibet. There had, of course, been the Tibetan refugees, but that was a little time ago, and that is the

great strength unfortunately of Communist tyranny; they stop people from finding out. I know in our Embassy in Peking, if anyone wanted to go anywhere—outside the great Wall, the Ming Tombs, Tienbin or more than about eight miles outside Peking—they had to give about three weeks or a month's notice as to where they wanted to go, so everyone is aware of exactly where they go. It is not all that easy. Whereas in India anyone can go wherever they like. It is one of the disadvantages of democracy.

Mr. RADCLIFF: I would like to ask Mr. Tilney how he thinks India could improve her public image in certain countries that feel that they have been victims of Indian military attack. For example how can India convince the Portuguese that she is a victim of military force and a friend in Rhodesia tells me that India has a very bad public image and also in Katanga. How can India improve her public image in those countries?

Mr. TILNEY: I would not like to comment on that. I think that there are many in India who may now regret what happened in Goa, but it is not for me to comment or even to give advice.

Mrs. ZINKIN: When you were in Delhi did you get the impression that the people in command, perhaps the President more than the other people, or the Defence Minister were considering the problems that

face India on two borders: the possible Pakistani aggression in Kashmir and that forces would therefore not be available for defence in Ladakh. How seriously were they looking at it?

Mr. TILNEY: I think they are well aware of that problem, and I think a lot of troops have been moved from the frontier south of Kashmir. Everyone is very well aware of the cost, in terms of military might and of actual economics, of what it means to be fighting on two fronts. The prizes of an agreement over Kashmir are very big indeed.

Dr. BRAMLEY: Do you think it a good idea to send arms to Pakistan now that they seem to be worried that only India is getting arms?

Mr. TILNEY: Surely what one wants really to do is eliminate the causes of friction between the two countries rather than to arm both, possibly against each other. That must be wrong. It is the causes of that friction that, I think, one wants to eliminate. But we have got to be awfully careful in giving advice. It is rather like interfering in a row between one's own family; they may turn ultimately on you. It really is not our job to interfere unless we are asked by both sides to do so. I remember in my first election, if I may tell a short story, that there were a number of spoilt votes. One of the voting papers had noughts for all three candidates,

and another one in my favour had not one cross but two crosses against my name, and underneath my name was "Love from Olga." Unfortunately, that was disallowed too. The crosses showed that she wanted to do something badly, but you have got to be very careful how you do it!

A MEMBER: Has Mr. Tilney any comments to make on the Colombo proposals, particularly with regard to Mrs. Bandaranaike's mission in relation to the Chinese and Indian agreement. And secondly would he like to make any comments on the historical background of the McMahon Line which does give a certain measure of support to perhaps the Chinese case or perhaps more a matter of argument than sometimes thought.

MR. TILNEY: In front of this audience, who must know far more about the McMahon Line than I do, I really do hesitate to make any comment on the second part. As regards Mrs. Bandaranaike's mission and the proposals, these are not really yet known, and so one cannot make a comment on them.

SIR OLAF CAROE: I think we are agreed that we have had an extraordinary deep and far reaching talk from Mr. John Tilney. When I saw the picture of him and that he was going out to India, I said to my wife: "Good Lord! John Tilney will have a time, and he will have an awful lot of homework to do." It is fright-

fully difficult to even understand the beginnings of these lines, but I think that we are all agreed that we have heard reason to believe and think that this is far more than a border dispute. It is a tremendous thing, it is probably the biggest thing that has happened since 1950, this rivalry between India and China and whether, as Mr. Tilney said, India and indeed the sub-Continent can remain in the free world is really the issue. And I think that we all rise to the challenge of his last remarks: That this is a matter which demands statesmanship of the very highest order on the parts of everybody, in India, Pakistan, Gt. Britain in the United States and elsewhere. I think we will also agree that he has shown us the line to statesmanship.

Crisis in South Asia

SIR PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS, CIE, addressed a joint-meeting of the East India Association, Pakistan Society, and the Royal Over-Seas League at Over-Seas House, St. James's, S.W.1, on Tuesday, 22nd January, 1963.

SIR JOHN WOODHEAD presided and introducing the speaker said: Sir Percival Griffiths is well known to you all and no introduction by me is necessary, but I would like to say one thing that this his last visit to India was the forty-eighth visit he has made to India to the sub-Continent since Independence; so

he should know something about India and Pakistan should he not? And Sir Percival I am rather glad to be in the Chair today because it will be the last occasion in which I shall be able to keep you in order. I was up to the 1st of January this year President of the India, Pakistan, Burma Association and Sir Percival has succeeded me, so I shall be able to keep him in order today, but I shall not be able to keep him in order in future; but Sir Percival's knowledge of India and Pakistan is quite astounding. He went out to India, to the sub-Continent in October last year and was there until the end of December. He visited many parts of India and Pakistan. He went up to the Assam and saw the tea garden areas, and I am sure he will be able to give us a most interesting account of what happened in India during those two months. When he went out I do not suppose that he ever expected that there would be a crisis such as has happened—he arrived out there in October, but soon after he got there of course the invasion of India by China took place and he spent a very active time between India and Pakistan.

You know Sir Percival well enough, I am sure he will give you a most lucid account of what has happened.

DISCUSSION

Mrs. ZINKIN: How much would the Third Five Year Plan have to be cut?

Sir PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS: I am afraid I cannot even guess that yet because I do not know the starting point. I have no idea what the Budget of defence would have to be for India until the strategists, or whatever the right word is, have worked out what they are going to need in the way of defence one does not know where to begin to start guessing about that; you will get perhaps a better idea in a few months time. I am sorry I cannot give an intelligent answer at the moment.

Mr. ZAMAN: You have said that China has already achieved its objective and that is why she stopped the war. Do you think that in view of this situation during the next Spring there will be no war?

Sir PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS: I said that China had achieved her immediate objective. I have very little doubt that China's long term objective is to be the boss of Asia, but there may be many things to be done in the process of becoming that before a massive attack on India—she may find it necessary to get a position in Burma, she may find it necessary to occupy many parts of South Asia before she is ready to try any real crossing of swords with India. Well now if I were China that would be my line, but I am not China and I do not know. If you make me guess I would guess that there will not be a fresh attack in the Spring because I do not see what China has to gain by it yet,

but that is a very wild guess and I may have to confess to you next year that I was wrong. My guess would be no, not next Spring.

Mr. ISLAM: Does the Speaker think that the West should now bring more pressure to bear on India so that the negotiations will not fail?

Sir PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS: Well, I would disapprove of pressure being brought to bear on India and not on Pakistan, or on Pakistan and not on India. The job of the West is to say to both countries "You have jolly well got to find a settlement."

Mr. H. A. MEDD: There was one thing that Sir Percival said that surprised me and I think may have surprised several other people and that was that in the Government of India as organized at present the fifteen or sixteen people who were extremely good at their own individual jobs, but they were not under any unitary rule from anybody. Now we have always been given to understand that is for some years that if ever there was a Prime Minister who has led pre-eminently that country it was Mr. Nehru, it seems then that this failure if it is a failure being evident does it date from before the time when you said that his reputation possibly suffered a setback due to the Chinese business or was it evident before that?

Sir PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS: It was not very evident before that Sir, it began to be evident really when the China thing began to be the dominant factor, and I suspect that there are perhaps two reasons for it. One is that Mr. Nehru all his life has striven for peace with China and has had to see the collapse of his foreign policy. That by itself must have been a very undermining factor for him, and on top of that I think that it is over and over again the case in international affairs that the man who is pretty good at directing people in peace has not got quite the militant drive for directing them in war; I doubt whether Mr. Nehru could ever make a great war leader, could take quick decisions about the kind of thing that have to be decided in times of war.

Mr. BRANDER: Would Sir Percival tell us something about that quarrel between Pakistan and Afghanistan, whether they settled it in any way because their trade was altogether stopped so perhaps they have come to some practical decision to let it go on again; it was stopping all the imports and exports.

Sir PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS: No, there has been no settlement so the quarrel continues and in a general way the embargo continues; there have been certain exceptions made with regard to cargoes of particular kinds, but there is no general resumption of trade there yet at all and feeling is still quite bad.

Mr. A. REID: Does Sir Percival think that the proposals that Mrs. Banderanaiké has brought to Delhi recently will succeed?

Sir PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS: May we put it this way. If I were India I don't think I would be very unhappy about them. They differ from what India had in mind in that they would not allow India to occupy the areas from which the Chinese had withdrawn. I think that if I were India I would say that does not really matter very much, that the areas are of no importance to anybody at all and what really matters to India is to buy time, and personally if I were the Prime Minister of India I would not be too unhappy about accepting them because that would give me time to build up my defences. What China's reaction will be I have no idea at all, but I would not be worried about accepting them if I were the Prime Minister of India—I am very glad I am not!

Lady STOKES: Could Sir Percival tell us why India was so ill prepared for this Chinese invasion?

Sir PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS: Well, I think there were several reasons for it. I do not think that until a relatively short time ago anybody took the Chinese danger seriously. Mr. Krishna Menon has been the scapegoat and I think perhaps rightly so, but in the same way in this country when we were not prepared either in the first or second war we had to

find scapegoats. Really the fault here was the lack of will on the part of the people to be ready, and I think the same thing was true in India. That people were not willing to face up to the fact that there might in fact be a war. For one thing that many people in India had an entirely false idea of the protection afforded by the great Himalayan barrier. I remember talking to a very senior official about that as far back as 1951 or 1952 and telling him some of my anxieties and he brushed them all aside and said the Himalayas were a tremendous barrier, and no army could really operate across it. Well, of course, it is nonsense when you have seen thousands of mule men—I have said this in this room before—when you have seen thousands of mule men come down over those hills year by year you realize that where mule men can come armies can come too. A false idea of security was built up. Secondly, there is no doubt at all that Mr. Krishna Menon was to a great extent responsible by his political promotions in the Army, by his failure to provide the necessary equipment—it is a shocking thing that the Indian Army was sent to fight in those hills with no warm clothing of any kind at all. There were terrible failures of preparation for which you must blame entirely Mr. Krishna Menon; I suppose that Mr. Nehru must take some of the blame too, because he for a long time refused to recognize that China might be belicose in her

intentions so you have to share the blame I think between Mr. Nehru, Mr. Krishna Menon and the public, just as we in this country had to take a great share of the blame for not being prepared for the last two wars.

Mr. ZAMAN: Do you not agree Sir Percival that they were prepared for the war. That they were prepared and were arming, but they thought that the fighting would be in the plains against some country in the plains—not China?

Sir PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS: I would answer that by saying that I think if they had not been hypnotized by these fallacies and these false ideas they could not have failed to see that their fighting would have to be in the hills. China was obviously the enemy, and fighting China was going to be very, very largely in the hills, and I think they were blind just as we were blind in this country.

Mr. ALAM: Did India take advantage of border clashes to cover up internal troubles?

Sir PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS: With very great respect sir, I think that that is quite an unrealistic idea. I think to suggest that India can have arranged that the Chinese could have been in a position where they could have wiped out the North Indian tea industry, they could have wiped out Digboi, they could have taken away some of the biggest sources of India's wealth, I think it

is with very great respect utterly and completely unrealistic.

Mr. ALAM: I suggest the whole took place at a time when, if you go back, it was at such a time that a large scale invasion was impossible. It was also at a time when the question of the United Nations was coming up, so in that respect, keeping in view, the question of military aid and keeping in view that they would have more aid for the Third Five Year Plan the whole incident was bolstered up to make it an international issue.

Sir PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS: I am sorry but I can only repeat that that in my judgment is quite fantastic. A large scale military invasion at that time was impossible, but a complete annexation of Assam was a very, very practicable possibility indeed. And do you really seriously think that India would assist her Third Five Year Plan by losing the whole of her North Indian tea industry, by losing her Digboi oil, by losing some of the most fertile land in the country? With very great respect sir, I think that you are being led astray by your feelings into an error of judgment.

Sir CYRIL JONES: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, it is just as unnecessary to propose a vote of thanks to Sir Percival Griffiths for his address as it is for our Chairman to introduce him to this audience, nonetheless it is a very pleasant

duty that falls to me because as you all know there is no person or very few people who by knowledge, experience access to people that matter out in South East Asia who can speak with a greater breadth of experience and authority than Sir Percival Griffiths. I think the East India Association and the Pakistan Society are extremely fortunate in having the benefit of Sir Percival's periodical addresses to us and the interest that they arouse is evident every time he comes by the size of the audience who comes to hear him. It is a very great pleasure for me to propose a hearty vote of thanks to Sir Percival for his most interesting, penetrating and informative address to us.

The Objects of the East India Association

(INDIA PAKISTAN AND BURMA)

IN 1866, eight years after the assumption of the government of India by the Crown, the East India Association was formed with the object of "the promotion of the public interest and welfare of the inhabitants of India generally." This object was steadfastly pursued during the ensuing eighty-one years. The Independence of India and Pakistan attained in 1947, while modifying the original conception, has increased the need for strengthening the bonds of friendship and the importance of mutual understanding between the people of Britain and the inhabitants of the countries formerly comprising the India Empire—namely, India, Pakistan, and Burma. The Association therefore is continuing its work, with the assistance of all those who are interested in the welfare and progress of these countries, by the methods which have proved so helpful in the past, namely:

1. By lectures on current questions affecting those countries and publication of the same.
2. By providing opportunities for the free discussion of important questions affecting India, Pakistan, and Burma.
3. By promoting friendly contact between the peoples of these countries and of Britain through the medium of social and other gatherings.
4. Generally by the promulgation of reliable information regarding the countries named.

The Association is essentially non-official in character and has no connexion with any political party. It seeks to provide an open platform for the consideration of current problems relating to India, Pakistan, and Burma. It welcomes as members all those who are interested in their welfare and progress.

Papers are read and discussed throughout the year, except in the months of August and September. Members are entitled to invite friends to these meetings.

Buddhism in Pakistan

As early as the third century B.C., the areas that now comprise Pakistan were an integral part of the great Buddhist Empire of King Ashoka. Throughout the centuries that have rolled by, Buddhism has not only survived as a religion but it has also been a great civilizing factor which affected the arts and life of the people of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. The vast treasure of Buddhist architectural remains, stupas, monasteries and temples, which are found scattered all over Pakistan, bear ample testimony to the impact of Buddhism over the cultural heritage of these areas. Even to this day the Buddhist religion is professed and practised in some parts of East Pakistan, and next to the Hindus, the Buddhists are the most important minority community in Pakistan. Strangely enough, the population of Buddhists in this country exceeds that of India—the land where Buddhism was for the first time, proclaimed to the world. As a matter of fact, in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Pakistan, Buddhists form a majority of the population. In West Pakistan Buddhist arts and crafts flourished and reached their zenith in ancient times in the areas now forming the North West Frontier of the Indus Valley. This region was known as Gandhara. Gandhara as well as Kashmir were part of the vast Buddhist Empire in the 3rd century B.C.. At that time Ashoka sent a Buddhist monk, named Madhyantika who converted to the Buddhist religion the entire population in the areas which now comprise the North West Frontier, part of north Punjab, the lower Indus Valley and the whole of Kashmir.

Thus the territories which formed the core of Gandhara remained mostly under foreign domination from 558 B.C. to A.D. 640. Despite such a long spell of foreign domination and influence, the people of Gandhara remained faithful to their religion, culture and language. The synthesis of the purely materialistic philosophy of the earlier centuries and the pious and noble tenets of Buddhism brought about a new ideology which was, in fact, a product of the best that was in the two opposite tendencies of human thought. As for Gandhara, it was the region where Hellenism in its eastward course and Buddhism in its westward march came in direct contact with each other and shaped a new and artistic blending. And thus a new school of thought came into being which found expression in the Gandharan Art itself.

The art of Gandhara, which developed mainly in West Pakistan from the territory north-west of Peshawar down to the plains of Attock during the reign of Kushan Dynasty, served the cause of Buddhist faith in a

hitherto unknown style. The Gandharan sculptures mark a bold departure from the indigenous Indian style and show clear evidence of Hellenistic influence both in technique and motifs.

The Hellenistic influence is conspicuous in the plasticity of Gandharan art which "aimed at liberating man from action and from the tyranny of his desires and expressing the philosophy of Buddhism by the tranquil picture of meditation."

In East Pakistan also the contribution of Buddhism was no less great. Though no definite evidence is available as to when Buddhism made its advent in East Pakistan, yet it is generally believed that it gained ground even before Ashoka's reign. The impact of Buddhism on Bengal, however, is best reflected in the accounts of the Chinese pilgrims Fahien (5th century A.D.) and Hiuen Tsang (7th century A.D.). Both of them visited almost all the important Buddhist centres in Bengal and came across a highly organized religious order in that area.

Buddhism also received patronage of the ruling dynasties of Bengal like the Palas (8th to 12th centuries A.D.) and the Chandras (10th–11th centuries A.D.). Under the Pala and Chandra rulers well-organized monasteries were established, which later on became centres of faith and learning and a new type of Polytheistic Buddhism which caught the fancy of the masses throughout that area.

In East Pakistan also, Buddhism has left a rich heritage in the realms of art and architecture. Many stones and metal images of Buddha, and Terracotta plaques have been excavated from various sites. Ruins of monasteries and shrines found at Mahasthan, Paharpur and Mainamati, tell a silent tale of the heyday of Buddhism in these areas.

Today the Buddhist population in East Pakistan is approximately 316,000, the highest in the subcontinent. It is however interesting to note that their present distribution is mainly confined within the borders of ancient Samatata, i.e., within the plains of Chittagong, Noakhali, Tippera and eastern districts of Bakerganj. Out of this total population, the Chakmas of the Chittagong Hill Tract number about 108,000; the Arakanese Buddhist 136,000 and the Bengali Buddhist 72,000.

The Chakmas, who claim their descent from the Sakya clan and profess to be of Aryan stock, live in the central regions of the Hill Tracts, apparently undisturbed by modern civilization. They are flanked on their left by the Mongs and on their right by the Bomongs—both being Buddhist tribals of Arakanese origin.

At present there are almost 310 Vihara and temples in East Pakistan out of which 245 alone are in the district of Chittagong. Of these almost 260 belong to the *Sangharaja* order. The total number of the Bengali Bhikkus is about 200, out of which 150 are of the *Sangharaja* order.

There are 29 Pali tols in important monasteries where free instruction in Pali sculptures is given and regular examinations are held by the Education Department of the Government of East Pakistan.

In the Chittagong Hill Tracts alone, there are 320 monasteries among the Chakmas, Mongs and the Bohmongs. Their philosophy and codes are compiled in a number of manuscripts (about 22) collectively known as the 'Aga Tara,' which are mostly written in corrupt Pali and are rather difficult to comprehend. The number of Chakma Bhikkus (monks) is steadily increasing with the spread of education and the gradual breaking up of their absolute isolation in the wilderness of the Hill Tracts. The arakanese Mongs and Bohmongs, the tribal neighbours to the Chakmas and the Arakanese in the plains are predominantly Thervada Buddhists with some minor local variations. The arakanese shrines in Cox's Bazar and the Mong shrines at Chittagong in the Hill Tracts are held in great veneration by all sections of Buddhist in Bengal and they make regular pilgrimages to these places.

Heaping the Rice Bowl of Asia

BURMA is the rice bowl of Asia and much of her national wealth stems from rice exports to neighbouring countries. She is by far the largest rice exporting country in Asia. Burma produced 6.8 million tons of paddy last year. About 1.8 million tons of milled rice was exported.

During the last war all the big foreign-owned rice mills were destroyed, and it has taken many years for a vigorous postwar rice production and processing reconstruction programme to regain lost ground.

This reconstruction programme, suggested by a survey of the Burmese rice trade carried out by an Italian F.A.O. expert, is encouraging increased production of higher quality rice by interesting the Burmese medium-sized mills in improved machinery and methods.

An F.A.O. rice processing expert, Augustine (Gus) Huysmans, a stocky vigorous, blackhaired Dutchman, was requested by the Burmese Government to set-up and start-up selected mills which would demonstrate these improvements to some 1,400 privately-owned rice mills.

The government decided early in 1960 to buy abroad 12 modern medium-sized rice mills. With Mr. Huysmans' assistance, eight of these 12 mills have so far been erected and are in operation.

A major aspect of his task was in training Burmese nationals to operate these mills. A separate government department has been established for this purpose and now numbers a dozen senior staff and some 70 juniors. These men, in fact, now install and operate the mills, which has left Mr. Huysmans free to follow lines of practical research in mechanized loading and artificial drying.

"Our objective has been to improve the quality and quantity of processed rice, and thus increase the value of paddy output," stated Mr. Huysmans. "Both quality and quantity have improved steadily over the past three years. This can be shown by the fact that the rice cut, that is rice rejected as inferior quality, is now only a quarter of what it was three years ago."

"These modern mills have proved their worth, for we have demonstrated an increase in yield of three to five per cent using this new equipment. This may not seem very much but it means considerably more profit to the miller in terms of the thousands of tons of rice we process each year. Of the 1.8 million tons exported from Burma annually, the eight government mills are responsible for 150,000 tons."

A good deal of Mr. Huysmans' time has been spent in travelling over the country, meeting rice growers and mill owners and suggesting changes in equipment or method. "A good deal still remains to be done," he said. "80 per cent of the industry is still using pre-1936 equipment and some dates from before World War I. However these new government mills are setting the pace and are slowly but surely demonstrating the need for change. There has been a parallel development in the manufacturing of medium-grade processing machinery in Burma, though high-grade machinery still has to be imported.

Mr. Huysmans has been instrumental in bringing mechanized loading to Burma. Two important shipping points have been mechanized and costs and loading time both reduced by 25 per cent as a result. One of these two loading points, in Rangoon, is fully automatic—the only one of this type in Asia—bringing the rice bags right into the ship's hold. All new loading points in Burma are being equipped with belt conveyors.

Motive power in the new mills is largely electrical, generated from steam boilers fed by waste rice husks.

Mr. Huysmans is also conducting a series of experiments in the artificial drying of raw rice, which is a completely new development in this field. "Artificial drying improves the milling quality," he explained. "Tests show foreign exchange value of such dried rice could be increased by 10-11 per cent."

A number of field experiments are being carried out using forced air drying, both heated and unheated, as well as solar drying. The Brace

Bequest of McGill University in Canada has sent an expert to investigate the possibilities for using concentrated solar energy for this purpose.

"The need for specialized training is growing steadily," concluded Mr. Huysmans. "Mill managers and operators must become familiar with modern methods and equipment if the industry as a whole is to be revitalized."

The staff of the rice processing department were all initially trained with Mr. Huysmans. Ten of them have gone abroad for extended training under the F.A.O. Fellowship programme, returning to take senior posts in government and industry, while many were trained by special arrangement in the home country of the company supplying the new mills.

Fifty Years' Service to Siam

By Dr. REGINALD LE MAY

A Vice-President of the Royal India Pakistan and Ceylon Society

I ALWAYS like to hug to myself the thought that I have two memorials in Bangkok, which I hope will endure for a very long time.

The first is the Road Bridge over the Menam, which was built to celebrate the 150th Anniversary of the founding of Bangkok as the Capital, and which was opened in 1932. When the idea was first mooted it was suggested that an Avenue should be built in the Palace area of Bangkok, but when this was sent to me for my opinion it did not seem a suitable object for a National Appeal, and I wrote a long memorandum to my Minister, H.R.H. Prince Purachatra, setting out the reasons, especially Historical, for building a road bridge across the river, and the economic advantages, especially to Tonburi, which would accrue and flow from it. This suggestion of mine was eagerly adopted by my Minister and the late King Prajadhipok, and the bridge was erected well within the contract time by the British firm of Dorman Long.

The Second Memorial is the Home of the Siam Society. As far back as 1924 when I was Secretary of the Society, I had given vent to the idea that the Society should possess its own Headquarters, but it proved premature, and it was not until 1928 that I persuaded the Council to take up the matter seriously.

I then approached H.R.H. Prince Damrong, and through him His Majesty, and obtained their blessing on the scheme as well as the promise of very handsome donations towards the cost. After we had collected enough money for the building itself and Mr. Healey, the architect, had offered his services free, it was found that there were no funds available to purchase the necessary land on which to erect the building.

I, therefore, approached Mr. A. E. Nana, a well known Indian Merchant, and, when I had explained our difficulty, he most generously offered to give the Society the amount of land which it now holds. Unfortunately for me I retired at the end of 1932 and so was not able to be present at the opening ceremony by His Majesty early in 1933.

There is another memory that I treasure very warmly. When my book on Northern Siam, *An Asian Arcady*, appeared on sale in Bangkok in December, 1926, I was returning from leave in Europe, and when I arrived back in Siam in January, 1927, I learnt that His late Majesty King Prajadhipok was absent on a Royal Tour of the North—the first King ever to undertake such a tour. A specially bound copy for presentation to him was on its way, but when he returned in February and I went to meet him with all the other officials at his private station, after he had greeted me, he said “I am most grateful to you, Mr. le May; your ‘Asian Arcady’ appeared at just the right moment. I believe I bought the first copy and read it on the train going North.”

More than thirty years later, when his present Majesty made a similar tour of the North with H.H. Prince Dhani, the latter wrote to me afterwards and told me that they had also taken *An Asian Arcady* with them to read on the way round. So it is very satisfying to me to know that I have been able to be of service to two Kings of Siam (though I fear that the North no longer remains the ‘Arcady’ that it was in my day).

I have just remembered a third memorial which I have in Bangkok and, although it is not of the same kind as those I have mentioned, still I hope it will be as permanent, as far as anything in this world can be permanent. During the years 1908 to 1920 I formed what I may call a large and representative collection of the Stamps of Siam, and in 1925, when it was proposed by the Late King Rama vi to hold a National Exhibition, this collection was purchased from me by the Committee as one of the chief exhibits. As many will know, King Rama unfortunately died in November, 1925, and the exhibition was cancelled. The collection was then handed over by the Committee to the late King Prajadhipok, who presented it to The National Library. I understand that it can always be seen by anyone interested upon application.

An incident has recently occurred which I think will be of interest to record. A short time ago a copy of the book published by H.R.H. Princess


Chombhot with delightful pictures of the xvii Century Ayudhyan House and its panelling which she rescued and re-erected in Bangkok was kindly sent to me. It so happens that nearly 40 years ago I bought in Bangkok a small cabinet which may be unique of its kind. I had it published recently in one of our Art Journals. It has side panels of gold lacquer, and when I compared them with some of the panels shown in the Princess's book, the similarity in execution was so great that I sent the Princess a copy of the Journal for her to examine, at the same time congratulating her on her foresight in preserving this ancient house. It now seems almost certain to both of us that some of the scenes of trees and animals are by the same hand, which to me is a very remarkable coincidence.

It is forty-six years since I published in 1917 a series of six articles about life in Bangkok in the *Singapore Free Press*, and I was secretly rather amused, though scarcely flattered, when the Editor of the *Bangkok Daily Mail*, in reprinting the first article, although he admitted I had a sharp eye, said it was obvious that the article had been written by a visitor; and yet I had already been nine years in the country. Since 1917 I have been writing almost continuously.

In 1920 a committee, consisting of Sir Walter Williamson, Mr. E. Wyon Smith, and myself, published on behalf of the Siam Philatelic Society a *Descriptive Catalogue of the Stamps of Siam*, which has become a standard work, and I am told has proved of great value to all collectors of Siamese Stamps. As far back as 1913, I had published in Stanley Gibbons' monthly journal a History of the Post-Office in the British Legation in Bangkok (1882-1885).

In 1926, as already mentioned, I published my first Book on Siam, *An Asian Arcady*. Next, I can now reveal that in 1928 I published in one of the last numbers of the famous *Edinburgh Review* (which had a life of about 125 years), under the non de plume of Amicus, a long article entitled "Progress in Siam." In this, after giving a short account of the Country's history, I dwelt at some length on the reforms in the administration which had taken place from the accession of King Chulalongkorn onwards. I spoke of the many developments in public works, and finally I stated that Siam's great problem was how to teach and persuade her educated classes that, while Government Service remained a very honourable task, it was no less honourable to take off one's coat and enter the fields of agriculture and commerce with the determination to produce something. This article was not only reprinted in the *Bangkok Times* but translated verbatim and published in the Siamese papers also.

I began life in Siam in 1908 in the British Consular Service, but since my return from Europe in 1922 to take up the post of Economic Adviser



The junk that left the wind behind

Hong Kong is half land, half water. And of its three million people, many spend their whole lives afloat—these are the boat-people, whose wooden craft jostle in the crowded bays to make small floating villages.

In these villages the boat-people are born, marry and die—returning to the land only to be buried. Their livelihood is fish, and from their fishing expeditions come the Lizard Fish, Golden Thread, and Croakers, which feed the island's packed population. Their life has gone on in much the same way for generations—a hard life of work and little leisure.

Today, things are changing for the better. There is the newly-formed Fish Marketing Organisation which not only provides schools for the children, but auctions the catch for the boat-people, and gives them a cash payment immediately it is landed.

With this ready-money the men can improve their exotic-looking boats—often by powering them with small engines. 'With these engines', says one of the men 'we are bringing in three times as much fish as before. We don't have to wait for the wind and tide to get us out of harbour, and by nightfall we can be out in the deeper waters'.

During all these changes, Shell has been along the quaysides, providing the boat-people with a fuel and lubricant service just as it does to fishing fleets all over the world—whether they operate from busy ports or out-of-the-way islands.

YOU CAN BE SURE OF



to the Siamese Government, I had become much attracted by Siamese Buddhist Sculpture and interested in its study. In a very short time I had determined, if it were at all possible within the limits of my purse, to make a representative collection of all its schools from A.D. 600 to 1600 to show connoisseurs abroad that Siam had produced something of spiritual beauty. I was much more concerned with the artistic than with the archaeological quality of the pieces I was seeking; by 1929, with the help given by H.R.H. Prince Damrong and Professor Coedès I was able to publish in one of our Art Journals, *The Burlington Magazine*, an article entitled "Introduction to the study of Sculpture in Siam," which was profusely illustrated and caused quite a stir among art lovers at the time, as it presented an entirely new field for their study.

This was followed in 1930 by *Siamese Tales Old and New*, a book which I am never tired of reading myself. These tales were extracted from a collection made by the late Phya Manunet Banhan and presented to me by my friend, Prince Chalad of the Railway Department. It took me nearly three years to translate the tales, which appeared weekly in the *Bangkok Times* before they were issued in book form. I was given the greatest help by my dear friend and then Secretary, Phra Pramonda Banya, in distilling the very spirit of each tale before it was committed to paper. Chao Phya Wongsā made me very content by telling me that I had captured perfectly the very essence of the tales. A new edition of 'Siamese Tales' was published by Probsthain of London early in 1959 and is now available.

In 1922, as a result of showing some very odd Northern coins to Mr. Mitchell, who was then Secretary of the Siam Society, I had incautiously promised him that I would take up the study of the Coinage of Siam. This was foolish of me, because at that time I not only had no coins, but I could not find any documentary evidence dealing with the coins of the Ayudhyan period. However, I took up the task, and ten years later, before I left Siam in 1932, with the help of Prince Damrong and Prince Piya, I was able to present the Society with a work sufficiently complete to enable it to be published in book form with 32 plates, and containing an account of how the old bullet coins were made. A demonstration of this process was kindly arranged at the Mint by Prince Damrong, and proved both interesting and even mysterious, as if one were witnessing the magic of an Alchemist of old. This study has long been recognized as a standard work on the subject, and I have recently been very happy to find that a new edition was printed for the Siam Society in Manila in 1961.

This was my last literary effort before I retired from Siam, but in the *Burlington Magazine* for October and November, 1933 I gave a detailed account, fully illustrated from my own and other collections, of the Ceramic

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Wares produced at Suk'ot'ai and Sawankalok in Central Siam between the years A.D. 1300 and 1600. A portion of my collection is now in the Victoria and Albert Museum, London. After my return to England I was, in 1934, admitted to Pembroke College, Cambridge, as a Research Student and the subject I chose was "Buddhist Art in Siam." In 1937 I took my Doctor's Degree, and in 1938 the University Press published my work on the above subject. It has long been out of print, but I am glad to say that the well-known firm of art publishers, Messrs. Charles Tuttle of Rutland, Vermont, U.S.A. has undertaken to republish the volume. This book is being reprinted in Tokio and it is hoped will be on sale by May of this year.

Following on this publication I had, in the Autumn of 1938, given a series of four lectures on "Buddhist Art in Siam" to the Courtauld Institute attached to London University; and then in the Spring of 1939 another series of ten lectures to London University itself covering the whole field of South-East Asia. In the meantime I had held exhibitions of my collection of Buddhist Sculpture from Siam, at Cambridge in 1937, at Oxford in May, 1938, and finally at India House in London in October, 1938. This last exhibition, which was opened by Lord Harlech, was held under the auspices of the Royal India Society, of which I am now a Vice-President. The exhibition was attended by Her Majesty Queen Mary, The Marquess of Zetland, who was then Secretary of State for India, and many other notables, including Sir Charles Wheeler, RA, the present president of the Royal Academy; and received excellent notices in *The Times* and other newspapers,

Then came the war, and all activities of this nature, as Caesar used to say, "went into winter quarters." After the war was over I managed to find sufficient energy to begin work again, and for seven long years I wrestled with the problem of producing a comprehensive work on South-East-Asia, comprising Burma, Siam, Indo-China, Malaya, and Java including the Islands. This was at last ready for printing at the end of 1952 and was finally published in January, 1954; a second edition was issued in 1956, and is still on sale. It will, I am sure, be of interest to know that this work, *The Culture of South East Asia*, has now been published in a cheap edition by the National Book Trust of India with a foreword specially written by Pundit Nehru, the Prime Minister. The Book Trust has also undertaken to translate this book into eight of the principal Indian languages: Hindi, Bengali, Gujerati, and Mahrahti for the North; and Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, and Kanarese for the South.

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
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
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
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
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Reception to the President of India

A RECEPTION given by the East India Association and the Royal India, Pakistan and Ceylon Society, in association with the joint Commonwealth Societies of London, in honour of the President of India, Dr. SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN, was held at the Royal Commonwealth Society headquarters on Thursday, 13th June, 1963.

The PRESIDENT replying to the speech of welcome by the Rt. Hon. the Lord SPENS said: I did not come here to make a speech, I was told it was a Reception. But now that your President has asked me to say a few words I may say that I, an ordinary commoner, started as a teacher and worked almost the whole of my life as a teacher. That I should have been elected Vice-President and President of my country shows how democratic our constitution is and how it has given opportunities to all the people, not merely to political workers, to rise into some prominence and serve the country to the best of their ability. When you think of the country which is nearly 450,000,000 strong, professing different religions, speaking different languages, and different stages of development, all bound together in one unity with the sense of belonging to one home, think of it all and compare that achievement with what is happening in neighbouring states and other parts of the world, and you will see that it is not a mean achievement. There has been administrative continuity, political stability, and even the crisis which we had recently, which was a challenge thrown to us, even that has not disturbed the smooth working of democratic institutions in our country.

One of the things in which we take special pride in India is the peaceful co-operation of the different religions there. You find Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Jews, Parsis, and all their sub-sects, but they work together as citizens of one whole. Only when political considerations interfere do religious distinctions acquire some prominence. Otherwise it has been a country where all religions were welcomed, not merely tolerated, but are appreciated by the practitioners of other religions because there has been a great emphasis in the country on the character of religion—religion as a personal encounter of an individual with the Supreme. And not merely doctrinal conformity or ceremonial piety. Such people may be religious at second hand, but those who are authentically religious are individuals who have been able to know something, to feel the ultimate mystery which transforms their lives and works in them as a cleansing fire, something which takes away all the baser passions of their nature.

Such individuals are very rare and it is not possible for you to have too many of them because it is a costing process. Because we thought that religion was a kind of personal insight into the ultimate reality we never laid much stress, exclusive stress, on any particular way of approaching the Supreme or calling the Supreme. The ways may twist and turn but when once you reach the top the spiritual landscape which you discern is exactly the same. All those, who by different routes have come up to the top are the people who belong to one family. We may belong to this particular denomination or other, but if we are truly religious we will not quarrel about names we give to the Supreme or the ways by which we reach the Supreme. This is a thing that came down to us from the early period—Asoka cut into the rock and he said:

“Do not quarrel about religions, concord is meritorious. Do not imagine that you have a complete hold on truth. You may not have it, no religion has a monopoly of truth, you must try to know the God above all Gods who is expressed in different ways and different individuals.”

That is how we put it, with the result that our constitution regularized it. As pointed out to us, every citizen of India has the liberty to profess, practise, and propagate his religion so long as he does not injure the convictions of other people or things which happen to be offensive to moral sense. So long as you avoid them you are at liberty to practice your own religion.

Similarly, when we took up the question of language, we have fourteen different languages. Only recently we had passed legislation in the Central Legislature making Hindi the official language of the country and giving English a place as an alternative official language which could be used for an indefinite period. That has brought about some kind of harmony in the country.

Then the parliamentary processes, practices and procedures which you will observe in our parliament or legislatures will remind you what happens in this country. We have taken them all over and whenever we are in difficulties we turn to May's Parliamentary Practice to solve our difficulties. As you do here, we do that also there. That is what we have been doing so far as that side is concerned.

During the recent crisis that we have had, our people, irrespective of their political parties, whether they were members of the Congress Party or the Communist Party or the Swatantra or the Jan Sangh all came forward and said “So far as India's security and territorial integrity are concerned we are prepared to do everything in our power.” And the basis of all these things is faith in the integrity of the human being, the faith which calls on us to give every human being an opportunity for his bodily welfare, for his mental alertness. We want to give everyone the



The President of India speaking at the Reception

opportunity to feed himself, to clothe himself, shelter himself. We wish to provide these opportunities, so we call it 'a welfare state.' But the most important point which we believe is that the individual should not be sacrificed for any group or organization. The individual may give himself or refuse to give himself, but he should not sell himself or lend himself for purposes which do not appeal to his conscience. That is what we mean when we say the sanctity of the human individual, for the sake of that we may have to sacrifice so many other comforts. It is that opportunity which we wish to provide for all our citizens.

The greatest problem which we have been facing is the problem of hunger, unemployment, things like that. We have done a great deal in this direction, but please do not imagine we are anywhere near the goal of fulfilling our ideals. They are still distant, we are aiming at them, we never had, for example, anything like the famine which we had in 1943. When our circumstances became difficult, we begged, we borrowed, we bought, we rationed, we did whatever was possible for us and tried to see that nobody died of sheer hunger or starvation. If such a thing had happened there would have been an uproar in the parliament and we are afraid

of parliament, as you are I suppose, and the country's stability would have been shaken and undermined. There are certain things that are essential for the stability of the country—wise leadership, the leaders must be those who dedicate themselves completely to the well-being of the community—administrative integrity. If there is corruption in high places, if people cannot be trusted, if the aid which we get from other countries is misspent, misused, apart from our own resources, then that means that people lose faith. Social upheavals are generally caused if you have dissensions amongst the leaders and corruption in administration. If you wish to avoid any kind of upheaval you must try to preserve integrity of your administration. You must try to see that those who come to the top are disinterested dedicated servants who have nothing else in their lives to look for except the well-being of the community to which they are appointed. Well that sort of thing is that.

Economic misery—if you are having economic misery you cannot have any sort of moral insight or spiritual development. If people are dying like flies what is it that you can have, nothing very much. Wherever revolution has occurred in this world, I have noticed it, they are all due to these things. Look at what happened in the Soviet Revolution—an absolutist government which threw all people into the depths, people who had any spirit about them, a corrupt church, defeat on all sides, economic distress, people dying like flies. And people thought, anything for a change. These are not conditions that could be tolerated at all. Other revolutions, Chinese, Egyptian, wherever you have them you will see there are selfish leadership, dishonest administration, economic distress, lack of a national purpose. The very offence, so to say, of solidarity of a nation. When these things are lacking, you will never be able to get any satisfactory society. It will be always unstable, when we are afraid of what is going to happen to us. But for so long as you are able to guarantee these things to our people, our people have common sense, they have some fundamental faith, and they believe that you are caring for two things—individual dignity and human fellowship, then you may be sure that you will be trusted and your country will be stable.

We have been able to maintain the stability and cohesion of our country because we have given them a purpose, and we have had magnificent leadership and as far as possible an honest administration. If there is any dishonesty there is such an uproar that we all raise our voices and we all say that this must be put an end to. You cannot have wide disparities of wealth and poverty. So many people living luxurious lives and others living in mud huts. A sort of a thing, a painful reality which touches the conscience of every decent thinking man. If he has got any element of compassion about him, any conscience about him, he cannot stand

this sort of wide distance that separates the illustrious few from the millions of people who suffer. Well these are things which we are trying, to the best of our ability, to inculcate into our ordinary human beings. We wish to give them courage, compassion, dignity, we want to make them feel that we are born into this world to love and to create, not to hate and to destroy. If we are able to give this sense, make them feel that the country has been there for four or five millenia, there must have been some vitality to sustain this country in spite of all the attacks which we have had throughout the centuries. That we are still alive, still vital, still looking forward, still dissatisfied at our present, still not merely adoring the past, but looking forward to the future. So long as we have this kind of impulse in our minds the future of our country, of every country for that matter, is safe. And we should try our best to help one another. It is no use merely criticizing other countries. Every country has its skeleton in its cupboard. There is no country which is free from all blemishes or all mistakes. Our attempts should be to find out what our deficiencies are and not merely look to the other man's deficiencies. Look within yourself, to try to get rid of the insufficiencies from which you happen to suffer. If you are able to do it you will push your country forward. If you are unable to do it you will drag it backward. Leadership really consists in anticipating the future, in forestalling events, in trying to find out how revolutions have got about, and to avoid them if you can. If you have prepared the conditions for a revolution you will get it. If you are trying to get rid of these things let us have it. Our country is passing through a very exciting period, but it is a peaceful revolution; we are trying to get the confidence of our people, we have the confidence of our people. When any elections take place we will always see that the people are all more or less sensible.

Once upon a time I was asked how much it cost me to become the Vice-President of my country, by another Vice-President of a great nation. I told him it cost me 10 dollars. "What?" I said: "Yes, because when my name was put up for the Vice-Presidency it was discovered it was not on the Voters List and I had to pay a penalty of 50 rupees to get the name inserted and that is all that my Vice-Presidency election cost me!" In other words, there was no other candidate and we got through. The Presidential election, I had to be there. There was no campaigning on my side, I never asked one man. There were two candidates that were put up because they came to me and told me that they wanted to show it was a democratic election and the result was, to my 5 lakhs and 80,000 votes the two others got 10,000 votes.

It gives you an idea of how the country is getting accustomed to proper democratic processes and so far as the public relations and also foreign

relations are concerned we are struggling our utmost to develop an attitude of international sobriety and never get lost in the temporary things, never meet crises as they come, but have a long strategic plan, by which you will be able to help yourself, and help other people also.


L O R D S P E N S

In welcoming the PRESIDENT OF INDIA, Lord Spens, President of the East India Association and Vice-President of the Royal Commonwealth Society, said:

I regard it as a very great and very pleasant honour that I should find myself, as President of the East India Association and a Vice-President of the Royal Commonwealth Society, in the Chair on this great occasion of the visit of the President of India to this building. Not only am I speaking on behalf of those two Societies, but I have also been asked by Lord Inchcape, the President of the Royal India Pakistan and Ceylon Society to speak on their behalf. It is natural that the latter Society should also be sponsoring this occasion as it particularly represents the cultural side of the links that unite India and the United Kingdom. Moreover our distinguished guest is himself a Vice-President of that Society. But today there are present not only members of the three Societies which I have mentioned but also many others, all interested in Indian and Commonwealth affairs, and assembled here to meet and greet the President of India and to listen in a few minutes to the words which I hope he will be pleased to address to us.

In the short time that you, Mr. President, are spending with us, we are indeed fortunate that you should have been able to pay this visit to us here. Not only do we welcome this opportunity of showing our respect for you personally and through you our affection for India but also it gives us some opportunity of returning thanks for the marvellous hospitality and welcome given by India to H.M. The Queen and H.R.H. Prince Philip during their recent visit to India. That hospitality and welcome made a great impression in this country and knit ever closer those bonds, particularly the invisible bonds, which hold our two countries together. We would do our best to maintain them.

Mr. President, (if I may introduce a very personal note), this visit of yours has brought great pleasure to me. For though for long I had known of you as a philosopher—I had read Greats at Oxford—and heard much of you at Oxford and in India, fate had never given me a chance of meeting you in person till last night when I had the good fortune of being one of Her Majesty's guests summoned to honour you and now today I have the pleasure of presiding here and look forward to hearing you.



Lord Spens welcoming the President

It is of course as a scholar, an educationalist and above all as a philosopher that your name was so well known to many of us before you started to play the great political part that has been and still is yours in the history of India.

Professor of Philosophy in Madras, Mysore, Calcutta, Lecturer in Comparative Religion at Oxford and Chicago, Hibbert Lecturer, Vice-Chancellor of Andra and later Benares Hindu University and for us, above all, Fellow of All Souls, the first Indian to be elected a Fellow of the British Academy, and Spalding Professor of Eastern Religion and Ethics at Oxford 1936–1952. With this outstanding academic career was combined your work at the League of Nations in the 1930's and with UNESCO in the 1940's. Finally after independence came your membership of the Constituent Assembly, your Ambassadorship to the Soviet Union and your election as Vice-President and finally as President.

Mr. President, we are indeed proud to have such a man as our honoured guest this afternoon. We welcome you here most sincerely and most warmly.

India's Place in the Balance of World Power

By Professor GEORGE E. GORDON CATLIN, FRSA, FRSL

THE title which is given to today's address is perhaps a rather wide and pretentious one, India's place in the balance of World Power, and I think it is best to say that any comments I might have to make must be comments with a markedly autobiographical quality, based on merely an individual experience. There are many here whose experience is indeed much wider than mine and who are entitled to make judgements, doubtless, which would be much more profound. I don't want to exaggerate the value of anything I may have to say. On the other hand, of course, as the Deputy High Commissioner has said, my connexion is indeed a fairly old one. This was not my first visit to India. My connexions with India go back to the Mahatma's Round Table visits in 1931; to my connexion with Mr. Nehru in 1936, to my invitation out to India by the then President of Congress, Maulana Azad, in 1946 and the Inter-Asian Conference by personal invitation of its President, Mrs. Naidu, in 1947—when, I may say, I was the guest of the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, for some little while. I went up then to China and came back again. And perhaps I might venture to mention, because the Deputy High Commissioner has indicated it, that I happen to be the draughtsman of a perhaps not totally unimportant document called "A Declaration in Support of Indian Independence"—perhaps only important because it was signed by quite a number of Members of Parliament, including several who subsequently became Privy Councillors and Ministers of the Crown. I mention this merely to indicate that my connection, although not profound, at least runs back a considerable length of time and is intimate in certain specific ways.

I might say that this is our—my wife and myself—our fourth visit. We also, this time, went on to National China, Formosa, through Bangkok and Hong Kong and spent four or five days there, part of the time as guests of the Foreign Minister. This was my second visit to China. I mention this because I went there quite deliberately. I consulted my Indian hosts as to whether there was any objection and they said there was not. I was glad to go because it seemed to me to offer a very important

listening post, a position where you could assess the Indian-Chinese situation with a degree of detachment, because on the one hand they were Chinese and on the other hand they didn't love Peking. Therefore you were likely to get a perspective which might be of some value to people in India and back home here in forming their own judgements.

I went out there to renew old contacts and to make new ones and to see what had been happening in India since 1947. 'The Future of India' is the subject of a symposium and, when I left India, I was roped in to make a contribution to this symposium by Dr. Chakrabarti on India since 1947. It was with great hesitation that I accepted; and I wrote it off, I'm afraid, while I was ill in bed—I shouldn't recommend anyone here to see what I wrote but, since I tried to do my best to make a comment on India since 1947, I shall try to do the same now.

There are—probably everybody here is fully acquainted with it—great developments, developments in the field of heavy industry such as one has also indeed found in other Asian countries, and especially the great dams near Lahore, in the Punjab; and irrigation developments of considerable and even deep importance. As I am told, for example, in Bengal these new irrigation developments have had a more profound effect on the standard of living and the pattern of living of farmers than their more ambitious schemes of communal reconstruction. They raised the entire standard of living and, as the standard was raised, the whole pattern of life also changed—which couldn't be changed by the imposing of new local government schemes of communal reconstruction, but could be changed by the natural readjustment of the farmer to different living conditions.

The great developments in transport are extremely interesting. Developments outside Bombay which may be copied elsewhere—are likely to be copied elsewhere—thanks to which the water buffalo has gone off the streets of Bombay almost entirely, and the water buffalo and his owners have been moved on to the big dairy farms, dairy centres, dairy communities, were interesting to me. This was not because, as I said at the time, I know anything about dairying or care anything much about buffalo-farming (in this my ignorance is almost abysmal) but because it was an extraordinarily interesting combination of communal enterprise, state enterprise on the one side with private ownership on the other, an apparently quite happy and satisfactory combination. I wouldn't want to exaggerate this, because I think a certain amount of pressure was applied on the recalcitrant to hurry them off the streets of Bombay and to get them up to the Acrey settlement. Pressure was doubtless applied to this end. But the end result seems to be eminently satisfactory and constitutes something which is worth studying as a model, that might probably

be followed elsewhere, in linking state ownership and, on the other hand, private ownership and private enterprise.

We were kept rapidly moving, almost to the last day. We saw the great atomic reactor station outside Bombay. There will be another soon in Bombay and perhaps others in other areas. The one at Trombay I found fascinating and I will come back to discussion of it a little later. Perhaps it was fascinating because just opposite is the great island of Elephanta—at least the little island of Elephanta—and here you saw an extraordinary contrast between the old India of the Hindu counter-reformation of the 7th century—this remarkable sculpture monument, series of monuments, due in part to the thriving wealth of the merchants of Bombay, who incidentally traded with the West. That's where they got their money from. This manifestation of Shiva worship, on the one side, met the ultra modern atomic station just across the narrow strait, on the other side. That, I think, is so fascinating and bears on my topic; and I want to revert to it later on.

I had the pleasure not only to seeing the President and the British High Commissioner and the American Ambassador, Mr. Galbraith; I also saw Mr. Nehru. I had a message to convey to him and there is no objection to my repeating the message because, before I left, I had been to see Mr. George Brown and said that I should see the Premier and was there any message he wanted to get across. And the message in question was that they had endeavoured, partly as a Party matter and partly as a National matter, to raise a fund for assistance to India at the time of crisis—and there were certain comments on that fund.

I asked Mr. Nehru if there was any message in return which he particularly wished to give. His comment was that India was confronted with this crisis and the Government had to consider—and this is of course a problem that recurred in our own British history at intervals of real crisis—how far should welfare undertakings, and how far should budget allocations earmarked for welfare undertakings, be cancelled in order that more money might be diverted to the national defence and the national emergency. There had, therefore, apparently got to be some kind of what is now called 'agonizing re-appraisal.' But Mr. Nehru said that having made the survey, what they discovered was that over 85 per cent of the area of budget allocation would have to be allocated in the same direction as before—because after all what was required for national defence, in terms of transport, in terms of power stations, in terms of ammunition factories, industrial factories and so forth, was money that would both have to be spent for the industrial development of India and its welfare and yet also was required in an emergency for defence. Only the other 15 per cent had been a choice, an unhappy choice, at the moment.

I see, incidentally, from various letters and papers that no less than 240 million dollars have been allocated by the United States of America Aid to India, not necessarily for military purposes, but in general connexion with foreign aid, the foreign-aid programme of the United States—the largest single allocation the United States has made.

And so we turn rather naturally to the threat from China. Here I repeat I was glad to go up into National Free China to get perspectives there. Quite clearly, if there is a major Chinese attack in the spring, since it is quite automatic that India will receive the support of the Commonwealth, Britain and indeed also Canada, Australia and so forth—and on the assumption that China in undertaking so large a venture is already in a position to reckon on Moscow, if *not* on active Moscow support—you can see for yourselves that the danger, the real danger to the international situation, would be extremely grave, in fact, quite frankly, I think we are much too complacent. There is here a very real danger to peace, one that after all we can only reckon as being postponed from earlier until this spring. Therefore the question arises to estimate how far this Chinese threat is, in fact, likely to mature.

Not unnaturally the Minister of Defence, Mr. Chavan, and the ex-Finance Minister, Dr. Deshmuk, the Vice Chancellor of Delhi, take an extremely grave view of the situation. They feel that if national emergencies have to be confronted—and these can be of the greatest possible kind—far stronger measures will have to be taken at an early date. On the other hand, the cynical may say that the job of the Minister of Defence and probably also of the Minister of Finance is to take that point of view and that they would be remiss if they didn't take it; and that this is not an entirely detached point of view.

I hesitate to indulge, because I think this is very dangerous, in empty optimism. There is yet some information I can give you—and this information is not infallible, but I think it may be pretty good. The Chinese in Formosa assured me that their Intelligence was pretty good. This partly bears on Formosa's relation to the mainland, which it would be irrelevant to comment on here, although I might be tempted in questions to answer a point or two on that—but also they were of the view that it was improbable that Peking China would launch any major attack in the spring on India. One naturally hopes that this judgement is true—I pass it on to you, because I think it is important in view of the source. You can yourselves judge how much has to be discounted but, on the whole, it is a pretty good source of information.

Mr. Nehru himself, while I was in India, seemed very much to take this line of playing the situation down. I remember certain comments of his, comments against stirring up any strong passionate sentiments against

the Chinese people as such. There was one specific phrase in which he said that India had had a small battle and a small disaster, and implied that this should not be exaggerated. The stressed word was the adjective 'small.' And his full acceptance of the Colombo proposals fits in with this picture, allowing the Chinese to proceed then to debate as to what exact interpretation was to be put on the Colombo proposals, to which he himself had given 100 per cent acceptance.

I don't propose—you have already heard lectures on this subject—to go into the details. My own guess would be that the Chinese would wish to protract negotiations without being particularly anxious to reach a conclusion, being primarily preoccupied with the strategic road which runs briefly across the line of the McMahon Frontier, runs over one section in Indian territory. On the other hand, their attack down in the North-East frontier was—I won't say a feint—was at least to show a military menace to extremely vital areas of India, but was not an area which they politically intended to occupy, or to make a vital and fighting point. Whereas the grave menace to India is this in the east, in the Brahmaputra Valley, the main purpose of the Chinese lay in the north-west, the North-West Frontier, on the old strategic caravan road of central Asia. I must say that, estimating the position in regard to a variety of factors, the majority of witnesses seemed to feel that the reason for a Chinese withdrawal was not some kind of sit-down diplomacy that the Chinese had mugged up in some book of strategy of 300 B.C. and which showed that the Chinese were super-subtle people, who thought of things that had not even been thought of by the Florentines in the western hemisphere. Rather the simple explanation was that the Chinese interest was pretty limited but that they engaged on a major menace just to assure themselves of that area and also to increase their prestige, and possibly also at the same time to decrease the international prestige of Delhi. The President, I would add, was of the view that the action of Moscow had been of quite decisive importance, that Moscow had indicated to Peking it could not count on certain vital supplies, particularly in terms of oil for the air force, and that therefore perforce the Chinese had had to withdraw—not simply because their supply lines were exposed but because they could not get the necessary supplies in a rather similar way to what happened in Suez, where the American Treasury indicated that this country would be bankrupt in four days unless it behaved itself. It is not for me to estimate what weight should be attached to this judgement of the President of India; I merely pass on to you his comment for you yourselves to digest.

Mr. Krishna Menon, whom I have a considerable affection for—I am glad that I was able to make some comments of a kindly nature,

partly because I have the British tendency to like an underdog—at the present moment Mr. Krishna Menon is not in tremendously high favour and, therefore, it seemed to me the appropriate moment to make some comments on the service he has certainly performed for India, both in this country and in the United Nations. The fact that Mr. Krishna Menon's voice, at a quite critical time when the issue was up as to whether India should not remain part of the British Commonwealth, was then cast decisively in favour of India remaining part of the Commonwealth is something not generally known. I think this should be known and I think most people here will feel, at least in this, in his favour. It should also be borne in mind that at the time he was very much exposed to the arrows of fortune, or misfortune. He is at the present moment not particularly popular but he is supposed still to enjoy some contact with the Prime Minister which shouldn't be discounted.

Mr. Shastri, mentioned as one possible successor to the Prime Minister, along with Mr. Desai and Mr. Chavan, I did not have the pleasure of seeing. He is an extremely modest and retiring man who has never been outside India and he is not generally available for interview purposes.

Now one other thing that bears on this question of the world balance and India's position in relation to it—can we expect that an increased cleavage will develop between the U.S.S.R. and Peking China? As indeed the President rather indicated, one reason why India is not likely to be massively invaded and one reason why the Prime Minister's policy of non-alignment is likely to be vindicated or at least not disastrously challenged, is because of the depth of suspicion between Moscow and Peking. I see that in a speech delivered only yesterday, February 25th, Mr. Nehru himself has spoken of the unity of the eastern block cracking up. There is no doubt, and it is recorded in hundreds of papers, that there has been a public washing of dirty linen between Moscow and Peking.

However, I venture here to be not so terribly optimistic as some people, for a variety of reasons, may be. The impression out in Formosa, the impression that I myself—allowing for Formosa's particular interest on this matter—was that quarrels at the top go on, not only as between Peking and Moscow, but also in the recent past in Moscow itself and for all we know at the back of the Iron Curtain may still be going on. The party structure, however much that of Peking may be Stalinist in its shape and old-fashioned, nevertheless does still hold. In the case of critical emergency, even in a situation such as the present, it is improbable that you would find the U.S.S.R. and China aligned on opposite sides; and it is extremely rash to presuppose this as a basic principle of their policy. There is something that you can put to the credit side. You can say this schism is a possibility. This can be worked for. This can be

allowed for. But then you may be sadly undeceived if you make this into any kind of axiomatic proposition.

I observe that the enterprising and distinguished Scottish publisher, Mr. Roy Thomson, went out to Moscow only the other day. I must admit that I think that his visit was extremely unfortunate. Mr. Thomson was trying to push the pace faster I think than any wise man would push it. He was, quite bluntly, putting Mr. Khrushchev into a quite impossible position. He not only propounded to Mr. Khrushchev, but announced in his own words in the newspapers, so far as I can gather—I wasn't there at the moment—how admirable it would be if Mr. Khrushchev would align himself with the West against the Chinese. Of course, many of us know that profound and interesting book, but somewhat unpopular book, by John Strachey called *The Prevention of War*, where the basic argument is that of a *condominium* between Washington and Moscow. I personally think that everybody should study John Strachey's thesis—even if Mr. Gaitskell, if I remember his words, may have regarded it as 'rather fantastic.' But to say that this is something that has to be borne in mind as a matter of world politics, and to say that you can bulldoze Mr. Khrushchev into declaring himself a friend of Wall Street and an enemy of the people of China in some kind of public spectacle, are two absolutely different things. In fact I doubt if it is something which Mr. Khrushchev would touch with a barge-pole. He will say he is a great friend of Peking China, although he isn't a great friend at present of the rulers in Peking. You're not going to get him to make a false statement like that suggested above.

The last comment I would like to make follows on what I have said before, and that is this question of co-existence. And here I would refer again to John Strachey's extremely interesting and basic thesis. I wrote to John Strachey and I said "your thesis is so unpopular that you couldn't go on to any public platform and state it—you have been booed off the platform—which doesn't mean that what you are talking may not be common sense." His thesis is, I repeat, that of agreement between Washington and Moscow which would provide a world commune, on the basis of which we might be able to maintain an enforced peace. There is here a very large measure, some people say, of optimism—or is it of pessimism?—and you are entitled, like Hugh Gaitskell (who said it in my presence) to say that is 'fantastic.' I personally do not dismiss it as fantastic; I regard it as something we have to further explore. In point of fact it seems to me that the present tone in Washington is to make feelers of the most cautious variety in this direction. It is patently upset by the present policy of M. de Gaulle because it assumes a strong and united West—so assured of its power that Mr. Khrushchev has to take that power into

account in his policy. It has this measure of optimism to it that, after all, the Russians have always thought in Great Power terms; in the days of the San Francisco conference at which I was present, M. Molotov dismissed with contempt what the small countries had to contribute and felt that here was an affair, not even of 'the Five'—because giving the veto to China was a gesture to the future and giving the veto to France was a gesture to the past. Only three countries, and perhaps only two, had seriously to be taken into account.

Again, of course, it is not only compatible with traditional Russian policy. It is compatible also with a certain aspect of American Democrat policy—it is very close to the policy of Franklin Roosevelt in his endeavours to handle Stalin. And I don't think we can throw it out altogether from tonight's discussion.

Now if, of course, in any fashion you can get some kind of Western-Moscow agreement, without stressing too much the present divergence between Moscow and Peking, but nevertheless allowing for that, as a geo-political fact, there is the danger of a long common frontier and the possibly overwhelming danger from Chinese populations—if we take that as the course that the future may run over the next decade or two then Mr. Nehru's non-alignment policy does here anticipate the way in which the tide of history in the balancing power in fact will go. That is to say, the whole policy required is that of reducing the sharp edge of the cold war and the tension of the John Foster Dulles' approach, and is that of trying to build as far as one can, sometimes tenuous, sometimes more solid bridges, cultural, economic and political, between—I won't say 'the East' because that's a completely misleading phrase—the U.S.S.R. and the Western world including the Commonwealth, which includes India, Ceylon and Pakistan.

Let us, however, suppose you do not get any major challenging attack from China in the matter of the next few months. Suppose, therefore, that Mr. Nehru's policy is one of not overstressing, but rather playing down, the extent of the Chinese menace, not to the extent of risking inadequate armaments but discouraging a certain type of militancy which, for example, you do find in some parts of Bengal, where there is a tendency to paramilitary movements which I think are of a quite dangerous kind—not that I wish to criticize my old friend Amiya Bou. It is quite clear that the Premier is opposed to movements of this kind of heating up the issue. Suppose that the Chinese attack does not take shape and, also, that the Western-Moscow policy is not too upset by M. de Gaulle and also takes shape. Then I think we will get something which gives us rather solid grounds for optimism. Incidentally, if it takes shape that way, Mr. Nehru, who is in some respects the Perikles of India, will say,

"Well, we always said so, this has been the steady basis of our policy and, see, this is proving to be right."

One last comment. You may say this is all very nice as a speculation on the international future, and in the balance of power, but what of India itself. I just want to say one last word on that. And it will be a somewhat enigmatic and ambiguous word. I referred before to—just across the sea channel—the contrast between Elephanta, on the one side, and the Trombay atomic reactor station, on the other. The one, the India of the Hindu counter-reformation of the 7th century; the other the ultra-modern establishment just across the water, mainly directed by young students, many of them trained for example in California and the like—something as modern and ultra-scientific and almost more than up-to-date in the 21st century as you would wish to come.

Now you say: Which way has India got to go? That is, of course, a foolish question, as India is involved in moving along both channels—some of India will remain in one, some of India will become the other. The question is rather of essential balance as between the two. And here I can't say that my report is wholly one of happiness. Mr. Albert West was Gandhi's adviser in South Africa. At the same time as I myself visited India, Mr. Albert West put on press record some of his unhappinesses about, for example, the appalling condition of slums in Calcutta where the problem is not one simply of poverty. The problem is partly one of a mood of extremely poor in endeavouring to get out of this poverty. And I am going to make the very drastic suggestion that I think India would be much benefited, Mr. Deputy High Commissioner, if there was no saluting, no giving of garlands and no taking-off of shoes in India for at least two years. I think, in other words, we want a radical spiritual change and that there is one aspect of Indian life which is too backward-looking, too ready to give semi-divine honours to supermen—against which Mahatma Gandhi always protested—too much swinging of censor, too ready to distribute flowers and so forth, and does not in any way adopt that peculiar spirit, scientific and mathematical and the rest, that one has very well exemplified in the Trombay reactor station. My good friend, the Sardar Panikkar, in his remarkable and stimulating book, *The Foundations of Modern India*, well emphasizes this point.

As I moved round in India I came across many—and there are thousands, tens of thousands—young men, Indian students, University professors and extremely brilliant young men—brilliant by any standards—highly sensitive, highly intelligent, men who would make their mark and be distinguished in any international society. This is one of India's great assets that you have got this reservoir and pool of young men of this character. And I can't help but feel that an isolationism and even

the unwillingness to go abroad, the feeling that it is good enough to stay at home and is rather proud of the fact of not going abroad, is not going to help India. If, thanks to UNESCO, it can get more of these young men in international circulation, beginning with the major Universities (as indeed is the case to some extent), with the move on towards minor Universities and major schools and, after a decade or two, penetrating down to villages, if you could get this stream of international culture, an international outlook penetrating more deeply into the whole Indian continent from Bombay and Calcutta—if you could do this, then I think you will get a rising of the Indian nation, already geopolitically in a key position and, beyond that, thanks to such a revival in a strong key position, then I should feel much more confidence in the shaping of the future and of balances of power. To such a revival I look forward with hope.

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Professor CATLIN delivered his address at a joint meeting of the East India Association and the Royal Over-Seas League at Over-Seas House, St. James, S.W.1, on Tuesday, 26th February, 1963.

Mr. KEWAL SINGH, Deputy High Commissioner for India, presided and introducing the speaker said: I am sure I am expressing the feelings of you all when I say that we are very much looking forward to listening to our very distinguished guest of the evening, Professor Catlin. I would not be so presumptuous to try to introduce Professor Catlin, who is known all over the world. He, as you know, has been very greatly interested in the history of political thought, in modern political trends, in developments of international affairs; and has had very intimate contacts in America, in India, in China, with the political philosophers, with the leaders, and has been studying international developments; and has given us the benefit of his thoughts in many books. Now I would not enumerate all the positions held by him and all the books written by him, as I am sure that is well known to you. I would like to say that it is an honour to have him here this evening, especially to speak on a subject of great interest to us all, that is, India's role now in international affairs after the very unhappy developments during the past few months.

Professor Catlin and his very charming wife have been very good friends of India through the past many decades. In India they think of them always with great admiration, regard and affection. We know that even before India got independence, their sympathy, very deep sympathy for India's political aspirations, were there and we know that since then he has been

studying developments with very great interest. They were in India about a month ago, travelled widely all over India and I hope he travelled comfortably. Therefore the Professor comes to us after his personal study of developments in India, of the effects of the Chinese invasion, of the thinking of the people and the leaders and of what sort of impact it has had. I am sure we are all very much looking forward to Professor's views in view of his very vast study of political developments, in view of his very deep dedication to international goodwill and to the possibility of a world government. We are therefore anxious to know from him what he thinks is the result of the recent Chinese aggression on India's international policy, on India's democratic planning, on India's role in international affairs.

In reply Professor CATLIN said: I thank you for those extremely charming and kind remarks which you have made. I don't know if I shall be able to live up to them. I can assure you that my journey in India, which I liked—and on this occasion I would now put on record my thanks to the organizers . . . I don't know whether you would talk about rising at 5 in the morning to catch a plane or getting a plane at 5 in the morning as comfortable, but anyhow it was superbly efficiently arranged and I found it, and I'm sure my wife did as well, extremely interesting and worthwhile; and I am extremely grateful to the Government of India for the arrangements they made. I ought also to say that having come back from this rather strenuous time in India, I had to go down to Cologne and to give an address to the University of Cologne and come back the same night. The result was that I got what in my youth would have been called 'an aacking cough' and the Doctor now calls trachitis, from which I only recovered two days ago. So I hope I shall be audible and articulate in what I have to say, although I struggle against certain physical disadvantages.

The Objects of the East India Association

(INDIA PAKISTAN AND BURMA)

IN 1866, eight years after the assumption of the government of India by the Crown, the East India Association was formed with the object of "the promotion of the public interest and welfare of the inhabitants of India generally." This object was steadfastly pursued during the ensuing eighty-one years. The Independence of India and Pakistan attained in 1947, while modifying the original conception, has increased the need for strengthening the bonds of friendship and the importance of mutual understanding between the people of Britain and the inhabitants of the countries formerly comprising the India Empire—namely, India, Pakistan, and Burma. The Association therefore is continuing its work, with the assistance of all those who are interested in the welfare and progress of these countries, by the methods which have proved so helpful in the past, namely:

1. By lectures on current questions affecting those countries and publication of the same.
2. By providing opportunities for the free discussion of important questions affecting India, Pakistan, and Burma.
3. By promoting friendly contact between the peoples of these countries and of Britain through the medium of social and other gatherings.
4. Generally by the promulgation of reliable information regarding the countries named.

The Association is essentially non-official in character and has no connexion with any political party. It seeks to provide an open platform for the consideration of current problems relating to India, Pakistan, and Burma. It welcomes as members all those who are interested in their welfare and progress.

Papers are read and discussed throughout the year, except in the months of August and September. Members are entitled to invite friends to these meetings.

Mohammed Iqbal Anniversary

THE Mohammed Iqbal Anniversary was commemorated on 9th May, 1963, at the Islamic Centre, London. His Excellency the Ambassador of Iran, who opened the proceedings said:

It is indeed a privilege and an honour to be here this evening paying tribute to a great poet-philosopher acclaimed by all the world.

Dr. Mohammed Iqbal, the spiritual father of Pakistan, was born in 1872 in the city of Sialkot. He was already famous as a poet when he left for Europe to continue his studies. He specialized in philosophy and law. Great poet, great lawyer, great teacher—an aura of greatness surrounded him.

Mohammed Iqbal died in 1938, and hence it is the twenty-fifth anniversary of his death that we are commemorating this evening. I would rather say that we are commemorating the Iqbal Day. Death cannot touch a man of Iqbal's calibre and if he has departed to a higher plane of life, this departure cannot be termed "death." He will be alive in all glory of life as long as human thought lives. And like human thought, his legacy is universal. Iqbal's universality is best expressed by himself. He says:

" My body, a flower from the Garden of Kashmir,
My heart, from the holy sanctuary of Hejaz,
My song, from Shiraz."

Neither do geographical or political boundaries confine him in, or to, one land. He only belongs to the World of Humanity. He says:

" We are from Hejaz, from China and from Iran,
But we are the dew-drops of the same smiling morn;
" Men of God have but one quest,
Our camps may be different, but our hearts are one! "

The few lines I quoted to you from Iqbal were in the Persian language. To us in Iran, Mohammed Iqbal commands a special position of greatness and honour. He chose the Persian language as a vehicle for the expression of his lofty thoughts. It is of course apparent why he chose the Persian language. In this language, once India's official language, he commanded a greater audience—an audience from Caucasia to Sinkiang. And in doing so, Iqbal's genius reached new peaks.

It is common knowledge that until the end of the seventeenth century, the Persian that flourished in Lahore and Delhi vied with that of Shiraz and Hamadan in points of literary excellence. Unfortunately, however, the Persian that was current in India became less dynamic.

It was for Mohammed Iqbal to re-create the dynamism of the language in India. His mastery over the language made it a deft tool in his nimble hands. He minted new expressions to express new ideas. He polished old tools to do the work of the new. And he did so with amazing success. For when we in Iran became acquainted with Iqbal's works, we accepted them with open arms. Here were old and dear relatives coming back home after an absence of years. Thus did he foster friendship between Pakistan—yet unborn—and Iran through more ways than one.



*His Excellency the
Ambassador of
Iran*

John Lawrence's Statue for Londonderry

THE statue of John Lawrence, Viceroy of India 1864 to 1869, which stood in Lahore for many years, has recently been re-erected temporarily in the grounds of Foyle College, Londonderry, where Lawrence was a scholar before proceeding to Haileybury. News was received in 1957 that this statue, which had been seriously damaged in civil disturbances, had been removed to prevent further damage to a store in Lahore Fort. Due to the initiative and influence of Lord Hailey and with the full support of a Committee it was decided that efforts should be made to bring the statue to the U.K. The late Sir Partick Cadell suggested that the statue should be re-erected at Haileybury and he approached the Headmaster who placed the suggestion before the Governors, but after mature consideration they decided that in view of the building programme to celebrate the centenary, they could not finance the project. Mr. J. B. Irwin, a member of the Committee and an old boy of Foyle College, put forward a proposal to the Old Boys' Association and the Governors of the College that steps should be taken to ask for the statue, and after consultation with the C.R.O., it was agreed by the Committee that Foyle College, where John Lawrence and his three brothers were scholars, should be offered the statue if the Government of Pakistan would release it. A personal approach was then made to the President of Pakistan by Sir Olaf Caroe and in reply the President agreed to its removal to England. The Government of Pakistan could not, however, make the arrangements for the removal, and the Foyle College authorities were apprised of the situation. It may here be mentioned that the Chairman of the P. & O. Steamship Co., on the request of Lord Hailey, had offered to bring the statue home free of freight. This was done, and the statue reached London in December, 1961. As it needed repairs and cleaning it was sent to a bronze foundry and on completion of the work in December, 1962, it was shipped to Belfast and thence taken to Londonderry. The Governors of Foyle in consultation with the Old Boys' Association felt that it would be preferable to erect the statue at least temporarily in the grounds of the present college instead of keeping it in store for three or four years whilst the new College was being built. This has been done and the statue was unveiled by the Vice-President of the Old Boys' Association on 1st March, 1963, and was formally handed over to the Governors.



Statue of John Lawrence in the College grounds

Photo courtesy of H.M. Stationery Office, Belfast

Pakistan's Helicopter Service

By GASTON DE CHALUS

PAKISTAN International Airlines have set up the world's most comprehensive scheduled helicopter service. Radiating from Dacca, East Pakistan's capital, the new service will, eventually, reach some 20 new points throughout the length and breadth of East Pakistan.

The economic development of the country is being seriously hindered by the present lack of good fast transport facilities. The rate of any future development will, therefore, be governed by the improvements that can be made to the lines of communication. The geography of East Pakistan is such as to make the extension of surface transport exceptionally difficult and costly, but adequate transportation must be provided at whatever cost to ensure the rapid development of the economy.

There are no direct roads and railways from the capital, Dacca, to the North West, West and South West areas of the country and the cost of building them is considered prohibitive. The wide and shifting rivers and streams, running North to South, plus the marshy land, make the construction of roads and railways an expensive and lengthy operation, especially in an East/West direction. A hundred miles of road or railway going East or West could require up to 75 bridges in its construction. Owing to the nature of the terrain, roads and railways have to divert many miles out of their true direction in order to find suitable sites for bridges. Even today, water transport still accounts for by far the major part of the traffic movement in East Pakistan. This method of transport is slow and inadequate and does not solve the problem of East/West movement.

Air transport is obviously the answer, but here again, the construction and maintenance of a large number of new airports would take time and the cost would be astronomical. The building of airports in East Pakistan presents a particularly difficult problem. Because of the heavy seasonal rainfall, high water level and marshy ground, landing strips must be of concrete with a stone base. They must also have an excellent drainage

system to deal with the heavy seasonal flooding. There is next to no stone in East Pakistan, so this must be imported by the inadequate transport facilities available. This is an expensive and time consuming operation and the country cannot wait for the building of a sufficient number of air strips for large, modern, passenger carrying aircraft.

For some time now, Pakistan International Airlines have been operating an "Air Bus Service" in East Pakistan with fares only 10 per cent higher than a comparable rail journey. These services, the cheapest in the world, link the central cities such as Dacca, Chittagong and Jessore, but still only reach approximately one third of the country.

The only alternative was helicopters, and with this in view, Air Commodore Nur Khan, Managing Director of Pakistan International Airlines, arranged for surveys to be carried out in East Pakistan with a view to the setting up of approximately 20 new heliports throughout the country. The final plan was presented to Field Marshal Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan.

Initially, two twin engined jet helicopters will be in service and a third at a later date. The craft will be amphibious which, along with their twin engines will make for an extremely safe operation in the conditions prevailing in Pakistan.

The service calls for approximately 20 new heliports, throughout East Pakistan, not all at once, but phased in over a year. The actual number of heliports might be increased or decreased, according to how the scheme works out. This, in effect, means that the service will bring the most remote point on any border of the East wing to within an hour and a half of the capital, Dacca. For instance, the journey from Dacca to Faridpur at the moment takes 22 hours 10 minutes. By helicopter, the trip will take 17 minutes. To Kulna from Dacca by railway takes 21 hours 20 minutes. By helicopter it will take 37 minutes.

Pakistan International Airlines will finance the whole helicopter operation from their own funds and will not ask the Government for any subsidy.

U.K. Stake in Pakistan

JUST over 67 per cent of all private foreign investment in Pakistan during 1957-60 came from the U.K. This was revealed by the recent State Bank of Pakistan report, *Foreign Assets and Liabilities and Foreign Investments in Pakistan*. The total was Rs. 21.42 crores (£24 m.).

The proportion is higher than for the 1947-56 period, when 55 per cent of all foreign investment came from British companies. The U.K. total in those years was Rs. 56 crores (£42 m.).

The total of Rs. 77.42 crores over 13 years has helped to diversify Pakistani industry. In addition, it has introduced to the home market high-quality products, including drugs and medicines, cigarettes, paints, soaps, metal containers, and electrical equipment.

One direct and beneficial result has been the saving in foreign exchange.

Development of Sui gas and the new oil refinery at Karachi are two notable examples. It is estimated that the using of Sui gas has so far saved the country a foreign-exchange expenditure of Rs. 18.5 crores (£13.8 m.) on other types of fuel and raw materials.

The oil refinery, which has been in production since last October, will turn out enough petroleum products to obviate the need for imports costing about £2.25 m. in foreign exchange.

Pakistan's export trade, which the Government is vitally anxious to see develop and increase, has also gained. Recently, local tobacco and oil products, two industries in which the U.K. has made large investments, have aroused interest among potential overseas buyers.

New factories, financed by British investment, are at present under construction, and in the near future woodscrews and electric motors will be added assets to the country's economic development.

Courtesy *Far East Trade*.

News from Japan

By MARY ROWLATT

Two significant events took place towards the end of 1962 both of which sprang from decisive Japanese initiative. One was the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Trade Treaty, on November 14th. Mr. Hayato Ikeda, the Prime Minister of Japan, alluded to this as an "epoch-making event" from which he expected Britain's exports to Japan would rise by twenty to twenty-five per cent, after the first year of the treaty's operation. The British Government's White Paper described it as putting an end to a discriminating attitude which "was becoming progressively harder to justify, particularly in view of the firm and continued attachment which Japan has shown to us and our friends in her international policies."

Some three weeks before the treaty was signed—on October 22nd to be exact—Mr. Ikeda declared: "Since I took office I have striven to double the national income. Now I realize that the foundation for this should be men who are right and true." He was addressing over two thousand delegates from 41 countries, gathered for the official opening of the Moral Re-Armament Asian Assembly Centre at Odawara near Tokyo.

The significance of this second event—the launching of this Asian Centre and Assembly—can hardly be over-emphasized. At a time when the eyes of the world were mesmerized by the spectacle of advancing Communism in India, here were Asian personalities assembled (including representatives of five governments) to frame a greater ideological offensive for their continent. Their aim was the dynamic nation-wide application and presentation of a moral ideology, so that division, poverty, war and Communism would be outlawed for ever.

Realizing the penetrating power of an ideology to cure the bitterness which keeps nations divided, the South Korean Government sent a delegation to Odawara. Their country still has no diplomatic relations with Japan and there are many unsolved issues between them. The man chosen to lead the delegation was Colonel Kim Chong Pil, director of South Korea's Central Intelligence Agency. "Newsweek" of October 29th mentions his visit to this assembly and describes him as "the master-mind" of the South Korean Government. Colonel Kim met Prime Minister Ikeda after both had been at Odawara and the result was two hours of fruitful discussion. A climate had been created in which Korean-Japanese talks could both take place and take place to good effect.

Colonel Kim went on record as saying that he "had never been so inspired in his life" as at Odawara.

The same uniting action was visible in the experience of seven Members of Parliament from Kerala, South India. They described at Odawara how in the past they had fomented divisions which had split the Congress Party vote at crucial elections and undermined public confidence, thus opening the way for Communist victories. The leaders of two rival factions then gave evidence of how they were united by the force of an ideology. This was now transforming the situation in their state.

The creating of unity among overseas Chinese was also planned at this assembly by representatives from Hong Kong, Singapore, Malay and Taiwan who had themselves found unity on a basis that transcended political attitudes. The purpose of that unity was best expressed in the decision of General S. K. Yee of Hong Kong, a newspaper owner, to use his papers to bring the challenge of a constructive ideology to Taipei and Peking alike. "A hundred copies of my magazine go twice a month to Peking," he said. "It is read by Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and Chiang Kai-shek." In those pages will now be read the news and basic thinking of an ideology more far-reaching than Communism.

Again, the relations between Australia and Japan have been overshadowed by bitter feelings originating from the war, although Prime Minister Kishi's heartfelt apology when he visited Australia in 1957 did much to dispel these feelings. How can this backlog of animosity be overcome? A pointer was given by Sir Raphael Cilento, a well-known Australian broadcaster and a former World Director of Refugee and Social Affairs for the United Nations. Announcing that Odawara had wrought a profound change of outlook in him, he apologized to Japan for the way he had used his radio broadcasts to "spoil the Japanese reputation" in his country. He assured those present that his future broadcasts would present an entirely different picture. "If you Japanese will accept me as a friend," he said "I would like to go forward shoulder to shoulder with you. Australia needs to look to the Asian countries for help. What Japan thinks today Asia and the world will think tomorrow."

This gathering at Odawara is a further decisive development in the direction Japan has been moving in since the end of the war. A step was taken in 1950 when Prime Minister Yoshida sent a delegation of 78 leading Japanese for ideological training to Caux in Switzerland. In 1957 the leaders of the Seinendan (a youth organization with 4,300,000 members) decided to accept Frank Buchman's invitation to be trained at the World Assembly Centre on Mackinac Island, U.S.A., in preference to Moscow's parallel invitation. One hundred and two went to Mackinac and only

seven to Moscow. In subsequent elections to the Seinendan Executive Committee all the key positions of responsibility were won by those trained at Mackinac and the Prime Minister later credited these youth leaders with a major role in restoring order and democracy in the country at the time of the riots of June, 1960. Even Communists admitted that people trained in ideology at Mackinac were incorruptible.

Then came Prime Minister Kishi's historic journey to Asian countries that had been at war with Japan; his purpose was to convey to them his nation's sincere apologies, settle outstanding issues and plan together for Asian unity and prosperity. This development deeply affected Japan's relationship with her former enemies.

These previous occasions, combined with Mr. Ikeda's recent visit to Europe and his participation at Odawara, represent more than reconciliation alone. They are moves towards a definite goal—the reshaping of human affairs to a great pattern, the divine pattern. Mr. Ikeda describes his conception of statesmanship thus: "I believe that there are three eternal principles that any man concerned in governing a country must observe, whatever the age, be he from East or West. They are these: first, he should maintain strict integrity in his personal life and habits and discretion in all his actions. Second, he should secure trust and approval in all his measures, invariably tell the truth and unfailingly observe the democratic principle of decision by the majority. And third, he should be a man of profound faith who constantly seeks divine guidance."

Mr. Yoshida and Mr. Kishi, two former Prime Ministers, have this to say in the invitation to the Odawara Assembly: "In order to lay a foundation for world peace and especially to create unity in Asia, individuals and nations must now give priority to Moral Re-Armament."

Broadcasts by Radio Peking attach the highest significance to such an ideological offensive on the part of the free world. How long will it take our Western leaders to evaluate the importance of this and act accordingly?

Pierre Loti and Japan*

PIERRE LOTI, whose real name was Julien Viaud, saw his *Madame Chrysanthème* published in 1887. In 1889, a second book about Japan, *Japoneries d'Automne*, appeared. Eleven years later, in December, 1900, he was back in Japan again and wrote a third book, *La Troisième Jeunesse de Madame Prune*, a kind of continuation of *Chrysanthème*. This was published in 1904.

Born in 1850, he was the son of the town clerk of Rochefort, a small town which is a sort of inland port, s. of La Rochelle and n.w. of Bordeaux. His family—*petits bourgeois*—were connected with the French Navy as were many other families in that part of the world. His mother, whom he adored, his aunt and his much older sister were Protestants of the old Huguenot tradition of La Rochelle.

In 1867, at the age of 17, he entered the Navy; and he retired in 1910 with the rank of "Capitaine de Vaisseau." But in the course of this honourable career he had also become one of the most famous authors of the Third Republic.

Here is the order (of publication) of Loti's books in his first and best period, all issuing from the firm of Calmann-Levy:

<i>Aziyadé</i>	1879
<i>Rarahu ou le Mariage de Loti</i>	1880
<i>Le Roman d'un Spahi</i>	1881
<i>Fleurs d'Ennui</i>	1882
<i>Mon Frère Yves</i>	1883

Then there is a gap of three years, and then:

<i>Pêcheur d'Islande</i>	1886
<i>Madame Chrysanthème</i>	1887
<i>Japoneries d'Automne</i>	1889

Between 1879 and 1923 (the year of his death)—a period of 44 years—he handed to his publisher a fresh volume almost every year; total output of some forty volumes.

In 1886, immediately after the *Chrysanthème* period, he returned to France and married Mlle. Jeanne Blanche Franc de Ferrière, daughter of one of the old families of Bordeaux. On 18th April, 1889 their son

* Summary of a lecture by F. Ashton Gwatkin, C3, CMG, to the Japan Society of London, reproduced by courtesy.

Samuel Viaud was born. "Almost a literary event," said the *Figaro*. He is still living in his father's house in Hendaye.

Loti, that is to say, Lieutenant Julien Viaud, was gazetted Chevalier Légion d'Honneur in 1887 for service in the Navy. In recommending his name for this honour, Commandant Dupont of *Triomphante* (the ship in which he first visited Japan) wrote about him as follows:

"Very often naval officers who possess a real talent apart from their life at sea make very indifferent public servants. M. Viaud is not like that. He loves his career. He serves with keenness, devotion and activity; and in every respect he deserves the recognition for which I have the honour to submit his name."

By that time he was the most famous of contemporary French novelists, a very best seller, read wherever French is read, and a rich man. In 1891, at the age of 41, he was elected Member of the French Academy—the highest honour that France can give to a man of letters.

Before he died he had been raised to the highest grade of Grande Croix de la Légion d'Honneur.

He was buried, with full naval honours in the family graveyard on the Ile d'Oléron opposite La Rochelle. There, in that corner of France from which his heart, in spite of all his vagaries, had never strayed, and with the sea—"ce cercle bleu"—all around him, lie the mortal remains of Capitaine Julien Viaud.

During the Franco-German War neither he nor the French Navy had played any significant part: but in 1871 he left home waters on his second long-distance cruise and for the first time he saw the Pacific Ocean. One of the duties of cadet officers was to keep a diary of their voyages, and to Loti this duty became a pleasure and provided a store-house of impressions from which a great part of his "novels" was to be derived. Some of Loti's diaries have been published; and all of them are I believe in the keeping of his son at Hendaye.

In January, 1872, his ship *La Flore* reached Tahiti where she remained for four months, January to May; and there cadet officer Viaud was initiated into many things.

There he became a writer, a novelist, although his book *Rarahu ou le Mariage de Loti* did not see the light of day until eight years later. But it was conceived in Tahiti, and it remained incubating in that marvellous diary of his.

This charming book is a forerunner of *Chrysanthème*. It should of course be illustrated by Gauguin. In it the set formula of the Loti novel takes shape.

"First, the prelude—without long hesitations or discussions; then, the idyll of the simplest and most natural kind; then, the sudden inevitable ending, when the ship sails away."

This is the formula *Rarahu*, the formula *Aziyadé*, the formula *Chrysanthème*.

Then, it was here, in Tahiti, on 25th January, 1872, that Julien Viaud was christened "Loti" by three Maori girls, who were garlanded with wild flowers and dressed in tunics of rose-coloured muslin with long trains. "Loti" is "roti" and means a "rose." The girls could not pronounce his French name.

Then, he "married" Rarahu who was one of the three—or more likely he "married" all three of them consecutively. He says in his book that his "bride" was lady-in-waiting to Queen Pomaré of Tahiti; and that she died of grief when he sailed away.

All highly improbable. I do not think any woman ever died for love of Loti.

But it was in Tahiti that Loti assumed that role of lover of exotic women, which was to be his speciality for the rest of his personal and literary life. His mystique!

This was not a pose but a relaxation. Loti was small, shy and diffident. He had fine eyes and a voice that was notably attractive to women with its soothing, suggestive intonations; and his gestures, too, as though he were a sculptor shaping a statue—raising a woman's hand to his lips "as though he were breathing in her soul."

He was more at ease with simple, primitive people than he was with his own social and intellectual equals. Hence Rarahu in Tahiti, Aziyadé in Turkey—with whom he could not even converse in a common language. Hence Pasquala Ivanovitch and Madame Carmencita. Hence Samuel the boatman in Salonica, Julien the Spahi and Frère Yves on board ship and in Brittany. Hence Madame Chrysanthème and Madame Prune. He is not the first, nor the only, high-brow who has preferred to go to bed with his unequals.

And further, Rarahu and the other girls in Tahiti brought him the delight of love that knows neither shame nor modesty nor jealousy nor remorse; love to be enjoyed like a delicious fruit or drink, without mental or psychological complications of any kind, and with a minimum of emotion. Surely this was a lesson worth learning.

As for the book, in which this precious lesson is revealed, *Rarahu*, as I have said, had to wait eight years before achieving immortality in Loti's second novel. His first novel was *Aziyadé*—subject, his love for a Turkish girl, a harem girl, a married woman, first glimpsed through a lattice window, when his ship had been sent to the Aegean on the eve of

the Russo-Turkish War. It was published in 1879, and at first had little success though his publisher thought well of it. After his return from Eastern waters, Loti persuaded himself that he was truly in love with Aziyadé. He wrote to friends in Constantinople asking them to find her and to help her to join him in France.

"Once in France," he wrote, "I swear she will be my wife."

Well, well! He was certainly in love with Loti, and with the fascination of Eastern life, and with the atmosphere of Islam, and with the Turkish cause to which he remained faithful for the rest of his days. As for his heart, his biographer, M. Serban, wrote:

"He left none of it in Japan, very little of it in Oceania; it was in Turkey that the greater part of it remained."

At this time (1878-9) he wanted to escape from certain memories and obsessions—to escape into a mirage. This was the period, too, when he felt for a short time the call of the cloister. He got as far as a retreat at La Trappe, but of this he wrote:

"This life is too gloomy. All day, all night funeral chauntings that give me the shivers."

There could be nobody less suited than Loti for the monastic vocation. Instead, he became a novelist.

With his second novel *Rarahu ou le Mariage de Loti* he became famous. He was taken up by French literary society. Alphonse Daudet, Alexandre Dumas fils and Ludovic Halévy were among his friends.

In 1883 he again sailed eastwards—this time to the war in Tonkin. Here he got a bad mark—his only one—for sending in to the *Figaro* an article that emphasized the brutalities of the war. This was "*mal vu*"; and he was recalled to France for a year and a month. But he was soon forgiven.

In 1885 he joined *Triomphante* and Commandant Dupont in Far Eastern waters. July to November, 1885 was the period of *Madame Chrysanthème* and of *Japoneries d'Automne*.

In 1886, *Pêcheur d'Islande*—I think, his finest book—was published. In the same year he returned to France and on 20th October he married.

In 1887 came the highly flattering invitation from Queen "Carmen Sylva" to visit her in Rumania. This was not, apparently, extended to Madame Viaud.

1889; he was attached to the Ambassador's suite on voyage to Tangiers and Morocco.

1891; Loti, Membre de l'Académie Française.

1894; voyage to Egypt, Sinai, Akaba, Petra, Jerusalem and Jericho.

The Admiralty treated him with consideration. They gave him home jobs, so that he could spend much of his time at Rochefort. Finally, he

was appointed to command *Javelot*, a gunboat resolutely moored at the mouth of the Bidassoa River to guard the frontier between France and Spain. This independent command facilitated his promotion to be "Capitaine de Frégate." It also enabled him to write *Ramuncho*, his fine novel about the Basques; and decided him to buy his house at Hendaye, where he eventually died.

In 1899 he was travelling again—this time to Ceylon, India (including Pondicherry, where he adored—it was just his cup of tea); and Persia (including Bushire, Shiraz and Persepolis).

On his return to France he was appointed aide-de-camp to Vice-Admiral Pottier commanding the French squadron sent to China at the time of the Boxer Rebellion. On board *Redoutable* he arrived at Taku in September, 1900. He was in China for a very short time, but long enough to put together a book, *Les derniers jours de Pékin*, published in 1902.

"Peking is finished," he wrote: "Her prestige has fallen, her mystery laid bare."

He felt a vague emotion of regret, but he had no Chinese Chrysanthème to inspire him, and he never had any sentiment for China.

That same year, 1900, in December *Redoutable* left for a cruise round Japan, to Nagasaki, Kobe, Yokohama—spending most of her time in Nagasaki. Hence it came about that Loti revisited the scenes of his former "marriage."

La Troisième Jeunesse de Madame Prunz was the fruit of his observations and reflections. It was eventually published in 1904. But long before that Loti had left Japan for ever, and the very slender thread of sympathy had been severed.

"In seeing the place once again," he wrote, "no reminiscent memory stirred, though it is still pretty beneath the white shroud of winter. The countries where one has neither loved nor suffered leave no impression upon one."

He had never experienced that spell of the Far East which I suppose all of us here to-night have felt more or less.

Except perhaps in Indo-China—see his "Pélerin d'Ankor," published in 1912. The tropical forests, the gigantic ruins of a mysterious past, the ritual dances performed in his honour at the palace of the King of Cambodia—these still had their magic for Loti. But for him there was no *Troisième Jeunesse*.

In January, 1910 he was placed on the reserve list. He had been in the Service for 42 years, of which almost 20 had been spent at sea. His naval career had been useful and honourable, but not outstandingly distinguished. His eminent service to the Navy had been in calling the attention of his

innumerable readers to the splendour and servitude of a sailor's life, set in the centre of "that blue circle, that dazzling solitude, so deep, so limitless, wherein nothing changes, nothing happens."

The war with Germany broke out in September, 1914. Poor Loti, gallant fellow in spite of his peculiarities, longed to "do his bit."

He was 64 years old and was attached to the Headquarters Staff of the Military Governor of Paris. Alas, he cut a sorry figure. Here is a description of him in *Loti aux Armées* by L. Cario (*Mercure de France*, 1st July, 1923):

"One morning I saw glide into the Baraque Adrian which served as our office a little man walking pussyfoot. His whole body, which looked slim and slight, was muffled up in a large sky-blue overcoat. All that I could see of him was a snub nose, a little white beard dyed slightly reddish and tiny feet encased in boots so small that they seemed to have been snatched from some Chinese doll."

"He was a sick man. He seemed to have collapsed," wrote M. Cario.

In February, 1918, he was convalescing in his house at Hendaye. He struggled back to the Army, but by May he was exhausted again.

He lived on for another five years, and saw published at least four more books—two books of memoirs and two books about Turkey—his last tribute to the memory of Aziyadé—full of his intensifying obsessions, hatred of the Germans (of course), hatred of the Greeks, the Armenians, and above all the perfidious British.

After a stroke which took away his power of speech he survived for two agonizing years and died on 10th June, 1923. He was 73 years old.

War has many victims whose names do not appear in casualty lists, and I think we may inscribe after Loti's name: *Mort pour la Patrie*.

The French public has forgotten Loti—almost; yet in my youth he was placed among the Great on both sides of the Channel—indeed all over the world—a master of French style. The First World War, the advent of Marcel Proust, André Gide, Valéry, Claudel and others overthrew the elder gods—not only Loti. He has not recovered ground nor his place in French literature.

And yet—he is still a master, a poet though he wrote in prose, prose so melodious and so crystal-clear. I would attach him, not to the novelists, but to the romantic poets of the 19th Century, who derive from Chateaubriand and from our own Lord Byron: Lamartine, Hugo, Baudelaire, Musset, Gautier, Lecomte de Lisle, Nerval, Hérédia, Verlaine, Rimbaud—those who sought to go "ever a little further" in their search for that "strangeness in beauty" which is Walter Pater's definition of Romance, and as Baudelaire has written.

"*Au fond de l'inconnu pour trouver du nouveau.*" Loti followed the poetic tradition.

As for his style in writing, imagine a blend of Lafcadio Hearn and Joseph Conrad, and you will get something like it in English. Here is what a French critic (Maxime Gaucher) wrote about it long ago:

"To everything, whether men or objects, he gives such intensity of life, such outstanding 'relief,' so much colour, that we do not merely read his stories, we feel them. . . . The style has such transparency, such suppleness, and one might say such elasticity that the thought emerges in the full blaze of light, all the colours so clearly reflected—they seem to stand out as in a stereoscope."

Such is the marvellous instrument that the Maestro could play upon with such infinite skill that it amounts to genius. And yet I cannot help thinking that the instrument is not a violin but a lute.

I have tried to trace a relationship between the famous Madame Chrysanthème and the still more famous Madame Butterfly. Puccini did *not* take his story from Loti's book but from a play which he saw at the Duke of York's Theatre in London—"Madame Butterfly" with Evelyn Millard in the title role. The play had been adapted by David Belasco from a short story with the same name published in the 1890's by John Luther Long, a third-rate American author who specialized in Japanese tales of the Cherry Blossom school. Both tale and play are written in an excruciating pidgin-English, which the authors considered to be appropriate to Lieutenant Pinkerton's Nagasaki home, and the following ballad was supposed to be Butterfly's and Pinkerton's favourite.

"I call her the Belle of Japan, of Japan.
Her name it is O Cho-Cho San, Cho-Cho San.
Such tenderness lies
In her soft almond eyes.
I tell you she's just ichi-ban!"

Bastard Japanesery never sank much lower than this. But the pathos of the story appealed to Puccini; and his librettists—Italian (Illica and Giocosa) and English (R. H. Elkin), escaping from that awful jargon, produced agreeably poetical versions of a tale that is touching though unreal. And they added Act I—Goro's matrimonial agency and Butterfly's "marriage," which might well have been taken from Chrysanthème and Monsieur Kangourou. But I have no evidence of this. Chrysanthème herself provided an opera by Messager, but it had no success and was wiped out by Butterfly.

It is strange that Loti should have never really known the Japanese. His stories of *Pêcheur d'Islande* and *Mon Frère Yves* might well have been applied to fisher-life in Japan. Of this and of much else Loti knew nothing whatsoever. In his whole life he spent no more than nine months in Japan: twelve weeks with *Triomphante* and twenty-three weeks with *Redoutable*—most of the time in Nagasaki. He could describe Japanese scenery, Japanese towns and villages, the sights, scents and sounds of Japan, the little life of little people, in a manner that has never since been rivalled. A little world of chatter and giggles in a little port (Nagasaki) that for centuries had specialized in commerce and amusement for a small handful of "foreign barbarians." Madame Chrysanthème and her "marriage" (which was not even pathetic) had been institutions ever since the Dutch had been settled in Deshima, two hundred and fifty years before.

Of this tiny world Loti gives a picture so accurate and so sensitive that, as that early critic had said, one not only sees it but feels it. Yet of the deeper roots of Japan, her violent and vigorous history, her pride, her sense of duty, her solidarity and organization, her piety, her adaptability, her originality, her industry, her quick intelligence, her intense curiosity, her poetry, her patience—he seems to have known nothing and to have cared less.

Of her virtues he notes only her love of nature and especially of flowers and trees, and her courteous though artificial manners. He was beginning to acquire a taste for her music. And in the preface to *Madame Prune*, written towards the close of the Russian War, he pays a sailor's tribute to her patriotism and her courage.

Madame Chrysanthème, most famous of all his books, is dedicated to the Duchesse du Richelieu, a *grande dame* of Parisian society; and in his introduction he writes:

"This is the diary of one summer of my life. I have changed nothing, not even the dates [Ed. Note: This is not quite true!]. The three principal personages concerned are Myself, Japan and the Effect produced on me by this country—this astonishing fatherland of all that is grotesque!"

It is Loti's most amusing book—a sailor's yarn!

The "marriage" itself, as arranged by Mr. Kangourou (? Kagoro), the professional *entremetteur*, is in itself farcical; so is the famous dénouement when Loti, returning to his Japanese home for a last tender farewell, finds Chrysanthème there, singing to herself a happy little song, and testing with a hammer—and with the competence and dexterity of a money-changer—dollars or yen that he had given her as his part of the contract.

"Even more Japanese" writes Loti, "than anything I could ever have imagined, this last glimpse of my marriage . . . The fear of leaving her in distress had caused me pain—almost; and I much prefer that this marriage should end in a joke, even as it had begun. So come, little *mousmè*, let us separate in all good faith and friendship. I took you to amuse myself. You didn't succeed very well, but you gave what you could—your little person, your reverential gestures, and your little music. Taking it all in all you were rather sweet in your Japanese way. And, who knows? Perhaps I shall think of you now and then, by ricochet, when I remember that lovely summer, those pretty gardens, and the vibrant song of the cicadas . . . O Amaterasu O mi-kami, wash me white from my little marriage in the waters of the River of Kamo!"

The "marriage" took place on the 7th July, 1885, and was duly registered at the district police station. The newly-married couple were installed in their first-floor apartment in a house belonging to M. Sucre and Mme. Prune (Sato San and O Ume San) in the Jukenji quarter of Nagasaki. The ménage Sucre lived on the ground floor and devoted their spare time to chanting Shinto prayers. It was a little house of paper panelling "that could be taken to pieces like a child's toy."

"Whole families of cicadas are singing in our ancient echoing roof. From our verandah a precipitous view over Nagasaki, its streets, its junks, its great temples. At certain hours all this lights up beneath our feet like a fairy scene."

Loti gives the impression that his residence and his "marriage" lasted some five months. In fact, it lasted for only five weeks; and in that short time he had absorbed a sense of the landscape and atmosphere of Japan which he was able to portray in a series of vignettes which in their way and within their limitations have never been surpassed.

Never once does he put a foot wrong. Never once does he commit one of those errors in fact or banalities of expression, that vapidty which makes odious so many books about Japan.

There is no 'plot' in the book, only a series of vignettes—much amusement; much exasperation, much boredom and just a little affection.

"That little Chrysanthème! After all, I do not dislike her. After all, when on neither side is there any physical distaste or hatred, familiarity in the long run creates a kind of bond."

Chrysanthème's meals (arriving from Madame Prune's kitchen on the floor below): a hash of sparrows, a stuffed prawn, seaweed-sauce, a salted sweet, a sugared pimento. And then the enormous bucket of Gargantuan proportions containing rice boiled in water.

"At night our house, built of old wood, very thin in substance, vibrates like a huge dry violin."

(This was a description and a phrase specially noted by Lafcadio Hearn, who was an enthusiastic admirer of Loti's style).

"The lightest sounds reverberate, change tone, become fraught with menace. Beneath the verandah two little aeolian harps give out at the slightest breeze the tinkle, tinkle of their blades of glass, like the melodious whisper of a stream. Outside, for as far as one can hear, the cicadas are carrying on with their vast incessant orchestra, and overhead, in the dark roof, one hears, like a witches' gallop, the deadly battle of cats, rats and owls careering to and fro."

Loti had a certain respect for Madame Renoncule, his mother-in-law. She would appear to have once been a famous geisha in Yedo who had been rash enough to have a baby who was Chrysanthème. Hence her rustication!

And after Chrysanthème she had had two more girls, Snow and Moon; and five little boys—Cherry-tree, Pigeon, Bind-weed, Gold and Bamboo. Chrysanthème she had taught to play the samisen with the fingering and style of the Conservatoire. And Loti proceeds:

"I begin to like her guitar, and even her singing. Nothing theatrical in her style—a high, sweet thin and plaintive tone. She has distinction and she dresses with sobriety and taste unlike the other *mousmé* . . . She is really very sweet is Chrysanthème, and pretty, too . . . If anyone had said to me on the day I arrived in Japan: 'Look, that is your *mousmé*, the one that is passing now,' I would have been delighted—certainly. But, as it is, I am *not*. It is Chrysanthème, merely Chrysanthème, just she, and no one else, the ridiculous little creature with her silly shape and her paltry intelligence, provided for me by the Kangourou Agency."

On the eve of his departure, Loti looks around on the little home which he will soon be leaving, and reflects:

"There they are, five or six little dolls, my neighbours, amusing themselves as they dance to the music of Chrysanthème's guitar. And this evening I feel a certain pleasure in thinking how this home and this woman who directs the dance—all, all are mine. I have been unjust towards this country. It seems to me that at this moment my eyes are being opened, and I can see it in a clear light, and that all my senses are undergoing a strange and violent change. I perceive and I understand much better and all of a sudden that multitude of charming little things in the midst of which I have been living, the artistic and delicate grace of shapes and objects, the quaintness of the patterns, the refined choice of colour schemes."

For two or three pages Loti continues his new found hymn of praise for Japan, the Japanese and their way of life.

Une amende honorable! Perhaps.

A few days later, on 12th August, 1885, *La Triomphante* left Nagasaki and the five weeks of Chrysanthème were over. Loti's ship sailed for Chefoo in China, and then returned to Japan—to Kobe and Yokohama—September to November. This was the period of *Japanneries d'Automne*.

This second volume of the Japanese trilogy (it was published in 1889) is a scrapbook and a guidebook, written no doubt under publisher's pressure for something more about Japan, and compiled out of Loti's inexhaustible journal.

The guidebook—the three chapters on Kyoto, Nikko and Yedo—take up more than three quarters of the whole volume. I had some difficulty in finding a copy of the book, but succeeded at last in running it down in the Public Library in Florence. I would not advise my audience to spend much time in hunting for it. If, however, they persist I would recommend them to read the accounts of the Foreign Office Ball and of the Imperial Chrysanthemum-viewing Party—the latter being the last occasion on which the Empress and her court ladies graced the occasion in the ceremonial dress of the Middle Ages.

Loti created his own Japan, the little world of Chrysanthème and Prune. It was a great achievement of imaginative authorship. Japan would be poorer without Madame Chrysanthème just as England would be poorer without Mr. Pickwick and Becky Sharp. To say that Chrysanthème never existed would be as silly as to say that Don Quixote never existed. Chrysanthème is an Immortal—even when, like other Immortals she is quite forgotten.

La Troisième Jeunesse de Madame Prune is a continuation of “Madame Chrysanthème” after fifteen years absence from Japan.

It has even less plot than in the earlier book. It is in form a diary noted down at intervals between 8th December, 1900 and 29th October, 1901, when *Redoutable* sailed away to Saigon.

Besides Mme. Prune, who in fact does not play a leading role, other members of the caste are: Madame Renoncule, who is Chrysanthème's mother, and who promptly offered Loti another daughter “Reed-Flower” to be a temporary bride. Madame Bear, the florist; Madame Stork, who kept the tea-house near the Fox Temple; Madame Ichihara, dealer in monkeys; and, above all—Pluie d'Avril, the “little cat” (and her real cat, Monsieur Swong), the tiny “maiko” dancer or apprentice geisha, who enchanted Loti; and Mademoiselle Inamoto, daughter of the Buddhist priest in the temple beyond the hillside graveyard which was Loti's favourite resort.

All the members of the caste are girls, *mousmé* (Loti's favourite word)—old *mousmé* and young *mousmé*. Not a single male performer—not even

M. Kangourou or M. Sucre. The latter was dead, and Madame Prune was now a widow.

There is no Japanese "wife" this time—just wanderings and observings in and around Nagasaki; and the little women, young and old, with whom Loti is "*un peu en coquetterie*."

Especially Mademoiselle Pluie d'Avril and Mademoiselle Inamoto.

He had asked for geisha to amuse him in a tea-house "*La Maison de la Grue*" on one bleak winter night. Mademoiselle Matsuko, a full-fledged geisha, *samisen* and all, had been provided; and then, with but after her:

"The strangest little being I have ever seen in my wanderings through the world, half doll, half cat. I have found the toy that I have perhaps vaguely longed for all my life—a little cat, a kitten, who can talk . . . Only those who have the true "cat-feeling" can understand me in the development of my passion for little Mademoiselle Pluie d'Avril. Either one has got the 'cat-feeling' or one has not got it. There is no arguing about this . . . When she enters the room, my little cat, all dressed up, always I get the sudden surprise of her new costume, extravagant design, chimerical colour-scheme. From the depths of the shadows of the huge room she advances—dazzling, with the majestic gait of a marionette. She is almost a dwarf, she is above all a fairy, and her body, which in itself is negligible, is drowned in the folds of her robe, which finishes in a wadded hem, hard and stiff, so that the train spreads out on all sides with pomp and circumstance. The distinctive features that give originality to her appearance are, I believe, the length of her neck and the extreme smallness of her head; but her charm, the essentially 'cat' expression, is in her eyes: eyes aslant, eyes upturning, sly, witty and all the time ironical . . . It is the first time that I have ever fallen under the spell. I shall often return to the *Maison de la Grue*."

He visits Pluie d'Avril in her private residence.

"She lives with Monsieur Swong, an enormous cat, a tom-cat with ample fur and imposing gait, wearing a little pleated collar; also with Madame Pigeon, an old, old woman with white hair, whom she calls her 'granny'—doubtless some Madame Prune of days gone by, who all the same has honest eyes and the air of a good old dame, gentle and almost respectable."

He describes (perfectly) the little house of the little dancer ("How often does the word 'little' recur in descriptions of this country!"). A very modest little house, a home of the people, but arranged with care. A few photographs of Mademoiselle Pluie d'Avril and some of her friends in their successful roles, and two European portraits—the Empress Eugénie and King Victor Emanuel. Monsieur Swong stares fixedly at him with his green eyes. Madame Pigeon withdraws. Is it intentional?

The mere suspicion would spoil for ever that dainty scene. However, everything down to the farewell passes in unspoiled innocence.

"But what, what is hidden in that little head, in that little breast? Always the same melancholy question, always left without answer, which I have so often put to myself with regard to beings essentially different from me and for me undecypherable—cats, monkeys, or children of a human race that is other than ours, whose gaze has entered into my gaze through the way of the deep . . . And what future is awaiting her, what prostitutions are in store? Will she retain her pretty looks as she grows older, when the flower of childhood has withered on her cheeks? And then when her prettiness has passed away, in what misery will she end her days—the little girl in her fine robes? . . . Compelled by her trade to be rather like those young cats who purr for all the world, I think all the same she reserved for me a shred more of friendship than for so many others."

Pluie d'Avril and Inamoto San! These are the most interesting characters in *La Troisième Jeunesse*—more interesting too than any of the *moussmé* in *Madame Chrysanthème*.

Inamoto was an emanation in the course of Loti's favourite walk in the vast cemetery on the mountain-side:

"In the heart of that lofty necropolis, in a kind of wooded enclosure, surrounded by a population of tombs. I think it is she, this *moussmé*, who at present is for me the personification of Nagasaki and its lovely Mountain of the Dead."

At the farthest end of the cemetery Loti had come upon a stone wall over which he had clambered; and there he had found an old, abandoned park, half jungle and half forest, and there, seated on the moss, turning over the pages of a picture-book representing gods and goddesses—a girl!

"Who are you?" she asked. "Who allowed you to jump over the wall?"

"Her eyes were scarcely at all slanting, the eyes almost of a little dusky girl of Provence or Spain, with a tinge of red amber. An aura of health and fresh young life. And her expression was so honest that for her I dropped the bantering tone which always seemed appropriate in the apartments of Madame Prune and Madame Renoncule, my mother-in-law."

Had Loti—aged fifty, Academician—at last met his Japanese Aziyadé? And was a story, the usual story, stealing into "Madame Prune" more than half-way through the volume?

Not at all. Loti remained in love, half in love with Japanese landscape and atmosphere—an atmosphere which, if violated by an intrusive

foreigner, was spoiled. This was the mistake he had made with Chrysanthème. He had treated her as a tart—which she was; and, in doing so, had broken the delicate porcelain of an *objet d'art*. He would not make the same mistake with Pluie d'Avril or Inamoto. Besides, he was too old, and they too young.

Inamoto was the daughter of a priest or guardian of a dishevelled temple, low down on the hillside; and Loti became her lover—no, not in that sense, but as a recurrent excitement for him and for her. Fifty times during his stay in Nagasaki, Loti was to climb over that wall, plunge into that fringe of forest and find Inamoto waiting for him in that clearing.

"A romance as chaste as that with Mademoiselle Pluie d'Avril, but different and deeper. No question this time of a little kitten dressed up, but of a young girl, who, in spite of her *mousmé* laughter, has eyes that are candid and sometimes serious."

Yet, in this romance there was the precious element of secrecy. They must not be caught together. That would be terrible; and that was so attractive. And besides she was part of the landscape.

"Is it she whom I shall miss, or simply the old grey wall, guardian of our assignations? so closely is her personality welded to her surroundings."

The few pages devoted to Inamoto San are for me among the most attractive that Loti ever wrote—the most delicate pages of a most delicate writer, the most expressive of the delicacy of Japan, described with the delicacy of the French language. Almost perverse this evident delectation in love unconsummated.

It is typical too of Loti's sense of nuance and gradation that he calls Inamoto by her surname. No other name is ever mentioned. She has no flower-name such as he finds or invents for the other *mousmé*. She is a personage apart.

The last farewell to Inamoto was his last farewell to Japan. In that clearing in the forest he takes her in his arms and kisses her. He had never presumed to do so before; and he writes:

"The sad embrace of sorrowing friendship. She thinks it is her duty to kiss me in return, and does so with such gentle awkwardness like a baby who does not know how to do it! One would say that never in her life had she ever kissed anyone . . . Is it possible that in the depths of her little soul there was really and truly something of friendship for me? There must have been, I think, since she had always returned there to meet me. Besides, I do not think that affection always has need of language, nor of deep mutual understanding, nor of any logical reason. It can gush forth, just like that—from a glance, from an expression of the eyes, from something else still less definable which escapes all analysis."

Vain, naïf, lonely, rather pathetic, Monsieur l'Académicien—something very different from the Don Juan, the “*cocoon internationale*,” the searcher after exotic pleasure.

And one wonders what Inamoto San may have thought of him and of her one encounter with Genius—Genius that knows no race distinction.

And now where are they all? Loti dead, nearly forty years ago. Chrysanthème and Prune—dead. Pluie d'Avril (she must have been just about my contemporary) and Inamoto San (four or five years older) may possibly, just possibly be still alive—old women in shabby *kimono* huddled over a scant *hibachi* fire like the old doxies in Villon's poem:

Et jadis fûmes si mignottes.

And Nagasaki itself, and the Jūjūji quarter?

I do not know—perhaps there is someone here who can tell us—what is left of Nagasaki since the cruel disaster of 9th August, 1945. I have been told that since Nagasaki is built among the mountains and not like Hiroshima on the plain, the destruction and mortality were much less, and that the town has now revived. But a great living poetess—adding a foot-note to the effect that one of her phrases is taken from an eyewitness's description of Nagasaki after the falling of the bomb—has written the following epitaph on the little world of Chrysanthème:

“There was a woman combing her long hair
To the rhythm of the river flowing.
She sang: ‘All things will end—
Like the sound of Time in my veins growing . . .
All loss, all gain—
Yet will the world remain!’
The song died in The Ray . . . Where is she now?
Dissolved and gone—
And only her red shadow stains the un-remembering stone.”

The poetess is Dame Edith Sitwell.

Iraq's Educational Revolution

IN all areas, on all levels, advancement and expansion in the Republic of Iraq have been revolutionary since the overthrow of the old regime in July, 1958. Progress has been made in the pursuit of objectives which are common to all young, developing countries, designed to raise the cultural, social, economic and health standards of every Iraqi individual—in general to give him a better way of life.

Underlying and supporting all forms of progress must be sound education. So it is that the Revolutionary Government in Iraq has channelled a great deal of its interest toward the Ministry of Education. This department in turn has laboured to open new schools and expand the facilities of institutions previously in existence. More and more, all the gates of knowledge are being thrown wide open, all citizens being provided equal opportunities to learn.

The educational system in Iraq itself is not revolutionary. It is organized on standard lines, beginning with youngsters in kindergarten and developing upward. The Directorate of Primary Education has had no difficulty in accomplishing its task of getting the ball rolling. Parents throughout the country, from all walks of life, have responded eagerly by sending their children to class as soon as there are classrooms to seat them and teachers to teach. Particularly in rural areas, the past three years have seen a marked rise in the level of primary education.

For the country as a whole, statistical data prepared by the Directorate of Educational Statistics shows that the number of children of primary school age, between six and twelve, is 1,184,230—18 per cent of the total population. In the 1957/58 school year (pre-revolution) there were 430,475 pupils, of all ages, attending primary schools. In 1960/61 the figure reached 776,353, representing an increase of 80 per cent over the three-year period. Taking into consideration the number of pupils of primary school age only, the same period shows an increase in enrolment from 32 per cent in 1957/58 to 54 per cent in 1960/61.

These rapidly increasing figures for the number of primary school students reflect parallel gains in the number of classes and teachers on this level of the educational system. Again in the three years following the revolution, 568 primary schools have been opened—440 boys' schools and 128 for girls. To staff these new facilities 3,752 teachers were employed immediately upon their graduation from teacher training institutes, along with some graduates of regular secondary schools who were given one

year of specialized teacher training. As an emergency measure, it has been necessary also to employ 897 graduates of secondary schools without specific training in the methods of primary education.

Still on the primary level, another aim of Iraq's Ministry of Education is to improve the health standards of its charges. This is being achieved by the implementation of a school nutrition project, supervised by ministry experts. The project is functioning at present in 1,371 schools, and providing over 200,000 children with tasty, healthful lunches. The programme also is being operated on a limited scale in an additional 2,532 schools, for another 200,000 youngsters.

The secondary level of the school system naturally forms the bridge necessary to carry primary graduates through to the college and university stage of their education. The revolutionary "open door" secondary school policy adopted in Iraq during the past three years has led to a marked need for more intermediate schools. While the school construction programme has been running full bent, it has not been able to keep pace with increased student enrolments. Statistics show that secondary school enrolment increased 90 per cent between 1957/58 and 1960/61, 63,054 more students entering classes; but during the same period the number of schools increased by only 54 per cent, 131 new units being built.

With regard to secondary level teachers, the comparison is better. New schools and old alike have been staffed with qualified new teachers from colleges and other specialized Iraqi educational institutions. A considerable number of foreign teachers also have been employed. Specifically, the number of teachers on this level of the systems has increased by 84 per cent, 2,240 persons. Thus, although classrooms are still rather crowded, there are sufficient instructors to allow for small classes and the degree of attention needed by students in the secondary stage.

Obviously the spiralling need for teachers has created a commensurate need for teachers training schools, and instructors. The Ministry of Education has devoted a great deal of attention to the normal solution of this problem, as indicated by the fact that the number of teacher training courses offered throughout the country rose from 46 to 62 in the first year following the revolution. This number remained static in 1959/60 and then dropped in the past school year, once the first great need had been met and the growth situation stabilized. One measure adopted to meet the acute teacher shortage two years ago was to offer a one year teacher training course to graduates of regular secondary schools. Graduates of domestic science secondary schools also have been used to alleviate the staff shortages in primary schools.

Vocational education in Iraq, while also on the secondary level, has been deemed of an importance to warrant separate administration. The education ministry thus set up a Directorate General of Vocational Education to concentrate on education in the fields of agriculture, industry, commerce and home economics. Talented Iraqi students who are not inclined towards the more academic fields are encouraged to train for careers in the various trades. Once they enter the vocational education programme they are trained in such a way as to give them not only the most modern techniques of their chosen field, but also to implant in them a recognition of its value to the society, a desire to work and apply their skills to the continued growth and success of their country.

One of the primary fields of interest for the vocational education programme is technical education, its aim being to supply qualified personnel to support the country's rising level of industrial technology. The Ministry has established, and the Directorate operates, various types of technical-vocational schools for the industrial arts. In addition, a technical training institute was established during the 1960/61 school year in co-operation with UNESCO. Its purpose is to train skilled technicians who later will become teachers themselves. The institute maintains a workshop for the manufacture of wooden and metal furniture to be utilized throughout the facilities of Iraq's school system. Similar workshops for practical training are operated in all technical schools, which thus serve the dual function of training and production.

At present the vocational education directorate is formulating a plan to extend technical education to primary and general intermediate schools. The purpose of this proposal is to discover talented youth at an earlier stage and to nurture their technical abilities, over a longer period, to an even higher level of proficiency. Further, in view of the increasing need for skilled personnel in all fields of technology in Iraq, particularly engineering, the Ministry of Education intends to establish a college of technology. Since the present College of Engineering in Baghdad University is unable to meet all the country's needs, the proposed college will train specialists in electrical, mechanical, geological, chemical and civil engineering, though not offering the broader range of courses required of a university graduate in engineering.

Again, statistics are the best indication of the progress made in the area of technical education in the past few years. The first school year following the 1958 revolution showed the greatest increase in numbers of students enrolled in technical schools—nearly 1,000. In the past three years the number of students has remained nearly constant at about 2,600, but the number of graduates has jumped markedly. In 1958, 136 students were graduated; in 1959 the figure was 411, and in 1960, 612. At present

there are eleven intermediate and secondary technical schools located in various liwas (provinces) throughout the country.

The second major interest of the Directorate General of Vocational Education is the field of agricultural training. The basic objective here is to raise the standard of living in Iraq's rural communities. The magnitude and importance of this task cannot be overly stressed in view of the fact that 80 per cent of the Iraqi population lives in rural agricultural communities. At present 10 of the 14 liwas have their own vocational agricultural schools, and plans are under way to establish four more agricultural schools in the remaining four districts. These schools are equipped with modern farm machinery, and employ the most up-to-date agricultural training methods to the benefit of the largest possible number of young novice farmers. These agricultural training schools also serve as guidance centres for established Iraqi farmers.

As a rule these schools accommodate 250 students, providing free board and lodging. Like the other educational facilities in Iraq, authorities are not satisfied with what they have accomplished up to now. In fact, research is being carried out with a view to establishing a higher institute of agriculture which would offer training on a level just below that obtainable in the College of Agriculture of Baghdad University, though more limited in scope.

The first of the four-year vocational agricultural schools were opened for the 1956/57 school year, and the first students were graduated last spring. Total enrolment in these important training institutions leaped from 472 students in 1957/58 to 1,060 in 1958/59, the first post-revolution school year, and continued its rapid rise to reach 1,720 students in 1960/61.

Training Iraqi girls in domestic science is another objective of the Ministry of Education and its vocational education department. These authorities intend to equip the country's young women to cope more easily with the various changes and advancements the modern times have introduced to the practice of homemaking. At present there are 14 schools of home economics spotted around the country. Their courses of study are designed to teach young prospective wives and mothers how to take their proper place in a progressive Iraqi society, and are based on the standards set by similar schools in even further progressed Western societies. Seven of these home economics schools were opened in 1958 and 1959, and the largest spurt in enrolment occurred after the revolution when the number of girls increased from 902 to 2,802. In the 1960/61 school year there were slightly over 3,000 girls attending secondary-level schools of domestic science.

At the summit of the Iraq educational system is the University of Baghdad. In the past few years the revolutionary government expended

a great amount of time, energy and funds to develop the university to a standard equal to that of the best Western institutions. At present, a major project is the preparation of a new campus, in the southern suburbs of Baghdad. Though it is still in the blueprint and mock-up stages, the consensus is that the modern, commodious new campus will be one of the most striking in the world.

Baghdad University at present is composed of Colleges of Arts, Science, Commerce and Economics, Education, Law, Agriculture, Medicine (branch in Mosul), Pharmacy, Dentistry, Veterinary Medicine and Engineering. Also attached to the University are Higher Institutes of Physical Training and Technology, and Institutes of Public Administration, Foreign Languages (2) and Forestry. Recently the efforts of the university's faculty to raise academic standards have paid off in that courses of higher studies leading to Master of Arts degrees in Agriculture, Chemistry, Engineering, and History have been opened, and a number of students accepted in the different programmes.

Perhaps the greatest area of educational need in Iraq is in the field of fundamental adult education. When the revolutionary government came into power in 1958 it found that 90 per cent of its citizens were illiterate. It decided to launch an all-out fight against illiteracy, and to strengthen and expand fundamental education designed to help the un-schooled adult improve his standard of living, and that of his family.

In 1958 there were only six fundamental education centres in all Iraq, with a total of 59 teachers and technical instructors—an inconsequential effort to be pitted against such a gigantic problem. With the help of a UNESCO mission, the new government formulated a five-year plan to combat illiteracy and backwardness throughout the country. All government agencies were pressed into service to get the campaign on its way. Later private groups were encouraged to take up and extend the fight. The minister of education appealed over the radio for all educated Iraqis to help the ministry in this attempt to change their country's educational status within a very short time.

Already there are 17 fundamental education centres. Before these could be established the ministry needed trained personnel for instructors. Thus a training course was set up to combine the facilities and interests of the various Iraqi ministries as well as UNESCO and other specialized U.N. agencies. The World Health Organization and the Food and Agricultural Organization took part in the training course; along with personnel from the Iraqi Ministries of Health and Agriculture, and the College of Agriculture of the University of Baghdad. Forty-four men and women took the intense practical training course offered during the summer of 1960. They now staff eleven new centres.

Iraq's fundamental education programme is concentrated in five projects: Hygiene and Health; Home Science; Agricultural Extension; Village Handicrafts; Literacy and Recreation. Activities in these fields however are not carried out separately, but form part of a co-ordinated plan. Before work is started, a preliminary socio-economic survey is made of the area to be covered. Thus the team assigned to this area gets to know the people and who to rely on for local leadership. Each member of the two or three-man teams has been trained in the principles of fundamental education, with special training in one or two of the five project areas.

The first two of these are nearly always coupled, the aims being to train people in correct habits of cleanliness and hygiene, both personal and in the home, and to impart some of the rudiments of domestic management. Work is undertaken in two stages. The first begins with home science classes in a few local households given by women team members. Their activities expand as they get to know the local women better, and more and more women come to visit and take part in classes in children's care, preparation and use of food, water, cooking utensils and other household goods, general domestic cleanliness and hygiene, budgeting, and better use of leisure. Thus the women of a particular village gradually learn to become better housewives with the resources at their disposal. The homes of the first trainees become models for the others.

The aim of agricultural extension work in the fundamental education centres is to train farmers in better methods of agriculture—those most applicable to his particular circumstances. Experimental farms have been set up in each of the centres serving an agricultural community, and thus the staff members may determine the most effective techniques for the area and proceed to apply them on model farms, with the aid of the owners. These practical experiments are often tried out on the farms whose households already have been introduced to the home science training, and whose owners are thus more open to suggestion and change.

When sufficient interest is aroused, 4-H and Young Farmers clubs are organized to keep up and stimulate this progress and to provide a forum for discussion of common problems, exchange of ideas and pooling of experience. These clubs also are natural for receiving the attention of literacy campaigns, and as groups to which useful information about health and hygiene, and other matters relating to village life, may be imparted by the fundamental education teams. Films and slides are common instructional devices.

Where handicrafts are concerned, the work of the fundamental education teams is organized to train the adult to employ his leisure time more creatively and productively, and to improve the output and workmanship

of existing village handicrafts. The choice of the crafts to be introduced is largely determined by the raw materials available locally and the socio-economic pattern of the community. Each centre is now being equipped with a workshop where the necessary training may be given. Already interesting experiments have been carried out to find how to make useful articles out of local materials, and to discover inexpensive durable materials for building village homes. The centre building in one small community was put up by the UNESCO expert in village handicrafts to demonstrate how a small village home can be constructed with locally available material in a manner which is functionally and aesthetically more satisfactory.

Perhaps the most important aspect of Iraq's fundamental education programme, and yet the most difficult to carry through, is the struggle for adult literacy. The problem lies in the lack of motivation. The illiterate adult often simply is not interested in acquiring this ability. Still, the other facets of the fundamental education programme in which rural people may see a more tangible purpose serve to create an interest in literacy at the same time. The predominant influence of the Islamic religion among the Iraqi populace, educated and uneducated alike, is the best tool the literacy programme personnel have. The people have a deep abiding interest in their religion, though they may not know much about it or even practice it regularly. The Koran is a highly revered book and provides a powerful incentive to learn to read. A series of reading lessons has been built up around the Koran, and the results achieved so far have been most encouraging.

Finally, the fundamental education movement in Iraq is trying to train people how to provide themselves means of healthy recreation. What form the recreation promoted by the local centres takes depends on the circumstances of the people, their cultural level and tradition. Preference is given to forms of recreation which will be significant to the populace without involved instruction, open for them new vistas of creative living and satisfy their emotional urges. Besides games and sports, fundamental education experts are introducing and promoting folk music and dancing, and village theatrical performances. Quite often the various education team members, with the help of the recreation expert, enlist village talent and put on plays dealing with problems of village life.

The revolutionary movement of education in Iraq thus is carried out in all possible sectors of the population, and at all levels. While a great deal already has been accomplished toward the solution of the staggering problem, it is still but a start. This in mind, the government, specifically the Ministry of Education, allows no relaxation in the drive to increase enrolments, school facilities and teachers.

And the Ministry of Education has several other, associated interests. For example, since the revolution, its Directorate of Curricula, Text-books and Audio-visual Aids has abolished most of the old school text books and revised the curricula at all levels of the education system. Technical committees periodically meet to devise new curricula, suggest ways of improving educational standards, and consult in the writing of new text books. In 1960 the directorate printed 3,372,000 text books for primary schools, 85,700 for intermediate schools, 24,250 for secondary schools and 230,000 to be used in combating illiteracy among adults. The Audio Visual Aids Centre provides schools with various teaching aids such as films and film strips. It is equipped with modern printing equipment and a photography laboratory, as well as radio and television equipment with which it produces educational programmes on tape and film.

Another activity within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education is the Directorate of Libraries, which organizes and supervises all school and public libraries throughout Iraq, ensuring that study and research sources are available to everyone, in all fields. In a similar cultural vein, the Directorate of Research, Translation and Publication offers financial aid to authors, translators and editors who wish to publish their works. These grants have made possible the publication of 86 books within the past three years. Three important projects currently being promoted by this directorate are the preparation of a detailed "Geography of Iraq" and another on the "History of Iraq," the translation of books of international fame, and the writing or translation of a series of children's books.

Finally, the Directorate of Missions has the responsibility of sending particularly gifted Iraqi students abroad to specialize in the academic or technical fields of their choice. Both secondary school and college graduates are eligible for study grants. At present engineering and technical students are given priority, due to the persistent need for specialized personnel to speed up Iraq's industrialization. About 80 per cent of the foreign study grants are available in these fields. Scientific subjects such as physics, chemistry, mathematics and biology constitute 15 per cent of the openings, while social and literary studies account for 5 per cent.

While Baghdad University is still in the expanding stages, these foreign universities will turn out young Iraqis versed in the professions which are necessary in building Iraq into a modern country with firm, broadly set foundations. Education, as always, is the key.

Courtesy The Arab World.

World Bank Power Loan to Thailand

THE World Bank has made a loan equivalent to \$6.6 m. (about £1.83 m.) to increase the capacity and area served by the transmission system of the Yanhee Electricity Authority in Thailand. This project consists of the installation of a second high-voltage circuit between the Yanhee hydro-electric plant in North-West Thailand and Bangkok, 281 miles to the south, and the construction of 446 miles of transmission lines to serve 12 towns in the central part of the country.

New transmission facilities will extend the power network being built as part of the Yanhee multi-purpose project for the production of electric power, flood control, and irrigation. Largest ever undertaken in Thailand and one of the largest of its kind in Asia, this project will ultimately produce enough power to meet most of Thailand's needs for the next 15–20 years. Construction of the first stage, which includes a 140,000kW power plant and transmission lines to Bangkok and 10 towns en route, was begun in 1958 with the assistance of a Bank loan of \$66 m.

This latest loan was made to the Yanhee Electricity Authority, an agency established by the Government in 1957 with responsibility for the generation and transmission of electric energy in the most developed and populated part of Thailand—a service area covering 35 of Thailand's provinces.

When the Yanhee power plant comes into operation in 1964, and transmission facilities have been installed, the Authority's system will have a total generating capacity of 320,000kW—140,000kW of hydro-electric and 180,000kW of steam and diesel—and will supply bulk power to 24 communities, as well as to Bangkok.

The Bangkok area is by far the largest power market in Thailand, and demand for power there has been increasing at an annual average rate of 15 per cent. This rise in demand took place despite the installation by many industrial and commercial enterprises of their own generating

units. Between now and 1970 demand for public power is expected to grow at the rate of 10 per cent annually.

To prepare for adequate and efficient distribution of Yanhee power when it becomes available, the Government established two new utilities: the Metropolitan Electricity Authority, which distributes power in Bangkok and is rebuilding and modernizing its system, and the Provincial Electricity Authority, which is planning to improve distribution systems in the provinces.

The second 230kVA circuit, from Yanhee to Bangkok, will be a duplicate of the one now being built and will be strung on the same towers. It will provide additional capacity and improve the efficiency of the system. The other transmission lines, of 115 or 69kVA, will run from Bangkok to the south-east and south-west, extending down both sides of the Gulf of Thailand to the towns of Chacherngsao, Choburi Sattaheep, Rayong, Nakorn Pathom, Rajburi, and Petchaburi, and from Yanhee to Tak, Sukhothai, Pitsanuloke, Pichit, and Uthradit in the north. A further line, some 60 miles long, may be built from Yanhee to Mae Sawd on the Burma border; this will depend on whether a zinc mine and smelter are built near Mae Sawd.

The project is due for completion in 1966 at a total cost equivalent to \$11 m. The \$6.6 m. Bank loan will cover foreign-exchange requirements. Remaining costs will be met by Yanhee Electricity Authority.

Including the latest loan, the World Bank has now made 10 loans totalling about \$137 m. in Thailand for railway, port, and irrigation projects, as well as the Yanhee multi-purpose project.

The loan is for 20 years, and bears interest at 5½ per cent a year. Nine commercial banks are participating, without World Bank guarantee, for a total amount of \$740,000. Participants include the Bank of Tokyo Trust Co., New York; the Mitsui Bank, N.Y. Agency; and leading U.S. banks.

Courtesy Far East Trade.

The Background to China's Foreign Policy

By E. H. RAWLINGS

THE open conflict between China and India over the true line dividing their frontier and the latest Soviet-Sino dispute in which Mao Tse-tung claims that world Communism cannot be achieved without war are signs that the Chinese Communists are becoming impatient at not gaining their ends through peaceful means. Taking the broad view, there is no doubt that Mao Tse-tung is attempting not only to establish himself as ruler of Asia, but also to make China leader of the Communist world. The prospect of achieving the latter aim is certainly remote, particularly if the Soviet Union can reach a satisfactory understanding with the West on peaceful co-existence.

Nevertheless, it is only fair to state that the only thing that is actually preventing China spreading her influence in Asia is the quantity of Western military and economic aid which is given to the pro-Western and neutral countries of Asia. Therefore, China feels that she cannot at present make any open attempt to extend her influence over these countries unless she is prepared to meet opposition as she has done on the Indian frontier.

However, it is obvious that China has one immediate objective which is to regain what she considers is rightfully Chinese: that is all territory which was once conquered by China and became part of China. This is not merely the idea of the present regime, but has been a Chinese principle for more than 3,000 years. It is a Chinese tradition that if any such territory is lost it still remains Chinese if it was absorbed into China's national life. In principle, the Chinese have never accepted the fact that they no longer have right to any territory lost to them. Thus, the main aim of their foreign policy has always been to restore former frontier and annual cessions.

Another principle of Chinese foreign policy has been to exert a strong influence over the weaker neighbouring kingdoms, such as Korea and Vietnam, and to a lesser extent over Burma, the Indo-China countries and even the pre-Dutch Indonesian States. The weaker neighbouring kingdoms were allowed to govern themselves under Chinese protection.

This was to ensure that they would not fall into enemy hands. China's relations with the other countries were in a ceremonial manner, which ensured the Chinese of their respect. Yet accurate historical records reveal that China had dormant claims on them all.

It is, therefore, seen that what Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues are actually doing is to establish new frontiers with China's land neighbours and to regain what they consider Chinese territory bordering on China. Their first action after they came to power in 1949 was to re-establish Chinese authority over Tibet in 1950, which was lost to China after the fall of the Manchu regime in 1911. Even in those days the Chinese came into conflict with the British over the position of the Tibetan frontiers. At the Simla Conference of 1912-14 the British proposed the McMahon Line which was accepted by Tibet and became the boundary between India and China and Tibet. But China never ratified the treaty so that in the present frontier dispute with India, China is claiming what she considers is her rights. Moreover, the region around the McMahon Line has become more strategically important.

China is not only concerned about her frontier with India, but has reached satisfactory settlements on her frontier with Burma, Pakistan and Nepal. She has allowed these countries a few more miles of wild mountain or jungle, which is useless to her, in order to gain sympathy over the Indian dispute. At the beginning of this year the Chinese insisted on a new frontier agreement with Mongolia.

It seems that the present relationship between China and her former tributaries remains unchanged from the old days. For example, both North Korea and North Vietnam are Communist States, and have to depend on China for their entire existence. It is, of course, the policy of the Chinese Communists to make the southern position of these countries Communist, but the present of United States support for their non-Communist regimes prevents this from becoming a reality. Moreover, U.S. naval and military strength in the region is a hindrance to any Chinese advance.

For the present, China's relations with Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, as well as with Malaya and Indonesia remain much the same as in the days of the Chinese Empire. It is not essential to China at the moment that these States should become Communist as they offer no threat to Chinese security. But it is essential to China that they remain neutral and do not join any hostile alliance, such as SEATO. Only Thailand has chosen to become a member of SEATO.

Generally speaking, China regards the United States as her greatest enemy, mainly because of the conflict over Formosa, where the United States recognizes the Nationalist regime. The Chinese Communists claim

that Formosa is lawfully a part of China and that the Nationalists do not represent the people of China. The off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, which China regards as her own, are under the protection of the United States. The chances that there will ever be a peaceful settlement to this issue are very remote as the Communists are unlikely to renounce Formosa, and neither is it likely that the Chinese people will dispense with the Communist regime. It is doubtful whether a non-Communist Chinese Government would be willing to accept the separation of Formosa from the mainland.

Moreover, the Communist regime is resentful towards the United States because she has blocked China's admission to the United Nations. This has caused considerable conflict between the two nations, especially as the United States supports Formosa, South Korea. It also blames the United States that many of the Western countries, and some of the Asian and African countries do not recognize the People's Republic.

Partly because the United States is China's chief opponent, the Peking regime, unlike former Chinese Governments, is trying to make its influence felt outside Asia, if only to annoy the United States. For instance, China's support and economic aid for Cuba is a typical attitude of the Chinese towards the United States. But it is a sign that the Chinese are willing to support any nation that has the slightest argument with Washington. In Africa, the Chinese are preaching the anti-colonialism policy in order to distract the newly independent States away from the West and pave the way for Communism. China has even spread her influence to Europe by supporting Albania in that country's conflict with Russia.

The cold war between China and the United States is likely to continue for a number of years for relations between the two countries are so tense that neither is likely to reverse their policy towards one another. Even if China was allowed to join the United Nations, it is doubtful whether she would be prepared to renounce any territory which she claims is rightfully hers. Moreover, United Nations membership would give China a voice in world affairs: and a voice indeed that could not be disregarded, because of her size. This alone would help her to strengthen her influence throughout the world, which would prove costly to the United States and perhaps the West as a whole. At present China has no effective way of getting over the American ideological blockade, largely because she is not yet a nuclear Power.

Until Mao Tse-tung's recent statement that world Communism can only be achieved by war, the Soviet-Sino dispute was purely an ideological one in which the Chinese believed that the teachings of Lenin should be practised to a greater extent than they were by the Russians. There was no material quarrel between the two nations and China sided with Russia

in world affairs. What then is the true reason behind the Chinese leader's rash statement in trying to draw the Communist bloc into a hot war with the rest of the world when China is not yet a nuclear Power?

One reason is that Russia has drawn back on Cuba, which has undoubtedly made the Chinese wonder whether Russia and the United States will eventually seek a compromise on nuclear armament in order to avoid destruction, and to prevent nuclear warfare being started by any other nations. If such a situation arose China's position would be weakened for she could no longer rely on Russia as an ally to safeguard her interests. It is therefore her ambition to try and frustrate any possible relaxation of tension between Russia and the United States. If she can succeed in doing so, Russia may well have to insist that China plays a greater part in international bargaining. Plainly speaking, Mao Tse-Tung suspects Mr. Khrushchev of trying to reach an agreement with the United States on a number of matters which are likely to affect the future of both worlds.

Not only does Mao Tse-tung want to prevent any sort of alliance between Russia and the United States, but he also does not want Russia to lead the rising nations of Asia and Africa along a path to a peaceful relationship with the West for this would make it more difficult to satisfy China's aspirations. So long as there remains an unsatisfactory relationship between Russia and the West, relations between the two Communist Powers are likely to remain cordial in spite of differences of opinion between the two nations.

But let us for the moment consider the consequences if the present split between Russia and China becomes wider and the two are theoretically at loggerheads. China might well react against Russia by claiming land along the Siberian and Turkestan frontiers which she already regards as Chinese. So far China has not claimed such land in order to avoid causing any ill-feeling with her important neighbour. But once there was no longer any possibility of healing the split this concern could be extinguished. If such claims were made Russia would be in a position of having to submit to them or to challenge them with her own conventional or nuclear forces. The latter course would certainly prove a setback for the Communist world.

Even if the present split continues and no open conflict arises between the Russians and Chinese, there is bound to be a feeling of disillusion within the Communist bloc, and particularly in States where the regime is none too soundly based. It may also discourage the emergent States of Asia and Africa which have shown inclinations to join the Communist world. In fact, China's present policies might even cause these States to distrust rather than side with her.

However, it is very doubtful whether China could cause a general split within the Communist bloc and become an open challenge to Russia for its leadership. The only countries likely to stand by China are its neighbours, North Korea and North Vietnam. As these countries have to rely on China for their very livelihood, they have no other choice. The rest of the Communist States, with the exception of Albania which is relatively unimportant from a material point of view, will side with Russia. Even Mongolia, jammed between the two Powers, has been brave enough to voice its opinion in favour of the Soviet policy.

Therefore, all Mao Tse-tung can hope to gain is to keep the rift between Russia and the United States open, because so long as there is no reconciliation between these two nations, China has a sense of security. Moreover, it enables China to continue her conflict and contention with the United States, which she now regards as a menace to her security. China's attitude towards the outside world is unlikely to change unless her claims to former Chinese territory have been met and that she reaches a compromise with the United States to enable her to take the Chinese seat at the United Nations.


Reviews

THE FOUNDATIONS OF NEW INDIA. *By K. M. Panikkar. (George Allen and Unwin). 259 pp. Index. 25/-.*

PAKISTAN. *By Ian Stephens. Nations of the Modern World. (Ernest Benn). 288 pp. Bibliography. Index. 30/-.*

REVIEWED BY PROFESSOR L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS, CBE

NOW that Sardar Panikkar has retired from the hurried, engagement-filled life of a Head of Mission to the scholarly leisure of the Vice-Chancellor's Lodgings in the University of Jammu and Kashmir, it is greatly to be hoped that his pursuit of letters—a pursuit which he never wholly intermitted even in the midst of a lengthy spell of distinguished official service—will long continue as his main preoccupation. In the course of her comparatively short period of independent existence, India has produced a number of able Ambassadors, and there are no signs at present that the supply of them is diminishing; but Sardar Panikkar's best service to his country has always been achieved in the field of literature, and it is good that he has now returned to it, without the distraction



The junk that left the wind behind

Hong Kong is half land, half water. And of its three million people, many spend their whole lives afloat—these are the boat-people, whose wooden craft jostle in the crowded bays to make small floating villages.

In these villages the boat-people are born, marry and die—returning to the land only to be buried. Their livelihood is fish, and from their fishing expeditions come the Lizard Fish, Golden Thread, and Croakers, which feed the island's packed population. Their life has gone on in much the same way for generations—a hard life of work and little leisure.

Today, things are changing for the better. There is the newly-formed Fish Marketing Organisation which not only provides schools for the children, but auctions the catch for the boat-people, and gives them a cash payment immediately it is landed.

With this ready-money the men can improve their exotic-looking boats—often by powering them with small engines. 'With these engines', says one of the men, 'we are bringing in three times as much fish as before. We don't have to wait for the wind and tide to get us out of harbour, and by nightfall we can be out in the deeper waters'.

During all these changes, Shell has been along the quaysides, providing the boat-people with a fuel and lubricant service, just as it does to fishing fleets all over the world—whether they operate from busy ports or out-of-the-way islands.

YOU CAN BE SURE OF



of other preoccupations. Anyone who doubts this conclusion will be well advised to study this, his latest, book, in which the author's gift of elucidating some of the more obscure and puzzling aspects of the contemporary Indian scene in terms which the Western world can understand is brilliantly manifested.

Dr. Panikkar's main thesis is that his country is now engaged in an experiment which is unique in the world of today, for it is nothing less than the creation, by democratic means, of a new national identity which is the resultant of many converging forces. This identity in its turn depends upon building, upon a structure of consent, a political, social and economic organization based on India's past but adapted to India's future. The thesis is partly historical and partly political; historical in its analysis of the strands of influence—cultural, social, intellectual—which have made India what she is today; political in its presentation of what India wishes the outside world in general, and possibly the "Aid India Club" in particular, to think of her. The dual aspect is brilliantly argued; indeed the entire book may serve as a model of how to present the image of the new India in a way which will command the intelligent sympathy of the reader.

Beginning with a study of the Indian inheritance, Dr. Panikkar identifies five main influences; the reaction of the traditional culture against the impact of alien rule; the reformation which transformed the institutions and outlook of Hinduism; the Christian tradition; Islam; and the legacies of British rule in the spheres of ideas and organization. He then deals in turn with the new social structure resulting from the awakening of the masses and the awakening of women; with the intellectual renaissance associated with the new learning, the emergence of the Indian languages; and the revival of arts and sciences; and with the influence of the new constitution upon territorial integration, the secular state, and the practice of democracy. Next come three brilliant chapters analysing Marxism and setting Mr. Gandhi in perspective against the ideas of orthodox socialism; and four final chapters explaining the trends and currents, political and social, which shape India today. To him, it is not Communism which is the main danger to advance but rather the old forces of traditional India, which may sap the revolutionary zeal on which further advance depends. No doubt the present Government of India will find itself in hearty agreement with this able exposition of its aims, hopes and fears.

* * * *

Possibly because Mr. Stephens considers—quite rightly—that the kind of book which he has written does not need source-notes, he modestly disclaims for it any classification in the category of "learned" works.

Yet in this respect he does himself less than justice. He has written the fullest and most illuminating account of the origins and growth of Pakistan which has so far appeared for the instruction of the serious-minded specialist. His standpoint is that of the historian rather than of the political commentator; and it is safe to say that anyone who desires to know in detail why and how Pakistan came into existence will find in him an exceptionally well-informed guide. He makes frequent use of historical parallels, sometimes even at the cost of interrupting his narrative; but if these may occasionally mean less to the general reader than the author intends, they are full of meaning to the student of history.

During his term of office both as a Government servant and as Editor of *The Statesman*, Mr. Stephens acquired an exceptionally detailed knowledge of the situation on the communal front during the years which immediately preceded partition. He is thus in a position to correct a number of the mistakes made by political commentators, such as Campbell-Johnson, whose close association with the actual course of events induced outlooks and judgments which suffered from a lack of background knowledge. The author makes no secret of his belief that in certain important respects, Pakistan and those who worked for her emergence were treated less generously than they deserved; and this conclusion is sustained by a wealth of detailed information. Indeed, no one who wants to know the precise way in which partition came about, as well as why it became inevitable, can afford to leave this book unread.

Even so, I am not quite sure whether the general reader, for whom presumably, the series in which this book appears is mainly intended, will not find a good many of Mr. Stephens' pages overloaded with detail. It may well be that such a reader would prefer to exchange some of these facts and judgments about the past for more facts and judgments about the present than the author has included. Moreover, even the specialist may find himself to a certain extent sharing this view. Not that he wants Mr. Stephens to have left out anything that is now included; far from it. But in the comparatively few pages which Mr. Stephens devotes to Pakistan today, his presentation is so clear and his fairness so evident, that very few readers indeed, however great their interest in the past, can refrain from wishing that he could have found space to tell them something more about the present.

In reading a book of this kind, the student of Pakistani affairs will encounter statements which challenge his own point of view and lead him to re-examine it. For my own part, I have enjoyed this experience, and I am pretty certain that other specialists also will find Mr. Stephens' narrative both stimulating and provocative of thought.

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
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
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
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
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India's Economy in the Present Emergency

By N. C. SEN GUPTA

Minister (Economic) Indian High Commission

IMMEDIATELY on the promulgation of the constitution of India in 1950, a Planning Commission was set up so that all available resources could be suitably utilized for integrated development. At that time various misgivings were expressed that a planned economy might have undesirable repercussions on a democracy. Misgivings were expressed that it might lead to undue regimentation, to premature exhaustion of resources, to galloping inflation. However, today the world opinion is different and the propriety of following a planned economy is admitted, not only in underdeveloped countries but also in the most developed countries. The first plan started in 1951. Naturally it was a case of taking first things first and concentrated on large investments in agriculture and the initiation of an irrigation programme which I think has become the largest ever attempted anywhere. This plan was fully implemented. The second plan was started in 1956 and had as its main objectives industrialization and expansion of employment facilities. With more than 70 per cent of the people living on agriculture, it was quite clear that unless the surplus labour could be drawn away from agriculture into industrial occupations, there will always be very large scale and chronic unemployment and under employment. We are also somewhat fortunately placed as regards natural resources. The iron ore resources of India are estimated at 21,000 million tons—supposed to be the largest in the world. We have considerable experience of producing iron and steel because of the two big iron and steel works already there. So we started three new steel plants with foreign collaboration, British, German, and Russian. As with steel we arranged the development of coal and also a large scale increase in the generation of power. The second plan led to an increase in the productive capacity of steel from 1.5 million tons to 6; coal production from 38 million tons to 60; and power generation from something like 3.4 million kilowatts to about 6.4.

Agriculture, of course, being the largest industry in the country continued to claim priority and production of food grains which was about 55 million tons at the beginning of the first plan reached 78 million tons

at the end of the second. This massive development effort, however, had one very disturbing effect, that was on our balance of payments. We had built up considerable foreign exchange reserves during the War years when India was a big supply base but due to this large scale investment in capital equipment for the different plan projects, the foreign exchange reserves came down from something like 710 million sterling to just about 75 million sterling at the end of the second year of the second five year plan. Ever since lack of foreign exchange has been our biggest bottleneck.

AID CONSORTIUM

Since 1958 planners in India have been thinking about this third plan. Much attention was given to the preparation of the third plan as it was quite evident that the economic break-through stage must be reached during the next ten year period, otherwise, perhaps, like many other under developed countries we shall have to spend many many years merely as an agricultural, decadent country. Before the third plan was initiated considerable attention was given to the availability of foreign exchange. Many of you will be aware of the visit of the three fine economists, widely regarded now as the visit of the three wise men, sponsored by the World Bank to check up the potentialities of India's third five year plan and the exact worthiness of the plan projects: Lord Franks, Dr. Herman Abs and Dr. Allan Sproul. These gentlemen looked into our plan and gave us encouragement and on the basis of their report the World Bank started the Aid Consortium which has now become a very accepted agency for channeling aid from developed countries to underdeveloped countries. We have now Aid Consortia for Pakistan, Turkey and other countries too.

In the third plan we have estimated that the foreign exchange requirements would be something like 2,400 million sterling—about 32,000 million rupees. The total outlay estimated is about 104,000 million rupees, that's £7,800 million. In other words roughly about 27 per cent is foreign exchange. Now this Aid India Consortium has given us in the last two years £844 million and in the last two years which have been the first two years of the third five year plan, we have been able to proceed as we had originally planned. Expansion of the three steel plants has been taken in hand—the heavy electrical project, the heavy engineering project, expansion of machine tools, a number of power projects, ropeways and machines are proceeding according to the plan. The private sector which trebled its investments during 1950 to 1960 has also been fulfilling its targets with efficiency and was also progressing properly. However,

difficulties of foreign exchange created very serious bottlenecks in the second year of the third five year plan reminiscent of the difficulties experienced in an almost similar period in the second plan. You see in our present stage of development foreign exchange is an essential prerequisite for every important project unless it is something very elementary and is concerned with, say, primary education. Our important projects can only be undertaken only after ensuring the availability of foreign exchange; not only for the capital equipment, occasionally also for the technical know-how. While at the Consortium meetings for the year 1961-62 there was no difficulty in getting assistance from the donors, in 1962-63 we experienced great difficulties.

The U.K. gave us 90 million sterling up to 1961-62, but in 1962-63 they could allocate only 5. Well there are, of course, very cogent reasons for this. You see the U.K. Treasury never expects India to draw more than 25 million pounds a year from the U.K. balances for Indian projects. This is a correct estimate and we also do not draw more than 25 million pounds annually and naturally no Treasury wants commitments to be very much ahead of anticipated withdrawals.

Secondly, the U.K. was thinking of joining the European Common Market and if they had done so they would have had to accept various responsibilities for the Common Market Development Fund. So there was a disinclination to increase commitments in 1962-63. The other big donor in Europe is West Germany which gave us 100 million dollars in 1961-62 and the next year could agree only to whatever was required for the expansion of the projects where they are the chief collaborators. Again Germany has some cogent reasons. It is already in the Common Market and it has now to give very much more for the projects of the associated territories. The result was that though the U.S.A. had offered to match all other donors up to 500 million dollars in 1962-63, the U.S.A. had to offer only 435 million dollars. In other words so far as the Indian Treasury is concerned they are short of about 130 million dollars. Again all this aid which comes from the Consortium countries is usually tied to specific projects. When the U.K. gives us a loan for a specific project we can draw on it only as the investment on that project develops. If we can't draw the result is that while officially undrawn credit lies with the Bank of England on behalf of India, our free resources are depleted. Last year we were forced to impose very stringent import restrictions for the foreign exchange balances had come down absolutely to rock bottom. We had to take advantage of stand by credit from the International Monetary Fund. While import restrictions may to some extent help the balance of payments position for the time being, they have on occasions very bad effects on the long term large scale development,

and it was the experience of some of the established industries in India last year that they could not get essential raw material imports and were working at only 60 per cent of their capacity. It was also the report of our Planning Commission that whereas industrial productivity in India rose by almost 11 per cent a year in the last three years of the second five year plan, there was a drop to 7 per cent in the first two years of the third five year plan. The Planning Commission, therefore, did start a kind of review of the priorities of the third five year plan in the middle of last year 1962.

A DIFFICULT SITUATION

This difficult situation became infinitely more complicated when the Chinese burst into India down the Himalayas last October. The Indian Planning has never taken into account any large scale expenditure on warlike activities though in pre-independence days something like 50 per cent of the Budget would occasionally go for defence purposes. The allocation was reduced every year and came down to practically 22 per cent. In 1962-63 because of various Chinese incursions this 22 per cent was increased to 27. Actually never in India's independent existence has more than 2.5 per cent of the national income gone for defence purposes. It was inevitable that defence would now become the highest priority. We had to rush through a supplementary Budget in November, 1962 allocating 950 million rupees to defence and in the coming Budget which is still under discussion we have to allocate practically 8,700 million rupees for defence purposes; a kind of burden which we have never anticipated and perhaps cannot bear, economically speaking. Necessarily this involves diversion from planned priorities. We are very grateful for help we have had from the U.K. and U.S.A. The subsequent unilateral withdrawal of the Chinese remains as inexplicable as their original aggression, but there's no doubt that the Chinese did not expect India would get so quickly such active and immediate sympathy from the U.K. and U.S.A. and perhaps the dramatic flying in of essential military equipment was among the factors influencing the Chinese to withdraw. However, the point is that the third plan retains its present pattern only if its programmes can be kept separate from defence requirements.

When the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations last winter signed an agreement with the Indian Defence Minister for the supply of equipment from the U.K., arrangements were made as to how lists of Indian military requirements would be scrutinized by the British Authorities and how supplies would be made from the War Office here.

Now it is working well, and on the whole satisfactorily, but you cannot put in all the immediate requirements within the four corners of this

procedure. Two months ago I had a delegation from India here to buy wool-tops for making woollen cloth in India for military overcoats. They left orders for something like two crores rupees here. It is difficult to bring this kind of requirement within the four corners of the agreed supply arrangements. I have, of course, put in a claim that this should be also met out of aid funds. Similarly there are various other immediate requirements which have to be met, which arise suddenly and means diversion of very scarce foreign exchange reserved for planned priorities.

Again, if you take the internal position in India, transport bottlenecks and scarcity of steel and cement have been repeatedly regarded as impeding the development work. Now you have to allocate this scarce transport for military movement. Steel and cement will continue to be very scarce in India and that is why we still have some kind of distribution control of these items. Again there is diversion for building border roads.

Finally, the question of stability of the internal economy. The third five year plan contemplated an annual average deficit of only Rupees 110 crores. Well, up to the end of last year an amount exceeding 325 crores had already been incurred. In spite of the tough top proposals in the current budget, the current budget will close with a deficit of 266 crores.

BREAK THROUGH ?

So if this deficit financing goes on increasing at this level naturally there is cause for great concern. In describing the first reactions on the Indian Budget proposals, *The Times* indicated in an editorial on the 1st March that India's predicament has an undeniable grandeur. The difficulties are there. There has been a serious attempt mainly because of this emergency, to break through the centuries old habit of hoarding gold and stringent gold control rules have been issued and so far as my information goes are being enforced.

The immediate problems, therefore, are two-fold: foreign exchange and re-orientation of the economy because of defence priorities. How do we get additional foreign exchange? We can get it in only one of three ways. We can have additional foreign trade. We can have additional foreign investment or we can get additional foreign assistance. The Indian foreign trade has been stationary and foreign exchange earnings of India from foreign trade have been stationary for a number of years. This is mainly because we are mainly exporters of raw materials and due to scientific and technological advances the demand for natural raw materials is now on the decline. Of course there are various international agreements. We press our case every day for cane sugar as against beet sugar,

natural rubber as against synthetic rubber, and it is true because of these agreements a sort of stability is maintained in the market, but when a country depends for 37 per cent of its exports on tea, it is difficult to sell more. I can't expect the Britishers to drink more tea. Already 500 million pounds are consumed here. Similarly, even though America is now drinking some additional tea, it is a drink and drinking habits do not change quickly. In the European Continent we did obtain a kind of decision mainly through the efforts of the British negotiators that tea would be allowed duty free entry and I presume that that decision will be implemented. But then you can't expect any immediate result. We sell a lot of jute, but then again jute has a lot of complications. This country itself is interested in maintaining the Dundee industry and there is a kind of control over jute imports. There is a well defined protection of markets and there are naturally complications. Similarly with our other exports. There are increasingly other peoples in the field. Cashew nuts, for example, where we had a virtual monopoly for many years, very popular at cocktail parties, but last year I found that Tanganyika was becoming a competitor. Surely I can't shut out African countries who also need foreign exchange earnings.

If we cannot hope for any immediate or dramatic improvement in our foreign exchange earnings through trade, we have naturally to think of foreign investments and external assistance. As regards foreign investments, so far our experience has been very satisfactory. Many of you are aware of the fact that British investments in India today are more than double what they were in 1947. American investments also have increased tremendously. I have been told that there is some apprehension that the tough proposals in the new Budget may act as a damper on the inflow of fresh foreign investments. Actually in the latest editorial on the Indian Budget in *The Times* which came last Saturday there was an indication like that. At the same time I am quite sure that people who do invest in India are aware of the fact that very few countries show such appreciation of assets in such a short time because of the protected market. And even today, even if I do not know the final shape of the Budget proposals to be enacted by Parliament, even now the total tax burden on the private sector in India is less than in most other countries. However, again we cannot expect any dramatic improvement in foreign investments. Therefore we have to look forward to the Consortium with great expectations. The next Consortium meeting is on the 30th April and they will take into consideration all these various aspects. Occasionally there are reports in various papers that of all the underdeveloped countries India has got the largest foreign aid. Mathematically that is true but you must get it in the proper perspective. The total population of India is equal to the

combined populations of the Continents of Africa and South America. So all those countries, different separate countries who have today in most places a larger per capita income than what we have, are getting better aid than us. *The Observer* had a kind of comparative statement about a month ago and it showed that India got in a 160 million pounds sterling in 1960 as aid which was higher than the share of any other country that year. Per capita it comes to only seven shillings in India whereas in Pakistan it is double and in countries like those in Africa it is twelve pounds, in Vietnam it is fourteen pounds, in South Korea it is four pounds, like that. That is the position and we do hope that all these considerations will receive adequate examination at the next Consortium.

DEMOCRATIC PLANNING

The present situation of the Indian economy is somewhat unsatisfactory and somewhat uncertain. None of the explanations so far advanced for Chinese aggression is perhaps wholly satisfactory. However, it is quite clear that the desire to remove from Asia the image of Indian democratic planning is certainly among the strongest motives. I have attended a number of Colombo plan conferences and every time I have found, of course in those days to my great satisfaction, that the other countries in South and South-East Asia were drawing a comparison favourable to India. India is a country where after all the integrity of the State has been maintained in spite of so many languages, so many religions and all that, and there is the working of true democratic processes through three general elections with adult suffrage and there is definite evidence of advance in economic development. Of course I must also admit that in all meetings on economic growth I also found various references to our over-population. Now here again, it is really an index of our development. The birth rate in India which was 49 per thousand in 1921 was found to be 40 in 1961 but the death rate which was 48.8 in 1921 has come down dramatically to 18 in 1961. The expectation of life at birth was just 30 in 1947, is today 46. As I explained at the other meeting referred to by the Chairman one public sector project which is doing very well is the L.I.C. because all the old policies were issued on the basis of 27 years life and the policy-holders now live to at least 46. Malaria has practically been eradicated; I come from Bengal and I know what havoc it can create. It would certainly be a great tragedy if all this developmental effort is now stopped and you have to divert the resources for military preparation. Again there has been a marked increase in literacy. In the 1951 census the total percentage of literacy was only 16.6 per cent. In 1961 literacy among males

rose to 34 per cent and among females to 13 per cent. I think the overall average now is something like 27. It would be a pity if this emergency withdraws resources from educational projects in the plan. Similarly we can go on thinking of other nation-building activities; through community development blocks, through housing organizations, etc. But the emergency has led to one very good result; this is the greatest challenge India has had to face since it became free and it is now admitted by all hands that the Indian people have risen like one man and there has never been such national integration as we find today. In spite of some initial panic in the stock exchanges, co-operation has been received everywhere for holding the price line. I have seen some criticism of course that monetary and price control policies are becoming very restrictive and that some of the proposals in the present Budget may act as somewhat 'dis-incentives.' Everybody wants dynamic growth, but it is somewhat inevitable that in the present uncertainty there will be more than ordinary emphasis on stable prices for essential commodities and large dependence on taxes. The American Ambassador in India, Professor Galbraith, in his essay on "A positive approach to economic aid" has indicated that foreign aid has a most useful impact only if there is action to remove barriers like illiteracy, absence of sound administration, presence of social injustice, and the lack of a sense of purpose. The Indian Five Year plans in preparation and implementation have demonstrated actual evidence of such action. That is why perhaps it is necessary that economic aid should continue to flow in.

I have practically come to the end of my talk. I was told last week that the I.T.V. film "One Man's Hunger" which illustrates the dire poverty in Indian villages and in a town like Calcutta has attracted lots of donations for the "Freedom from Hunger" Campaign. Indeed, one must see for oneself the depth of poverty in which millions live in India: it cannot just be put across through statistics and graphs.

Now after centuries of inertia the Indian people are launching a plan to get ready for economic development, depending for implementation on democratic processes, modelled mostly on this country. Though a very ancient country it is very young among independent nations and if I can come down to brass tacks, as a Finance Officer, India must obtain the necessary financial resources through a judicious combination of mobilization of internal resources and external assistance. The balance has been disturbed by the emergency. Now this budget was a serious effort to maximise internal resources. Heartening assurances have been received regarding defence aid, perhaps the Consortium will give similar help as regards economic assistance.

The Commonwealth Institute

By SIR KENNETH BRADLEY, CMG

THE one thing I am not going to talk to you about this afternoon, I can assure you, is Asia. In so far as I am anything I was once an adopted African, but I do not think I am that any more. I am very sensible of the honour at being asked to speak to you. I have only one subject and that is the Commonwealth Institute, and you are going to hear about that. I hope you have not heard it before, but it is my only tune just at the present. I would like to tell you something about it and more perhaps about the job it does. A surprising number of people still do not realize what actually we are doing here. The purpose of the Institute is to foster the interests of the Commonwealth by promoting among all its peoples a wider knowledge of one another and a greater understanding of the Commonwealth itself. The Ministry of Education thinks that we should devote all our time to schools, the Commonwealth Relations Office thinks that we should devote all our time to promoting Commonwealth relations, and we go on our way. We are neither fish, flesh nor fowl. We are not a voluntary society, which some people think we are; we are entirely grant aided. But the odd thing about us is that we get grants from every single Government of the whole Commonwealth, including St. Helena, which gives me £15 per year. Incidentally I should say that most of our money does come from the British Government because we do most of our work here, but we do at least get a token grant from every other Government and that to us is extremely important. We are not part of the British Government at all; we are under the aegis of the Ministry of Education because we have to be under somebody's aegis as the Treasury gives us money, but we have an independent Board of Governors on which sit all the High Commissioners. Sir James Robertson, of course, is our Chairman. We are thoroughly independent and the Ministry so far have not tried to control our policy except in so far as they hold the purse strings. We are, however, seldom defeated by this. I am sure some of my audience here were political officers in India and Asia; I was certainly one in Africa and we know how to make bricks without straw, and I find that that early training of mine has certainly been a great help to us. For instance, when it came to our new building, the British Government said "You can have £600,000 plus the land" and we said that it was not nearly enough so we went round the Commonwealth and one way and another we raised nearly another quarter of a

million pounds in cash and kind. There was not a single Commonwealth Government that did not give something and a great many firms and even the settler Africans and Indians around Kilimnjaro passed the hat round and sent me £850. It is that kind of thing. I say all this because I want to emphasize the fact that we at the Institute do consider ourselves to be a pan-Commonwealth organization. I am directly responsible to the High Commissioners and my other Governors and not to anybody else. This was brought home to me rather amusingly in Ceylon a few years ago. I was arguing with—I think he was the Minister of Education—trying to get him to take part in an art exhibition we were organizing and he said “No! I do not think we can afford it and I will advise my Government that we must not do this” and I said “I really think you ought to.” “Well!” he said, “If you think I am wrong will you say so on this cabinet file?” I replied “Look, I am not even a civil servant any more, I am a mere Englishman, I have absolutely no right to write on a Ceylon cabinet file.” He looked at me rather severely and said “Well, as I understand it as to about 1/45th you are a member of my department, will you kindly do as you are told.” Which I think is perhaps a rather unique position. Anyhow, I am very keen on this aspect of the thing which is vitally important to us in working with the Commonwealth, especially with the new nations, that we should at least represent their people and should in no way represent the Government of this country only. This is an enormous help to us and that is why I always emphasize it so strongly.

TEACHING DISPLAYS

I expect some of you have been to our new building. We have had about half a million people there since November and they have either admired the architecture or not, but you know in some ways I often think that the building itself is rather like the Commonwealth—those big exhibition galleries with no visible means of support whatever, but a hive of activity and enthusiasm. What in fact do we do? Well! let us take the building first. In those galleries we have these permanent exhibitions on every Commonwealth country all paid for by their own Governments, not by us, all of which were designed by James Gardner with our help—I think he made a very lovely job of them. Each of those exhibitions is a teaching display—history, geography, economics, art, sculpture, religion, that sort of thing, always in the same order so that coherent lessons could be given. Our technical object is to teach from them to schoolchildren. The result of this is that in the first six months of this year—that is since January—we had 375,000 people there, of whom 50,000 were children arriving in coaches with their teachers asking to be taught. This, of course, is very

encouraging, but if any education expert here can tell me how out of a staff of three teachers I can teach 1,000 children in the same morning, all asking to be taught about the Commonwealth, I should like to know the answer as we have not found it yet. We are being absolutely overwhelmed with this, but it is nice to think that all these people who have come there since January, whether they want to see the building or whether they want to come in out of the rain or whatever their reason may be, they all go away at least having learned something about the Commonwealth.

FREE PROGRAMMES

Attached to these galleries, of course, we have a cinema which gives free programmes of documentaries three times a day. Oddly enough, the statistics—it always interests me not being a statistician—show how much of a regular pattern they form. One third of the people that come to the Institute go to that cinema and the graph is absolutely staggering. Now do not ask me why I do not know. I once tried putting on a sixpenny entrance fee and nobody went in at all, which may be a comment on Commonwealth documentary films. I do not know, but I instantly removed it. We also use that cinema for other purposes—dramatic shows, ballets, concerts. We had the first performance of a symphony composed by a Nigerian, played by the Fulham Symphony Orchestra. Anything we can do to encourage Commonwealth activities we will always try to do if we can. The art gallery—some of you may have seen it—is I am told the most advanced art gallery in Europe technically. It is full of gimmicks and it works quite well, and we are trying to go right in at the top level with exhibitions of Commonwealth art and stay there. I do not know whether we have succeeded or not. In the old building we gave over 100 art exhibitions of one kind or another, but their quality was extremely varied—we had some shockers—but I think since we opened we have kept a very high level thanks very largely to Eric Newton, the art critic, who has been our art adviser during this first year. You will be glad to know that the Arts Council, in co-operation with ourselves, are putting on in the art gallery next summer the first major exhibition of contemporary Indian painting that has ever been held in this country—anyway I think for at least thirty or forty years. This should be quite an event. I expect it will be mostly abstract and I will not be able to understand a word of it. It will, I am told, be quite an event. My great grumble about the art gallery is that I never see a picture there that I can make head or tail of. I only wish somebody would paint something that one could make head or tail of, I mean to an ordinary square like myself. At the moment we

have a Canadian exhibition on. Now that was very interesting because I had a telephone message to say that the Queen would like to bring the President of India to see the Institute on the morning of the 13th June, as that was the only time he could manage. Would it be possible to have an Indian art exhibition? Well, the answer was, of course, I could not, as we cannot lay on an art exhibition at three weeks notice. I rang back and said: "Look! we are opening on that day an exhibition of Canadian painting which is a very big thing from Canada. It has never been seen in London before and it is going to be opened by the High Commissioner for Canada. I wonder if the Queen would consider opening this exhibition and bring the President of India as her guest?" and the message came back that the Queen would bring the President as her guest, but that she would invite him to open the Canadian art exhibition and that they would both like to make speeches on the occasion. Well, they did; they both spoke for about five minutes. This, I think, was a unique Commonwealth occasion and exactly the kind of purpose that I want to see the Institute used for. We had rather fun because we got the Fort Henry Guard from Ontario, who were over here for the Royal Tournament, to put up a guard of honour on our forecourt, all dressed in the uniform of 1860 with their muskets, pipes and drums and they all had beards, nice black woolly ones, and it was really very picturesque and a great success. That is the kind of activity which I think we ought to do everything we possibly can to foster, and I am most grateful to the Queen for giving the lead on this occasion.

One of the other rather interesting things—non-educational—which we do at the Institute is the Commonwealth students' club. We have a club for Commonwealth students of all kinds and we have had to restrict the membership. The club has been going for nearly ten years, but this year when our membership reached 500 we had to stop. Now I am not pretending that this club is anything very high flown—the members spend most of their time doing the twist—but I think it is quite a good thing, and what I like to see very much is Malays, Indians, Africans, East Africans, West Africans and a few New Zealanders, Canadians and a few English students all learning to make friends with each other and there is absolutely no trace in that club whatever of any kind of prejudice which, as you know, is quite rare and I do run it with a sort of pan-students' committee. I always feel sitting on that committee is part of the best education I get from this country; it is great fun to watch them. That is the kind of thing we do in the building. We have a library and all kinds of other things, but it is partly educational, it is partly Commonwealth promotion of all kinds. I think probably the most important work we do does not happen in the Institute at all. In terms of quantity our lecture service to schools—on which we have a panel of Commonwealth speakers—is giving at the

moment about 9,000 lectures a year in schools all over the country and those are mostly junior schools. I had a conference at the Institute a few years ago at which I got together a cross-section of the British educational world. As you know, or in case you do not know, the British educational world is run by 146 local educational authorities, each of whom is completely master in his own house and each of whom has quite different ideas about education, and trying to work with them is rather a confusing game, but I got them all together from universities, from the education authorities, from schools and from training colleges and I said: "Nobody has ever taught the Commonwealth properly in our schools. Commonwealth history is taught from the wrong angle; it is always treated like a success story of British Imperialism and lots of people existed before we were out of the world. It is scrappy and there is no coherence about it and as for teaching anything else about the Commonwealth, well nobody ever learnt anything at all. Should it be taught in the schools and if so, how?" We sat these people down for three days and to my astonishment they did produce a whole series of unanimous recommendations which I thought was a great achievement on their part because, like economists who put two educations together, they can be guaranteed to run in different directions as fast as they possibly can. However, they did not on this occasion and they said that a child of about up to the age of thirteen can simply be taught to accustom himself to the idea of the Commonwealth, to accept Commonwealth people as natural friends and associates and absorb the whole thing into his system through the pores. But later on in the last year, in secondary modern schools in their fourth year, and especially sixth formers at grammar schools, it is important that the young should be taught what the Commonwealth really is and seriously, how it has grown, what its problems are and what its potential is. Well, you see these lectures of ours bring the Commonwealth home to the youngsters. I am not sure how effective they are, but we give an awful lot of them, we are thinking about that at the moment. We are not doing much with the secondary modern schools at the moment, which is very wrong—there is a tremendous field there—but I think with luck we should be able to start up with them next year. I hope so; we have an expert Committee sitting on this at the moment. But with the sixth forms it is a different matter. All we can do, you see, is to help the schools; we cannot just go in and take schools over, so the way we do it is we have study conferences of one day, we collect, say, 300 sixth formers from all the grammar schools of say, Nottingham, and they study some perfectly frightful subject like the Commonwealth and the Common Market—we had twenty conferences on that one subject last year alone; really high level stuff about the Commonwealth. We send literature for them to read beforehand, we indicate the

kind of work and study they can do, and we get very distinguished speakers who are highly knowledgeable. They are either dons or very senior people from High Commissions or one or two very hand picked journalists—I expect you share my respect for what I call the really objective hand picked journalist—and we have about three of them who help on this. These kids are given about three hours solid information—no controversy—and then they have discussion groups and they ask questions for about one and a half hours and we treat them as though they were all senior wranglers at Cambridge with a touch of humanity thrown in. This is the technique of the sixth formers. I think these conferences are extremely useful and successful and we have developed them very widely. We have exactly similar conferences in teacher training colleges because, of course, a teacher in training is to us the most important person of all. This year we organized from London 75 of these conferences, which is a good deal more than one a week, and from our Scottish Institute in Edinburgh—it is a miniature of ourselves on a much smaller scale—they did about another 15. That is a lot in terms of organization. We cannot keep up with the demand and July is absolute murder; we have been averaging 11 conferences a week for the last four weeks. This means that some of us spend our time wearing out the seats on British railways or queuing in our motor cars. It is a hard time, but, of course, this is after the exams and they do not know what on earth to do with the children. However, I do think that in the terms of quality this is probably the most valuable thing we can do and I am most anxious to extend this conference technique into the secondary modern school. We have experimented with it a few years ago and it evolved into a kind of mixture of lessons in vaudeville. You get a West Indian singing folk-songs followed by a few calypsos, followed by some useful information about the West Indies and so on; you have to level the whole thing, but it can be great fun. The thing about the secondary modern schools is, of course, that they are so much freer than the grammar school children, they are not so exam-ridden and they have much more freedom. Those are the two main things we do with schools. We also have a thing called Schools Advisory Service which sounds rather dull, but in fact it is rather fun. Any teacher anywhere—and even to some extent overseas—is at liberty to write to the Institute for help. I had one good lady who tackled me in the passage and said “I come from Trinidad. How do I teach the constitution of the Commonwealth to my dock-workers in the evenings?” I said, “Madam, I require notice of that question.” But they can write and ask anything—“I am going to give my class a project on Kerala, or on Ceylon, this term. Can you help me?” The answer is “We can” and do. We have an enormous collection of teaching aids and we send them a whole box full of booklets, charts and everything else they

want, and reading lists and, of course, they can use our library. That I think is quite a valuable service at the moment; it is running at the rate of about 7,000 enquiries a year. I see no reason why that number should not double. That really is most of the work we do, except a few odds and ends like making travelling photographic exhibitions on Commonwealth countries, which we send around the countries. There are always four on the road in this country at any one time. They are a useful way of teaching people about other countries and whenever we make one we always make a copy and give it to the country concerned. At the moment Nigeria has one of these exhibitions of itself circulating Australia, and there is a very good one on Australia circulating in Malaya and it finished up in Sarawak, where it was eaten by the white ants. But I think it is a useful little service we can give to these other Governments.

RESPONSIBILITIES!

Our trouble since we opened this new building is we are—as I think I have already hinted—rather overworked. We have got more than we can cope with and one of our constant troubles is, of course, that the politicians will not leave the Commonwealth alone. James Gardner and I designed the whole of the West Indian gallery on the basis of Federation and made all the exhibits, then they scrapped the Federation. I am not looking forward to December this year when probably the Central African Federation will all have to be re-built. Malaysia is coming into being and at the moment I have got Brunei slap in between Sarawak and Borneo and it probably will not be in the Federation at all. The East Africa Federation is going to be born in December, and all these things mean that we will have to alter our exhibitions. Some state becomes a republic and everything has got to be changed over night. A Prime Minister falls, a new one is appointed and I have got to get a photograph of him and there isn't one. These are the kind of responsibilities which that individual, the museum keeper, has to cope with. A lot of people do not realize what panics one can get into. The worst panic I ever had, if I may detain you for a totally irrelevant story, was on the day the Institute had just been finished. I may say we moved into that building four weeks before the Royal opening with 20 per cent of our furniture, so we were sitting on packing cases, the exhibition was only 60 per cent finished and none of the staff had even begun to prepare for 850 guests, including the Royal Party. I have a very hazy recollection of those four weeks. The only thing I remember most vividly was sitting in my office feeding alcohol into exhausted artists until 2 o'clock in the morning, but it came off. My irrelevant story was this, that during this hectic period we were putting on a major art exhibition which included a

major statue by Henry Moore, it was a very large thing and weighed I don't know what—it took seven men to put it up—and I was standing there on our galleries reading a letter from the architect saying: "Sir, we feel we ought to warn you that Mr. Moore's statue is 125 per cent over your floor safety factor." At that very moment a noise began like all the earthquake effects that the B.B.C. have ever achieved. It went on and on and I just stood there with my heart in my boots thinking of Henry Moore going through the floor into the cinema; in fact it was a gentleman pouring rocks into the Canadian exhibition out of petrol cans. I have never had a worse moment. Well now, I have told you, I think, what we do and what the Institute is all about. We are trying now to, if we possibly can, get the idea spread in other Commonwealth countries that they ought to do likewise. It is just as important for young Nigerians to learn about Indians as it is for young British people to learn about Nigerians. But this is up to them; this is not our job. If they want to do it and get ideas we shall give them all the help we can, but the initiative has got to come from them. I have talked about the Institute a good deal and now I should like those of you who have not seen it to come and see it. I am having the pleasure of entertaining a party from the Royal India Pakistan and Ceylon Society on the 24th September, and I should be delighted to extend the invitation to the members of your Association.

Lecture Discussion

India's Economy in the Present Emergency

Mr. N. C. SEN GUPTA gave his address at a joint meeting of the East India Association and the Royal Over-Seas League at Over-Seas House, St. James's, s.w.1, on Tuesday, 16th April, 1963. The Rt. Hon. Lord SPENS presided and introducing the speaker said: I was lucky enough to have heard Mr. Sen Gupta talk during the last fortnight, and it is true it was at a meeting where there was no reporting of any sort and possibly he was able to speak a little more freely than he may be able to do this afternoon, but what I am quite certain of is that every word he says to us will be of very great interest, and certainly as far as I am concerned of instruction as well. He was originally a member of the I.C.S., he entered it in 1941, has held various financial posts of one sort or another and he is now at India House as Economic Minister, a very important post at this particular time. All I can say is that if he is as good as the last occasion on which I heard him speak I have no doubt whatever that all of us are going to enjoy ourselves very much.

In reply Mr. SEN GUPTA said: Naturally I feel diffident after such

a nice introduction. I certainly feel it is a great honour and a privilege to be asked to speak to this meeting because I am fully conscious of the fact that many members of this distinguished gathering have personal knowledge of India and are perhaps better informed than I am of the problems of Indian industrial and economic development.

DISCUSSION

Dr. BRAMLEY: Has Russia offered any aid in this emergency and if not, had she offered it would you have accepted?

Mr. SEN GUPTA: Well, we would have accepted. As you know though all our defence preparations are depending so much on assistance from the rest of the world, only one Russian aircraft project is all we have accepted. It is so far a token help, only 4 Mig's. Well, they have not offered anything very substantial, just for the emergency, but the fact that they are to some extent not fully on the side of China, that itself is a help.

Dr. BRAMLEY: I must ask another question. Russia has millions of tons of surplus wheat. Why can't they help the starving people of India?

Mr. SEN GUPTA: There are two reasons. One is that our arrangements so far are adequate as regards wheat. We have a very large scale contract with the Americans under their P.L. 480 programme. We get about 5 million tons a year. That wheat we get against rupee payments and the rupees are again made available to us under the American Aid programme for our economic development project. Now that kind of arrangement Russia cannot do. Secondly, Russia does not sell much wheat outside the Socialist Bloc. Russia has joined the International Wheat Council but does not report much availability for international trade.

Sir ARTHUR DEAN: India had agreed to have the International Road Engineering Congress held in Delhi in October/November of this year. That was arranged 18 months or more ago and recently was cancelled because of the emergency. I am a Member of the International Commission and it seems to me, shall I say, an unnecessary panic movement to cancel something which would have been of comparatively very little expenditure, and which would have added to the standing of India in that particular branch. You may not, of course, be acquainted with the details.

Mr. SEN GUPTA: Can you tell me if this Conference was scheduled for 1962 or 1963?

Sir ARTHUR DEAN: 1963. There is a Conference every fourth year. The Indian Delegation at the last Conference, which was held at Rio, pressed very hard that the next Conference should be held in New Delhi, and finally that was agreed by the International Commission in Paris about two years ago. The arrangements were quite well forward when rather suddenly, understandably in some ways, they were cancelled. Was India in the sort of position that you really had to say that a total of perhaps £150,000—the amount which would have been spent on the whole organization—was too much?

Mr. SEN GUPTA: No, I do not think it is a financial consideration, because it is a rupee expenditure mainly. On the other hand we would perhaps earn some foreign exchange, if visitors should go to India. I do not know the facts but I can perhaps think of two possibilities. One is, you know there has been a kind of regimentation of engineering personnel in India. Directors of companies have been requested to relieve as many engineers as they can. Maybe if these people are really involved in various special work, there is some difficulty of manpower for organizing an international conference. The other possibility which I can think of is, because now I have officially arranged such shiftings for other international conferences, perhaps there has been some other claimant,

some other country which may be in a better position today, might have told India, "Look here, why not let go this time? You'll get your time in another 4 years or 10 years." Maybe something like that. Do you know where it is going to be held now?

Sir ARTHUR DEAN: Well, it's not going to be held this year. The proposal that is coming up in Paris fairly soon is that Hungary offered that it should be held in Budapest, but there is a certain doubt as to whether all the countries who are subscribing members will favour that. There was another country that offered four years ago, but they were another Commonwealth country and they withdrew in favour of India. It just struck me that you might, in your present position, know something about this.

Mr. SEN GUPTA: I can check up if you like.

Sir ARTHUR DEAN: It is a relatively unimportant matter perhaps, but those sort of things are diplomatic in a way and I think it has perhaps done a little to injure India's image in the circles in which it was hoped that a really good congress would have been held in India.

Mr. H. H. HOOD: I would like to take this opportunity of asking our speaker to give his opinion on an important point on India's economic position, not just yet, but in the not

distant future. I have here an article in one of the leading London newspapers recently headed "More Food for India's Millions" and the article quotes figures issued by the National Council for Applied Economic Research. I am not going to take up your time by reading all the figures, but looking at the figures for the years 1973 to 1976 they show that for this period the supply of cereals exceeds the demand by no less than six million tons. Now if that estimate is correct then undoubtedly India will be able to export 6 million tons of cereals. At the moment she doesn't know quite what to do to get sufficient cereals, but does our speaker think there is much possibility of those figures being realized in view of India's financial difficulties? How can India import a great amount of fertilizer? It is a very big question.

Mr. SEN GUPTA: It is certainly a big question for our discussion. You see, as I told you, we started at 55 million tons production at the beginning of the first plan. Now in ten years it rose to 78. Now the target for this whole plan is to reach 100 million tons. Today, with 78 million tons production and with imported American wheat of about 4/5 million tons we meet our requirements. When we reach 100 million tons we should also meet our requirements even though the American help would not be there, but there would be large increases

in population too. You see, in India you get every year at least 10 million new mouths to feed. That is the problem. Now, the whole plan certainly has a very ambitious and integrated programme of food production which includes building of fertilizer plants, almost one in every state. We have got a lot of foreign collaboration also in building these fertilizer plants. When I was in India I came to learn that you can perhaps convert everything into fertilizers: heavy water into fertilizer, power into fertilizer, gas into fertilizer, petrol into fertilizer, there are large possibilities of converting various things into fertilizers. And then again thanks to the donations of the Ford Foundation we have a very big intensive programme of food production in India, the Foundation's programme covered one district in seven states, so seven districts were selected so that they would put through a co-ordinated and integrated scheme of food production. The seven districts showed such wonderful results that the Government was forced by clamour in the other states to take over one district each in other states too. So we have today 15 pilot projects in India where food production is perhaps proceeding on modern technological lines. Now modern technology has made food production something of a revolutionary phenomenon. Today only 9 per cent of the American people produce so much food that they can practically feed the entire world.

Now I do not know what would be the advance of technology in another 10 years time. Maybe in 1973 we may also reach that stage but I can only say there are various snags. After all our land tenure systems are inherited on ancient lines. They have to be rationalized. Where the land carries a lot of surplus people they have to be sent to the new industrial development projects. So while Dr. Lokanathan's estimates look very optimistic and encouraging to various people, there are a lot of snags and if by the end of this third five year plan we can see fulfilment of the target of 100 million tons I think we should thank our stars. Just before the meeting, the Chairman was telling me that as regards economic activities 3 months ahead is the maximum period we can look forward to.

The CHAIRMAN: I hope you will forgive me taking up a little more time. I was delighted to read in the papers a few days ago that the Indian Parliament had practically decided that the use of the English language should be indefinitely continued. I am particularly interested in this because a few years ago the position was that English would be discontinued officially in 12 years, I think it was. Before I left India at the end of my Chief Justiceship I had many arguments with the leaders in India on the subject of English. When I went back in 1958 I went to dine with the Prime Minister. He greeted me at the

door by saying "Chief Justice, you've won your battle." And I said, "What in the world do you mean?" He said "English is going to be continued indefinitely."

Sir JOHN WOODHEAD: It is my privilege and honour to propose a vote of thanks to Mr. Sen Gupta for his talk this afternoon. We all listened to it with great interest. I do not want to be pessimistic, but the continuation of the excessive expenditure—shall I call it?—this heavy expenditure on arms will be a very severe blow. This year India has probably succeeded in dealing with it, but if next year there is military expansion on the same standard there will be very great difficulty. India has to protect herself against the possibility of

aggression from China, which means that heavy military expenditure has to be incurred; and I see little relief from taxation for the next few years. I am sorry to strike a pessimistic note but one must look at realities. We have enjoyed what you have told us and we thank you very much for coming to us this afternoon.

I have one other duty to perform. You will have seen an announcement in *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* of the engagement of our President to Miss Kathleen Dobbs. They are to be married, I think, a little before Whitsun, and we offer them our hearty congratulations and wish them every happiness in the future.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much indeed.

East India Association

NINETY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT

MANY of the Association's activities during the year were concerned with keeping its members in touch with events in India following China's sudden and unexpected aggression in Kashmir and the North East Frontier Agency. The Chinese invasion of these two border regions came as a profound shock to India; Mr. Nehru, the Prime Minister, expressed his countrymen's reactions when he described the Chinese attacks as India's greatest menace since Independence, and he later confessed that India was out of touch with the realities of the modern world. China's open aggression was also a shock to the British people, and there was strong support for the British Government's expression of sympathy, voiced by Her Majesty the Queen and the Prime Minister, and for the prompt despatch of military equipment to aid the Indian forces. These sentiments were echoed at meetings of the Association.

The first of the addresses on the frontier war was given in November by Sir Olaf Caroe, who is a recognized authority on India's northern borders. He spoke during the critical week when Chinese troops suddenly over-ran a large part of the Ladakh area of Kashmir and practically the whole of the North East Frontier Agency north of Assam, and then as suddenly announced their intention of withdrawing to what they called the "line of actual control." Illustrating his talk with a selection of map slides, Sir Olaf Caroe used them to demonstrate the historical position of the disputed frontiers and China's claims both in Ladakh and in the region of the McMahon Line. He pointed out that the Chinese claim in the Ladakh area was quite a new one; earlier Chinese maps did not show the Aksai Chin bulge as belonging to China. With regard to the McMahon Line, he made the interesting point that when the Chinese Government repudiated the 1914 Convention between India, Tibet and China, they did so because of disagreement about the frontiers of what were then known as Inner and Outer Tibet; they never mentioned the McMahon Line as the reason for their repudiation of the Convention, and the Tibetan frontier with India was, therefore, not in dispute. Before September, 1962, the Chinese on the whole respected the McMahon Line while blatantly crossing the frontier in Ladakh, and Sir Olaf Caroe took the view that the underlying policy of the Chinese was to bring pressure on India to trade what Peking claimed in Ladakh for Chinese recognition of the McMahon Line.

Early in January Mr. John Tilney, MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, spoke to the Association on his visit to India in November while Mr. Duncan Sandys, the British Commonwealth Relations Minister, and Mr. Averill Harriman, President Kennedy's representative, together with British and U.S. Military Missions, were in the country to discuss help for India. Mr. Tilney prefaced his remarks by giving his impressions of China formed during a visit to that country two years earlier; he did not believe, he said, that the free world had a clue as to what was going to hit it from China and they must prepared be for anything. Referring to his talks with the business community and those who had been evacuated from the various tea estates in Assam, Mr. Tilney paid a tribute to the great work of the Indian Air Force. So far as China's aims were concerned, the Chinese obviously wanted to secure the road they had built from Sinkiang to Tibet through Ladakh, to humiliate India, to damage her economy, to keep India and Pakistan apart, to dominate Asia by frightening the countries on her borders and possibly to snub Moscow. Mr. Tilney praised the efforts of Mr. Duncan Sandys to get India and Pakistan to settle their differences over Kashmir and to present a united front to China.

Our members and those of the Pakistan Society were in a specially privileged position when they were addressed at a joint meeting in January by Sir Percival Griffiths, who not only was in the Sub-Continent at the height of the Sino-Indian crisis, but was able to visit the tea-growing districts of Assam after the Chinese withdrawal began. In a survey of the whole situation as it affected both India and Pakistan, Sir Percival went out of his way to make it absolutely clear that the planters (both British and Indian) and their wives and children who left the Brahmaputra valley as the Chinese were approaching did so on the strong advice of the Indian Governor of Assam, and that they returned as quickly as the Indian authorities would allow them. Any statement that the planters were evacuated of their own volition was a lie. While the crisis had a unifying influence on India and showed the Indian people—despite non-alignment—who their friends really were, its effect on Pakistan was one of alarm at the amount of British and American military aid given to India which, the Pakistanis genuinely feared, would one day be used against them. He asked his Pakistani friends to realize that Britain had no choice: India or Pakistan must have British assistance if they were threatened from outside. Of one thing he was absolutely sure, namely, that some kind of settlement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir was vital.

The effects of the fighting with China on India's economy were dealt with by Mr. N. C. Sen Gupta, Minister (Economic) in the India High Commission. Mr. Sen Gupta made it clear that these effects were serious;

India was compelled to raise the strength of her armed forces to meet the Chinese threat, and unless further substantial foreign aid was given, her economic development under the Third Five-Year Plan was bound to suffer. The reactions of the trouble with China on India's place in the world balance of power were examined by Professor G. E. Gordon Catlin, who declared that India needed a radical spiritual change and that her young men should circulate more freely in the international world.

Pakistan's constitutional problems were discussed by Professor Rushbrook Williams shortly after his return from a visit to that country early in 1962, when H.E. The High Commissioner for Pakistan presided. These problems, Professor Rushbrook Williams said, were almost unique in any one country, but the progress made in solving them had been resumed after the emergence as a national leader of President Ayub Khan. The new constitution took full account of Pakistan's special problems and was attempting to deal with them along lines suggested by practical experience. The general political situation in India, Pakistan and Burma at the beginning of 1962 was reviewed with his usual clarity by Sir Percival Griffiths, who was the guest of honour at the Annual Meeting in July. The Association held one film display during the year; the display included coloured films dealing with India and Pakistan kindly lent by the India and Pakistan High Commissions.

Two largely attended Receptions were given by the Council, the first in honour of the new High Commissioner for India, Mr. M. C. Chagla, and the second as a farewell to Mr. T. N. Kaul, the former Acting High Commissioner, before his departure for India. Mr. Chagla, who was welcomed by a fellow member of the legal profession, Lord Spens, said that when India became independent in 1947, there were prophets of doom who thought that freedom would be fatal to Indo-British relations. That had been completely falsified; relations between the two countries had never been better or stronger than they were today. Mr. Chagla paid a tribute to the Commonwealth, which stood for three basic concepts, namely, human dignity, the rule of law and the use of the English language. He concluded by referring to the dangers facing the Commonwealth over the Common Market, a danger which has since—for the time being—disappeared. This subject was also dealt with by Mr. Kaul, who put before his audience India's doubts and apprehensions as to what might happen if Britain joined the Common Market. One point Mr. Kaul stressed was the need for English people to go to India to teach in Indian colleges and schools, and he suggested the exchange of teachers and students between the two countries on a reciprocal basis.

Sir John Woodhead, the Chairman, continued his membership campaign which helped to keep our strength on a level basis despite deaths and resignations. Nevertheless the problem is a pressing one and members are urgently requested to help the Council to secure recruits so that the Association can continue to fulfil its task of promoting friendship between Britain and India, Pakistan and Burma during difficult days. Members who cannot attend meetings are asked not to resign, since they can follow the detailed proceedings of the Association in the *ASIAN REVIEW*, thereby supporting the Association in its valuable work. The Association again expresses its gratitude to the Pakistan Government for their annual donation of £100.

Our cordial thanks are due to the Royal Over-Seas League for valued assistance in arranging joint meetings at Over-Seas House, and to the Pakistan Society and its Secretary, Sir Harold Shoober, for helping to organize occasional combined meetings. The Y.M.C.A. Students' Union and Hostel co-operated in a tea party for India and Pakistan students in London held under the auspices of the Hospitality Fund, when Sir Francis Low presided and the students were addressed by Professor G. E. Gordon Catlin. Two grants of £45—one to cover 1961-62—were made during the year from the Adelaide Manning Female Education Fund to the National Indian Association, Calcutta, to assist the education of Indian girl students.

Our losses by death during the year included one of our Vice-Presidents, Mr. Mohammed Ali, a former Prime Minister of Pakistan, and one of our life members, Sir Cowasji Jehangir, Bt, of Bombay, who was a generous supporter of the Association. Their passing is deeply regretted. Among other losses mourned by the Association were those of Sir George Bambridge, Sir Miles Irving, Lt.-Colonel G. Keighley-Bell, Sir Arthur Lothian, Lady Monroe, Sir James Nuttall and Sir George Spence.

Members of the Council retiring by rotation, but eligible for re-election, are Lady Chatterjee, Sir Cyril Jones, Professor C. H. Philips, and Mr. F. Richter. Two others also due to retire, but who do not wish to stand for re-election, are General Sir Douglas Gracey and Mr. S. C. G. Bach of the British Council, who is leaving for Iran. The Council have under consideration the filling of these vacancies. It is open to any member to propose at the Annual Meeting a candidate or candidates to fill vacancies on the Council subject to not less than seven days' notice being given to the Honorary Secretary.

J. A. WOODHEAD
Chairman.
FRANCIS LOW
Hon. Secretary.

NINETY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING

THE Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the East India Association (India, Pakistan and Burma) was held at Over-Seas House, St. James's, London, S.W.1, on Tuesday, 30th July, 1963. The Right Hon. Lord SPENS, KBE, President of the Association, was in the Chair, and the Guest of Honour was Sir Kenneth Bradley, CMG.

The CHAIRMAN: It is my privilege to preside at the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Association and to welcome all of you and particularly to welcome our chief guest today, Sir KENNETH BRADLEY. We are going to have an address from Sir Kenneth in due course and all of us know of the marvellous job he has done both in connexion with what I knew as a boy as the Imperial Institute which now I think is the Commonwealth Institute. We miss Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar whom we hoped was going to be with us this afternoon. Circumstances have made it necessary for him to return to India more quickly than all of us anticipated, and I certainly shall send him a note and say how sorry I am that he was not with us here this afternoon.

This has been quite an important year in the history of the Association. In the first place my old judicial colleague, H.E. Mr. Chagla, has come here as the High Commissioner for India. We had a great reception for him soon after his arrival. On the top of it, and speaking out of turn so far as this report is concerned, we have had the visit of the President of India and we are waiting for the visit of the President of Pakistan in October. I cannot but believe that those two visits will do more for the good relations between our respective countries than almost anything that has happened in the past.

This year our chief talks have been rather dominated by the relations and the events that took place on the frontier between India and China. Three of our most important addresses were connected with the invasion of India by China, and the resulting effects of it, and one only hopes and prays that our autumn meetings will not be dominated by the same trouble and the same type of events; but the lectures we had—the first one by Sir Olaf Caroe on the Frontier and then those by Mr. John Tinney and Sir Percival Griffiths—were all of outstanding interest as to what had been happening and why and what India might have to fear for the future.

We have had to say goodbye to Mr. Kaul, who had acted as High Commissioner for India for many months, and wish him well on his transfer to Moscow. We have suffered seriously by deaths during this year and also by retirements, and not least the retirement of Sir Douglas Gracey, who has been one of our great supporters since he came back to this country.

I am not going to keep you very long, but I always like on these occasions to put on record the enormous personal debt that I owe in connexion with the affairs of the Society to three men: Sir John Woodhead, Sir Francis Low, and Mr. Richter. They really keep the wheels of the Association running and I rather feel that as President I sit somewhat above the revolving wheel and looking on at it all, but to them we all owe an enormous debt and we are extremely grateful for all they have done for the Association. I hope that this is a fit and proper occasion on which our debt to them should be publicly acknowledged. I am now going to ask if Sir Arthur Dean will move the adoption of the Report.

SIR ARTHUR DEAN: I have been allotted the very pleasant task of moving the adoption of the Annual Report. In doing this there is very little that I can add to what has already been said by our President, Lord Spens, but I do feel I can say how much I have enjoyed the meetings over the last year. I have been a member for a very long time and I have read the Annual Reports and ASIAN REVIEW; but it is only in the last fourteen or fifteen months, since I retired and settled in this country, that I have been able to come up and listen to the various talks and discussions. It is these talks that have made me realize the very important place that the Association has for the discussion of the affairs of India, Pakistan, and Burma. The high level of the discussions following the very valuable papers that we have listened to has been most impressive to me. The amount of specialized information that has been put at the disposal of those who come to the meetings has been immense, and I think we must all agree with what Lord Spens has said as Chairman that we owe almost all this very valuable information, these most interesting papers and discussions to the hard work put in by our Chairman and Secretary. With those very brief and inadequate remarks I beg to move the adoption of the Annual Report.

DR. BHATTACHARYYA: It is a very great pleasure for me to be able to second the Resolution so nicely put before us. I have no doubt that we have done a tremendous amount of important work during last year, and I should like to second the Resolution wholeheartedly.

THE CHAIRMAN: As there are no questions, and as the adoption of the Report has been proposed and seconded, I formally propose to put the Resolution to the Meeting that the Annual Report be adopted.

The Resolution was carried unanimously.

THE CHAIRMAN: I will now ask Sir John Woodhead, as Chairman of the Council, to present the Annual Accounts.

Sir JOHN WOODHEAD: You have the Accounts before you and I will not say very much about them, although it has been my custom to say a few words about the accounts at these meetings. In 1961 and 1962 I was glad to be able to announce a small excess of receipts over expenditure. Unfortunately, I am not in that happy position this year, for the Accounts of 1963 show an excess of expenditure over receipts. It is true that the excess is a small one, approximately £10, but it is still an excess, and I wish it had been otherwise.

The subscriptions from members had, during the last two years, remained steady, but again unfortunately 1962/63 shows a small reduction of just under £10. £10 seems a rather popular figure with us, but as I said last year the task of recruiting new members does not become easier, indeed it is getting more and more difficult, and it is sad that in spite of the best endeavours of Sir Francis Low and myself to expand our membership, we have to register a slight fall in 1962/63. As the report says the problem of obtaining new members is a pressing one and if the Association wishes to continue to fulfil its task of promoting friendship between Britain and India, Pakistan, and Burma it is essential that our membership should show an increase instead of a decline. We give good value for our small subscription, which remains at £1 5s. 0d., the same as it was when the Association was founded 97 years ago. May I make a very special appeal to all our members to assist us during the present year by enlisting new members. During the coming year we shall have to meet additional expenditure in consequence of the removal of our offices and so we shall certainly require new members. The Council will be grateful for any assistance which members will be able to give in this direction.

Our warmest thanks are given to the Government of Pakistan for their Annual Subscription of £100. It is of very great assistance to us.

ASIAN REVIEW continues to maintain a very high standard, and I congratulate Mr. Richter, its Editor, on a very good publication. Mr. Richter takes a great interest in the welfare of the Association and we accord to him our grateful thanks for all his assistance. May I remind the members that they get ASIAN REVIEW free of charge, which is almost equal to their subscription for the year. In fact, as I said, our subscription has not increased since we were founded 97 years ago, and, I do not think any Society can beat that record.

To our Honorary Secretary, Sir Francis Low, we repeat our congratulations and our thanks for all the work he has done for the Association in arranging lectures and especially arranging receptions. It is not an easy task; it involves a considerable amount of work and sometimes a considerable amount of disappointment, but we are very grateful to Sir Francis Low for the great interest he continues to take in the Association.

Sir CECIL TREVOR: It is with very great pleasure that I move the adoption of the Accounts.

Mr. H. HOOD: I have very much pleasure in seconding the adoption of the Accounts.

The Resolution was carried unanimously.

Mr. B. MOODY: I move that Lady Chatterjee, Sir Cyril Jones, Professor C. H. Philips, Mr. L. R. Phillips, and Mr. F. Ritcher be elected to the Council.

Mrs. D. P. KAURA: I have great pleasure in seconding this Resolution.

The CHAIRMAN: It has been moved that the persons named should be elected *en bloc* to the Council. That has been agreed unanimously.

I have now much pleasure in calling upon Sir Kenneth Bradley to address the meeting.

After Sir Kenneth Bradley's Address, the CHAIRMAN said:

It only remains for me to voice your thanks to Sir Kenneth for his extremely interesting address. I am bound to plead guilty to the fact that I have not yet been inside the Institute, although when I was a boy I was in and out of the old Imperial Institute almost every day of my life. But I look forward to going further west in Kensington and I shall hope some time to take advantage of the very kind invitation he made to me personally. I am sure all of us realize the tremendous value the Institute in fact is, and what interest it has aroused throughout the Commonwealth. One has enquiries from all sorts of people and the first one is always "Where is it and how do we get at it when we get to London?" That is one of the first things my friends from overseas want to know. Well, it is quite simple. Sir Kenneth Bradley has told me how to do that and I know that when my friends get there they are welcomed by Sir Kenneth. The work that the Institute does, I believe, is one of the great links between us and our fellow members of the Commonwealth. I am sure all of us will accept Sir Kenneth's invitation before very long.

[*Sir Kenneth Bradley's Address appears on pages 207-214*]

The Objects of the East India Association

(INDIA PAKISTAN AND BURMA)

IN 1866, eight years after the assumption of the government of India by the Crown, the East India Association was formed with the object of "the promotion of the public interest and welfare of the inhabitants of India generally." This object was steadfastly pursued during the ensuing eighty-one years. The Independence of India and Pakistan attained in 1947, while modifying the original conception, has increased the need for strengthening the bonds of friendship and the importance of mutual understanding between the people of Britain and the inhabitants of the countries formerly comprising the India Empire—namely, India, Pakistan, and Burma. The Association therefore is continuing its work, with the assistance of all those who are interested in the welfare and progress of these countries, by the methods which have proved so helpful in the past, namely:

1. By lectures on current questions affecting those countries and publication of the same.
2. By providing opportunities for the free discussion of important questions affecting India, Pakistan, and Burma.
3. By promoting friendly contact between the peoples of these countries and of Britain through the medium of social and other gatherings.
4. Generally by the promulgation of reliable information regarding the countries named.

The Association is essentially non-official in character and has no connexion with any political party. It seeks to provide an open platform for the consideration of current problems relating to India, Pakistan, and Burma. It welcomes as members all those who are interested in their welfare and progress.

Papers are read and discussed throughout the year, except in the months of August and September. Members are entitled to invite friends to these meetings.

Frederick Richter, CBE, MA

FREDERICK RICHTER, for many years the Editor of *ASIAN REVIEW*, died on 26th August, 1963, in a London hospital at the age of 73.

Son of Dr. J. P. Richter, a well-known art historian, and brother of Miss Gisela Richter, for many years Curator of the Classical Department of the Metropolitan Museum, New York, Frederick Jean Paul Richter was born on 22nd December, 1889. He was educated at Charterhouse, where he won the Havelock Exhibition, and at New College, Oxford, taking an Honours degree in History. While at Oxford he was for a time Secretary of the Oxford Union Society, helped to found the Grenville Club for the discussion of foreign affairs, and was a contributor to the Undergraduate periodical *The Oxford Fortnightly*.

Soon after leaving Oxford, in 1912, he became editor of *The Asiatic Review*, founded in 1886 by his uncle the late Dr. G. W. Leitner, the distinguished Orientalist. Not long after the last war the title was changed, in conformity with modern usage, to *ASIAN REVIEW*.

In the First World War Frederick Richter served in the Royal Army Ordnance Corps. After demobilization he was elected Honorary Secretary of the India Society—later to be known as the Royal India Society and now the Royal India Pakistan and Ceylon Society—which had been founded in 1910 to promote the study of the culture of the sub-continent.

He was keenly interested in education and accepted the responsibility for the welfare of students from India, Pakistan, Kedah, Johore, and elsewhere. When Ceylon became a Dominion in 1948 he was appointed to the staff of the High Commissioner in London for educational work. These several activities brought him into close contact with the Universities of Great Britain and Eire. During the last war he was selected to be acting Secretary of the Universities China Committee.

In recognition of his excellent work on behalf of Anglo-Dutch relations the Queen of the Netherlands bestowed upon him, in 1937, the Order of Oranje Nassau in the rank of Chevalier. He was awarded the OBE in 1944, and raised to CBE in 1959.

It is true, as stated in *The Times* obituary, that he was adept in the art of delegation, but he never spared himself. It was no unusual event for him to work in his office until the early hours of the morning. Rarely did he permit himself the luxury of a week-end away from his desk. If he had a motto it must have been: "If it ought to be done, let us do it." Once it became apparent that something ought to be done there was no rest for

himself, nor for those associated with him, until that something had been accomplished.

His capacity for work was phenomenal. In addition to the service he rendered to the Royal India Pakistan and Ceylon Society, he was the Honorary Secretary of the Anglo-Netherlands Society, the Iran Society, Anglo-Turkish Society, and the Indian Women's Education Association; and for many years was a member of the Council of the East India Association.

As an editor his activities were many and diverse. An early and notable achievement was the publication of Rabindranath Tagore's *Gitanjali*, the first of Tagore's works to be published in this country, and which gained for the poet the Nobel prize. Frederick Richter also edited in addition to the *ASIAN REVIEW*, of which he was the majority shareholder, *Britain and Holland* for the Anglo-Netherlands Society, *Art and Letters*, the journal of the Royal India Pakistan and Ceylon Society, and the Iran Society's *Occasional Papers*.

He had a wide range of friends and acquaintances of almost all nationalities, and his tenacious memory enabled him to keep them well documented in his mind. He was quick to detect the absurdities in people, and often displayed a most unexpected gift of mimicry. He was a brilliant conversationalist.

Frederick Richter loved beauty, music, the arts (many young artists have to thank him for the recognition of their talents they gained through the exhibitions of their works he arranged); but above all he loved people—his rich gift of friendship jewelled by his sparkling wit endeared him to all who knew him.

Milk Production in India

OVER the greater part of India milk is always in short supply. There just isn't enough for everybody. Moreover the price puts it outside the reach of most people. In the smaller towns, even people from the middle-income groups cannot afford to buy it.

The milk shortage in India isn't due to a shortage of cows: the country has 200 million bovines, a quarter of the world's entire cattle and buffalo population. The shortage of milk results first of all from the general lack of good nourishing livestock fodder coupled to the very low productivity of the animals. Moreover at least a third of India's livestock has no economic value and is only maintained for reasons of tradition and sentiment.

For many years the Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.O.) has been working with Indian authorities to try to improve the situation. In charge of F.A.O. activities in this field is Dr. R. O. Whyte, a well-known British grassland specialist who journeyed backwards and forwards between Rome and India from 1951 to 1961, and who, since last year, has been working full-time in India advising the Central and state governments on the measures needed to improve India's grazing and fodder resources.

VALUE OF DAIRY FARMING STRESSED

"A large part of F.A.O.'s work in India for the first 10 years was essentially research," said Dr. Whyte when interviewed on a recent visit to F.A.O. headquarters in Rome. "We carried out fodder crop trials in different states, accumulated data, prepared a map of the natural grasslands of the country, and bred new varieties. We could do nothing more concrete until a solid market for milk could be established. Without this farmers were naturally not interested. Now the situation is changing completely. With the support and help of UNICEF, of the Colombo Plan countries, and of bilateral agencies, and in co-operation with several large firms, India has begun to build milk processing plants all over the country. These plants supply nearby cities with milk and milk products. Now we have at last the possibility of establishing a nation-wide dairy industry and we can begin to talk to farmers in terms of money, in litres of milk and rupees per acre. They know they can now find outlets for their milk."

But many Indian farmers still have to be persuaded that dairy farming is worth their while financially.

"Farmers everywhere are businessmen and they will not take up a new crop if they think it is going to bring in a lower return per acre than their usual food and cash crops," Dr. Whyte said.

NEED FOR SUBSIDIES TO FARMERS

Subsidies by the government may be necessary at first to cover the difference between returns from food and cash crops, and from fodder crops expressed in terms of milk production. The states of Kerala and Madras have begun to pay a subsidy on an acreage basis to farmers who had converted their land from food and cash crops to fodder crops. The state of Orissa is on the point of following suit.

The aim of these subsidies is to make it financially worth-while for farmers to get into the habit of growing good fodder, feeding it to good cows and buffaloes, and selling the milk to a dairy plant. A subsidy for five years may be sufficient.

To encourage small farmers to improve their methods of production and at the same time promote the expansion of dairy plants, only farmers in dairy co-operatives or supplying dairy schemes should qualify for these subsidies, said Dr. Whyte.

A major bottleneck to the extension of fodder cultivation is the shortage of good seed in India.

"Indian national grasslands are not productive enough for dairy cattle and there is a great need for seed of fodder, grasses and legumes, particularly of the tropical and sub-tropical varieties," the E.A.O. expert said. "In the final analysis it is adequate fodder fed to productive dairy animals that will ensure the full operation and success of an Indian dairy industry. But in most cases the fodder isn't there yet and we still face years of low production."

GRASSLANDS INSTITUTE ESTABLISHED

A major step towards the ultimate goal was taken this year when the Government of India set up the Indian Grassland and Fodder Research Institute under the third Five-year Plan.

According to the Planning Commission, the Institute will undertake new research and co-ordinate it with existing research. It will also attend to the training of personnel. The first three-months course for fodder research workers will begin in September.

In order to give the participants, who will number about 25, the maximum experience with the various conditions found in the Indian sub-continent, the Institute will hold its course in three different local-

ities: Karnal, at the National Dairy Research Institute; New Delhi, at the Indian Agricultural Research Institute; and Jodhpur, at the Central Arid Zone Research Institute. The course is divided into three main sections: Fodder Development and Utilization; Agronomy and Improvement of Herbage and Fodder Crops; and Grassland Ecology, Improvement and Management.

Other training courses on the development and extension level are being planned on a regional basis.

ANIMAL HUSBANDRY PROBLEMS

Fodder improvement is only one of the major problems facing the scientist and technicians who are working to build up an efficient dairy industry and the doctors and nutritionists anxious to see Indian adults and children increase their average protein intake.

Before the Indian child can look forward to his daily glass of milk other problems of animal husbandry will have to be solved—including that of diseased and infirm cattle which, in the words of a recent issue of *The Times of India*, “compete with good stock for the limited fodder and grazing that is available.”

“There are actually two quite distinct forms of cattle husbandry in India: one based on economics and the other based on tradition and sentiment. One is made up of productive animals, the other of animals that are old and sick,” explained Dr. White.

“In our work in India we must make a clear distinction between these two forms of animal husbandry,” he added. “Our objective must be to concentrate on economic animal husbandry and make it as efficient, productive and financially attractive as possible.”

The Manufacture of Scientific Instruments in India

THE National Instruments Factory, Calcutta, a Government organization, has been in existence for more than 125 years. The growth of this industry is closely associated with the industrial development and national welfare of the country. The pioneering activities of this Institution have inspired the growth of an instrument making industry in India. The factory was established in 1830 under its original name of Mathematical Instrument Office to fulfil the needs felt for a factory in India for repairs of survey and other instruments. There was a staff of seven men to begin with. The establishment of this office made available the facilities at its workshop to other departments of the Government of India, notably the Army and Public Works Departments. A special optical section was started in the year 1919 and, for the first time in India, the process of manufacture of lenses, prisms and other optical components was developed. The valuable experience thus gained was later utilized in the manufacture of all types of optical instruments. The manufacturing potentialities of the office were fully demonstrated during the Second World War, when it was converted into an ordnance factory for production of a large number of service instruments. Since June, 1957, this organization has been converted into a private limited company. This is now known as the National Instruments Limited and is one of the Central Government undertakings under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

The location of the factory at Calcutta is advantageous from various considerations. All indigenous raw materials required for the manufacture of instruments are available in or around Calcutta. The right type of people are also available here in good number. Instruments enjoy an all-India market. The new factory, constructed under a reorganization scheme, is now situated at Jadavpur near Calcutta.

The total estimated outlay for the reorganization programme was Rs. 7.7 million, its foreign exchange content being Rs. 2.9 million. This factory had a peak strength of 2,300 in 1944 against a pre-war figure of 400. The strength of the factory during the last 3/4 years has been practically steady and the average number of persons employed at present is about 1,100.

The factory produces no less than 250 broad types of instruments, such as scientific and surveying, optical, meteorological, drawing, measuring

and industrial instruments. In the course of the next few years, manufacture of simple types of instruments will be gradually discontinued and the factory has already been concentrating on the manufacture of relatively complicated existing and new items. Mechanical components, wood works, castings, etc., are being obtained from ancillary industries for final rework and assembly in this factory. Production of simple items is being gradually off-loaded to cottage industries, subjecting the products to inspection by the factory. Thus, a big enterprise is gradually becoming assembly-oriented. It is estimated that this company will be in a position to off-load work worth over Rs. 1 million per annum.

Some of the items of manufacture are: levelling instruments, theodolite, compass, drafting machine, pantograph, binocular, microscope, profile projector, thermometer, and fortin's barometer. A new addition during the earlier part of the Second Plan was pressure and vacuum gauges in various sizes and ranges. The company now produces over 25,000 gauges annually and is catering to the needs of the Indian Railways and various industries. Clinical thermometer is another item which has passed the stage of experimental batch production and arrangements are in hand to manufacture these on large scale.

The N.I. Ltd. is actively pursuing for the last few years the standardization of instruments and components. The changeover from the F.P.S. system to the metric system has also been effected for a number of items and this process will continue till the factory is in a position to completely change over to the metric system. A close association with such important institutions as I.S.O., Indian Meteorological Department and Technical Development Establishments has also been maintained.

An industrial engineering unit has been set up in the interest of efficient production of engineering instruments and this unit is engaged in time and motion study, machine loading, fixation and norms for various components, simplification of methods and modernization of procedures.

The project for manufacture of optical glass in India is now engaging the active consideration of the Government. With the completion of this project, the problem of availability of an essential strategic raw material will be solved. Similarly, the possibility of manufacture of bourdon tubes, hairsprings and capillary glass tubes is also being explored.

The instrument industry in India is still very young and, even at the present stage of industrialization of the country, there is considerable scope for further expansion. It is estimated that India imports instruments annually worth Rs. 100 million. The combined capacities of the Government instrument factories and the private manufacturers touch only a fringe of the country's ever increasing requirements, and, therefore, there is enough scope of expansion in this field.

The Renaissance of Rural Life in Pakistan*

By L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS, CBE, JP

MAY I begin this afternoon by expressing my gratitude to the Royal Society of Arts for inviting me to join the galaxy of distinguished persons who, year by year, have paid well-deserved homage to the memory of Sir George Birdwood? It is now nearly fifty years since I began my long connexion with the Indo-Pakistani sub-continent; but I still vividly remember the great reputation which Sir George enjoyed, and the respect in which he was held both by his own countrymen and by the people among whom he carried out his epoch-making studies of the indigenous arts and crafts. I only wish that he were alive today; for he would, I know, rejoice to see how many of the ideas for the acceptance of which he worked have passed into the day-to-day policy of the Governments of the newly-independent countries of Asia. It would, indeed, be an interesting task to trace in his writings the origins of much that is sometimes thought to be a characteristic discovery of the modern movements of community development. Let me take one instance which happens to occur to me. The work which has, for the last six years, been undertaken by the East Pakistan Small and Cottage Industries Corporation is entirely in line with the policies for which Sir George Birdwood pressed. The Corporation has set up a number of centres in rural areas which undertake instruction in screen printing, advanced sewing, garment- and doll-making, ceramics and the like; it arranges facilities for the supply of raw materials and accessories; it has been highly successful not only in marketing the finished products both in West and East Pakistan, but also in building up a steadily-growing export trade. Apart altogether from the value of this activity in preserving indigenous crafts of high artistic value just as Sir George Birdwood foresaw would happen, it is succeeding in bringing small but useful supplies of cash to the aid of struggling village economies.

Tempting as it would be to work out in detail the debt which Pakistan, in common with India and other Asian countries, owes to the pioneering

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thought of Sir George Birdwood, any such investigation would take me too far from my main subject this afternoon, which is to give some broad impressions, based upon the personal observation of my Wife and myself during the last few years, of the great changes which are now coming over the rural life of East and of West Pakistan. But in order to set these changes, as it were, in their proper perspective, it is right to remember that they represent Pakistan's version of a broad process which can be seen in operation in several other countries. This process has been almost forced upon many newly-independent nations of South-East Asia—and, I may remark, in passing, upon much of the Arab world as well—by the realization that a high proportion of their populations tends to stagnate economically because of the low productivity to which the outmoded practices of a traditional agriculture still condemn it. Thus in order to raise effectively the living standards of any given country, it is essential to improve the conditions of village life by introducing more advanced agricultural techniques; by setting up cottage industries; by establishing schools, dispensaries, health, maternity and child-welfare clinics, as well as adult literacy centres and reading rooms. It is only by such methods that an Asian rural community can be roused from apathy, inspired to help itself, and taught to play that part in the life of the nation as a whole to which its numerical importance entitles it. Unfortunately the whole process tends to be slow, unspectacular, and very expensive; so that it does not make a particularly strong appeal to that pride in rapid achievement which is so marked in newly-liberated countries. Big steel plants, enormous barrages, vast hydro-electric schemes, are not only useful—perhaps indeed essential—in themselves; they are also excellent advertisements of a modern outlook in the nation which—often largely with foreign help—decides to set them up. Please do not imagine that I am criticizing the process of industrialization to which many Asian countries, including Pakistan herself, stand committed. This process is inevitable if these countries are to advance economically, and we in the Western world are pledged, and rightly pledged, to helping it forward. But it is essentially long-term in its aim; it will be many years before its effects are felt in the villages, where anything up to 90 per cent of the population may live. Meanwhile there are political, as well as economic, dangers in devoting too large a proportion of national and foreign aid resources to large development projects at the expense of neglecting the interests and needs of the rural population. Such neglect, if it should occur, leads to that widening of the difference in outlook between the governors and the governed, which is a prime source of political instability. The governors are in any event preoccupied by such large national questions as foreign policy, finance, development projects, urban needs,

the influence of pressure-groups, industrial progress, and the hurly-burly of political life in the large cities. But if they allow these preoccupations to blind them to the needs of the countryside, where the bulk of the population live, they do so not only at their own peril, but at the peril of the entire polity.

In the course of tours of rural areas in East and West Pakistan which my wife and I made in 1956 and 1957, we were much concerned with what struck us as a dangerous lack of touch between the central and provincial machines of government on one side and the masses themselves on the other. It would, of course, have been extremely unfair to ignore the burden placed upon the administrative structure by the clamant needs of sheer national survival. Unlike India, which inherited from the British a highly-perfected administrative system and a soundly based economy, Pakistan heired nothing but comparatively undeveloped fragments of the former British *raj* without a central focus and with no economic tradition of its own. In the course of the first decade of her existence, the struggle for survival was won; the prophets who confidently condemned Pakistan as unviable were confounded by events. But the concentration upon urgent national needs had been effected at the cost of the neglect of many other problems; and there was an obvious gap between the outlook of the national leaders and the feelings of the rural population. In this respect we noticed a contrast between Pakistan and India. In India, too, there were symptoms at this time of marked uneasiness among the rural masses as well as of wide differences in outlook and interests between the cities and the villages. But in India, there was the father-figure of Mr. Nehru to command the devotion—and, at election-time the votes—of the rural population. The personal devotion which he evoked served to stabilize the entire country. Pakistan had possessed no such father-figure since the death of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah; and the masses had no one to whom they could look except political leaders whose personalities and methods excited their instinctive distrust.

It should be recognized that many of the Governments which ruled Pakistan between the death of Liaquat Ali Khan and the Revolution of 1958 did their best to improve rural conditions with such resources as could be spared from what were looked upon as more pressing claims. The Village and (Agricultural and Industrial Development) movement, though it operated upon the proverbial shoe-string financially, did admirable work both in East and in West Pakistan from its beginnings in 1953 until 1961, when its functions were taken over by the Agriculture Development Corporations and the Agriculture Departments of East and West Pakistan, and by the Basic Democracies—of which more later. In 1956 and 1957 we were much impressed by the spirit of devoted service which

pervaded the entire movement. In some respects, at least, scarcity of funds acted as a stimulus to enthusiasm and to a kind of missionary spirit, which preserved everyone who worked in the organization from feeling that they were members of just another Government Department. This feeling, it may be noted, has become a very real danger in two countries where far more Government money is spent on community projects, namely, India and the Philippines. There, although good work is being done, enthusiasm seems on the wane, and more importance is perhaps attached to improving, by external agencies, the material conditions of village life, than to encouraging the villagers themselves to local effort. We noticed throughout the Village AID movement a gratifying absence of bureaucratic regimentation. The main object, which was kept steadily in view, was to turn out the right type of village-level workers, both men and women, who were not only full of zeal for their task, but were trained to avoid arousing antagonism, to enlist co-operation, to make sure of every step before taking the next, to exercise infinite patience in gaining the confidence of those among whom they were to work. It was the duty of these men and women to carry to the villagers the improved techniques recommended by the experts; to promote the adoption of new varieties of crops, of better seeds and more efficient tools; to persuade, by example rather than by precept, the leaders of village opinion of the advantages of improving their surroundings, increasing their income, and interesting themselves in local problems of sanitation, health, literacy, child- and maternity-welfare, and the like.

To begin with, many of the techniques of worker-training were imported from the United States; but these were intelligently adapted to the requirements of Pakistan. Three centres of instruction were set up in East Pakistan and six in West Pakistan—the significance of the difference in numbers I shall explain later; and my wife and I were able to visit them and talk to the trainees and watch them at work. We found that the training of would-be village workers was both practical and thorough. The women were instructed in home economics, in cooking upon improved smokeless stoves of a design which can be made almost without cost in any village, in nutrition and diet supplements, in fly and pest control, in child care, in home sanitation, and elementary hygiene. They were also taught how to raise vegetables in the soils they would encounter; how to look after poultry; how to cut out and sew the garments in common use; how to use spare time in ways that would supplement the family income or the family diet, or both. The men were instructed in improved agricultural methods carefully worked out by expert advice for the localities to which they were to be sent; in soil and seed testing; in the skills needed

to encourage cottage industries; in road alignment; in elementary sanitary engineering; in simple building techniques, and the like.

When we made our tours in 1956 and 1957, we found that the Village AID movement had already spread to something near half the country, not so much, we thought, because of governmental effort, but because it was definitely "catching on" among the people themselves. How this was coming about was obvious when we visited a number of villages both in East and West Pakistan. We found that village streets were being paved and drained; waste land was being reclaimed and cultivated, trees were being planted for fuel, humus and amenity-value; link-roads were being built with culverts against monsoon breakages; improved seed and new ways of cultivation—such as the drill sowing of cotton in line and the Japanese method of rice-raising—were being tried out; new varieties of vegetables were being grown, poultry-farming was spreading; and a new crop of small but practical schools, dispensaries, health clinics and adult literacy centres was growing up; cottage industries were being organized. The mainspring of all this was voluntary effort, first awakened, and later tactfully directed, by the village level worker, who remained modestly in the background, giving all the credit for what had been achieved to the villagers themselves, but quite obviously occupying the position of valued counsellor and trusted friend. We encountered a good deal of criticism of the Government for not doing more to help in these developments; and while there may have been some substance in these complaints, it was pretty clear to us that such official help as was given was intelligently applied to build on the foundations that were being laid. But few of the villagers to whom we talked, both in East and West Pakistan thought that the Government was really interested in their well-being. "We are doing what we can," they said, "but we need more help than the Government is giving. The trouble is that the city politicians are feathering their own nests and don't care what happens to us." Another very common complaint was: "These city people only come to us when they seek our votes; and if we try to explain our grievances and needs to them, they promise us the earth and go away and do nothing!"

Although it may have been true that village problems counted for little in the perpetual struggle for political power which at that time raged in Karachi, Dacca and Lahore, it was certainly not true that the local officials were apathetic to the progress of Village AID. Within the limits imposed upon them by the funds which the politicians voted, the Divisional, District, Tahsil and Sub-Divisional officers laboured very hard to encourage the movement—so hard, indeed, that some independent minded people, especially in West Pakistan, resented their efforts, and said so to us; while in East Pakistan we encountered complaints that the sub-divisional

officers were trying to "run the show" themselves. But the fact is that the Village AID movement was already so important that some structure for co-ordinating local schemes, for preventing duplication of effort, and for making the best use of available resources had become essential if the excellent work that was being done in the villages was to be properly utilized. This structure took the form of grouping about 150 villages into a Development Area, and grouping the Development Areas under a Development Directorate, with responsibilities extending to an entire administrative unit. Each Development Area was in the charge of a Development Officer, who was assisted, in theory at least, by an advisory council of village representatives and local technical officers; while the Director who co-ordinated the work of the Development Areas within his charge kept closely in touch with the Head of the District and with representatives of the technical Departments of Government, such as Agriculture, Medical, Veterinary, Co-operative, and so forth. In many villages, we found complaints that local opinion was ignored, and that the officials were inclined to do as they thought fit—although their good intentions were generally admitted. But the villagers tended to think of themselves and the officials as "we" and "they," to the loss of both sides. There was, however, one interesting and important consequence of the closer connexion between the Village AID movement and the administrative machine. It became clear to the authorities that the ordinary rule-of-thumb methods in current use for dealing with village problems hitherto employed by the administrative and technical services were no longer suited for conditions in which the villager was becoming increasingly articulate; proper scientific training in village problems had become essential. Accordingly two Village AID Academies were established, one at Comilla for East Pakistan, and one at Peshawar for West Pakistan, to undertake research, psychological, social and economic, into the problems of village development. Side by side with this research, formal courses of instruction were arranged for revenue, medical, veterinary, and co-operative officials whose duties brought them into contact with village life. It was an interesting experience to visit these Academies and to talk, not only to the highly-expert instructional staff—recruited from the New World as well as from Europe and Pakistan—but also to the officials under instruction. Some of these were Development Officers and Development Directors, among whom there was a considerable proportion of women; these mainly came to widen their own background by studies in village psychology and social problems. Others were technical men, experts in their own lines, like animal husbandry and soil chemistry, who came to learn how their particular type of work fitted both into the general village pattern, and into the activities of the other experts. Both

Academies, we found, were satisfying a real need; each was closely in touch with local conditions and local problems; but in both we found some trace of sadness that the importance of the work that they were doing did not seem to make much impression upon the higher administrative—as contrasted with the higher technical—officials. In this respect, perhaps, Comilla was a little more cheerful than Peshawar; because East Pakistanis and their Government had made an earlier start in tackling the problems of village life, and the work of Comilla was less uphill because the ground had been in some measure prepared for it.

To an audience of this kind, it is unnecessary to underline the contrasts, ethnic, climatic, economic and social, between East and West Pakistan; but everyone with first-hand knowledge of these contrasts will, I am sure, share my own wonder that two such different areas hold together as closely as they do to form a single country. The tie which links them is as President Ayub Khan has recently pointed out, primarily religious; this has been reinforced by the sense of common patriotism induced by a widespread feeling that they are both, as it were, beleaguered by their great neighbour, India. But leaving aside the strong bonds which link them, they are very different places; and this difference emerges very clearly in their respective reactions to the Village AID movement. In East Pakistan, this movement linked directly with a good deal that was being done already. The country was covered by a network of Union Boards, with areas corresponding to revenue subdivisions; and these Boards were in theory at least representative of the villages in the subdivision. In practice, they were run almost entirely by the subdivisional officer; but a number of these were enthusiasts for village uplift; and the best of the Union Boards had for a long time been doing very good work in promoting the improvement of village conditions. Moreover, Debt Settlement Officers had been appointed to tackle the problem of rural indebtedness; they had accumulated a deep knowledge of village problems and knew just what the villagers needed economically. On the whole, the standard of literacy and especially of social and political awareness is higher in East than in West Pakistan; the population is highly concentrated, so that we found that a Village AID worker could easily look after as many as seven villages, and effective co-ordination of local schemes was simplified. Moreover, one significant difference which we found between East and West Pakistan resulted from the fact that as early as 1951, the East Pakistan Government had passed a very drastic Tenancy Act which had broken the power of the landlords by setting a 30-acre ceiling on individual holdings. There was thus little or no big zamindar influence to treat the Village AID worker as an intruder, and to hamper his activities. But the new agrarian reform was by no means all clear gain, because it made agricultural pursuits

unprofitable and unattractive to the *bhadralog*, the educated middle-class squires who were often a progressive influence in the countryside. They would unquestionably have backed up Village AID very strongly, had they not been previously driven into the towns, because they would have been quick to see the possibility of increasing the value of their property and of adding to their revenues. In West Pakistan, the corresponding class of yeomen landholders were proving the firmest friends of the Village AID movement, while in East Pakistan, the village workers had often to lament the lack of local educated backing and support. Even so, the whole atmosphere of East Pakistan was generally favourable to the purposes for which Village AID was working; and from the very beginning the Comilla Academy found itself able to arrange well-attended courses, not only for the kind of professional people for whom the Peshawar Academy was so successfully catering, but also for those sections of the general public who are interested in the countryside and in rural uplift. Unfortunately, in spite of the apparent interest in rural well being which the 1951 Act might argue to exist in political circles, the ordinary politician in East Pakistan took little heed of the villagers except at election time. Everywhere we went, we encountered bitter and very vocal complaints about the way in which elections to every local body, including the Union Boards, were rigged by carpet-baggers from the cities, so that the needs of the rural masses were subordinated to individual and Party interests. Yet, in spite of the corruption of political life, the Village AID movement made notable progress.

In West Pakistan, circumstances were not quite so favourable. The standards of literacy and of political awareness are in many areas a good deal lower than in East Pakistan; the country is bigger; the population is both smaller and more scattered. No village-level worker could possibly look after more than three or four villages; and even to do this meant spending a great deal of time on his bicycle in getting from place to place. Moreover, in West Pakistan, there are many areas where the villagers display a sturdy independence, a dislike of outsiders of every kind, and a conviction of self-sufficiency in conservative ways, which together make uplift work very difficult. Nor was this the only obstacle that the Village AID movement had to face. While the small yeomen and middle-class landholders with modest estates welcomed the village-level worker, backed his efforts, and gave him every facility, the great landlords, living in quasi-feudal state, often obstructed, and sometimes actually expelled him, because they did not want their tenants, upon whose dragooned votes their political influence depended, to be raised from their position of helpless subservience. It was obvious to us that until a measure of agrarian reform was introduced into large areas of the Punjab and

Sind, the progress of the Village AID movement would be slowed down in West Pakistan. This was all the more regrettable because in the localities where it was taking root, its power for good, as I have already explained, was immense, and its achievements remarkable. Particularly impressive was the hold that it had gained in remote areas like Gilgit and Baltistan, in Azad Kashmir, and in tribal territory on the North-West Frontier, as well as in Sind. For the first time, the inhabitants of such places as these were shown how to help themselves and were given a real chance to do it. This was made easier because local leaders were quick to grasp the possibilities of economic improvement which Village AID offered and used all their influence to promote it.

The general impression which my wife and I carried away with us from our examination of the Village AID movement in 1956 and 1957 was that it possessed great potentialities both for economic uplift and for bridging the gulf which, as it seemed to us, yawned so widely and dangerously between the governed and the government. But in order to bring this about, something like a reorientation of outlook among the governors was essential. This reorientation has now taken place; its instrument was the revolution of 1958. Concerning the consequences of this revolution for Pakistan as a whole, I have written and spoken much to other audiences. Here I must confine myself to a brief summary of what it has effected in stimulating and vivifying the drive to improve the conditions in which 81 of the 94 millions of Pakistanis—the rural population—live. From the first, the new administration recognized the supreme importance of the rural masses. The main operative factor in this change was President Ayub Khan himself. Not long after he succeeded to power, he was kind enough to arrange for my wife and myself to visit Rihana, his birthplace in the Hazara District, and Darwesh, the village from which his wife comes. "I want you to see where we come from," he remarked to me: "We are just village folk." Against this background it is easy to understand the striking success of much that he has done for rural Pakistan, based as it is on his own complete understanding of the outlook and interests of the ordinary villager. Almost his first step was to clear the way for the progress of Village AID by agrarian reforms in West Pakistan, the effect of which was to break up large feudal holdings while at the same time ensuring by a liberal land ceiling, that agriculture should continue to be a worthwhile profession for the educated classes. Full tenant-right has been instituted wherever it did not previously exist; already between 1 and 2 million acres have been distributed to sitting tenants and other, with provision for the instalment purchase of ownership, and for the compensation of former great landlords by interest-bearing bonds. The improbably low ceiling fixed in East Pakistan—30 acres—by the 1951 Act has

been raised to 110 acres per family, so that the yeoman class can be attracted back to the land, while middlemans' rights have been abolished.

These reforms were only the beginning. They were quickly followed by the system of Basic Democracies. With the political implications of this remarkable plan, and with the part which the Basic Democrats are playing in the 1962 Constitution, it is beyond my purpose to deal here. I can only refer those who are interested to the lectures which I have delivered to other learned societies and to my recently-published book on *The State of Pakistan*. On this occasion I must limit myself to pointing out that the Union Councils and Union Committees—more than 8,000 in all—which are elected by direct adult suffrage in small, “neighbourhood constituencies” have now taken over most of the functions formerly executed by the Village AID movement; and have taken them over, moreover, with adequate financial and administrative powers, and, of course, with the completest knowledge of local needs. Above the Union Councils are the subdivisional or tahsil Councils, the District Councils, the Divisional Councils, and finally the Provincial Councils, on all of which a directly elected element sits with progressively higher and higher grades of administrative and technical officers. The result is that the entire movement for rural improvement and uplift has been keyed into the structure of the Government, and given the status of one of the most important of all the nation-building Departments. On it are focused the combined efforts of the health, education, social and other services; and at every stage of the many-tiered edifice which looks after it, village opinion and village needs are directly represented.

I wish that I had time to tell you in detail of the enormous changes in village life which my wife and I found in the course of the tours which we have made every year since 1959, when the new regime's efforts first began to bear fruit, and what we had encountered in 1956 and 1957. In all the villages that we visited—several dozen both in East and West Pakistan—we were impressed by the grip which the community spirit had gained on the inhabitants. Not only was the good work which we had seen Village AID doing in 1956 and 1957 enormously extended, accompanied by an impressive improvement in general living conditions, but it was being done quite as a matter of course, with the weight of public opinion pressing it on and demanding continued action. The former Village AID worker, now, with the change in organizational methods, attached to the Union Council, was in a far stronger position; he had no need to initiate schemes; he had become the adviser on their practicability and on the best methods of executing them. When, for example, a proposal was made in a certain Union Council to take over from the Agriculture Department the job of distributing improved seed

to the farmers, it was to the trained village-level worker that the Council looked for expert knowledge to test seeds for their proper quality. Moreover, in the advanced villages, the range of activity of the Council and its helpers had reached new levels; the construction of mile-long link roads and schemes of street paving and drainage and the like are taken as a matter of course, what the Councils are now angling for is the extension of electricity supplies, the establishment of branch post-offices, the institution of training classes in arts and crafts, and the elevation of their primary schools to secondary status.

One very noticeable change has been the breakdown of the old distinction between "we"—the people—and "they"—the Government. This is perhaps the most vivid illustration of the revolution in official orientation which has taken place. Again and again, both in East and West Pakistan, we found proofs that the officials and the people have drawn closer together. This is in part due to the real power that the Basic Democrats exercise. A subdivisional officer or a tahsildar no longer dares to treat local opinion cavalierly; if he does, he runs the risk of finding the whole matter brought before his superiors by Chairmen of Union Councils who sit, along with him, on the District Councils. Both sides have gained. Villagers have said to us: "We never knew what a difficult job the administrators have to do until we had to sit side by side with them and help them do it"; while the officials can now count upon a degree of intelligent and informed co-operation which they never experienced before. Two factors, I think, have combined to bring this about. One is that both sides have, as it were, "gone to school," their instructors being the educational machinery of the former Village AID movement, which has been enlarged and extended. It was the Village AID organization which set up the instructional centres where every elected Basic Democrat has to attend to learn his rights, his duties and his responsibilities to the public. In the process, he learns about the work of the officials with whom he will have to deal; whom to approach when he wants such and such a thing to be done; how the case for doing it ought to be presented. On the other side of the scale, every administrative officer, from the tahsildar and subdivisional officer right up to the Collector—and now, lately, even to the Commissioner—is obliged to attend courses at training centres which culminate in the Village AID Academies to learn what he needs to know about the village and its problems. These courses, and the outlooks which they engender, do really bring the governors and the governed together; they are a potent factor in the creation of the new spirit. The second factor is the continued and lively personal interest which President Ayub Khan himself shows in the progress of the Basic Democracies and in their work for village uplift. He tours very frequently both in East and West Pakistan to see things for

himself and to keep in close touch with the masses. Wherever he goes, he makes a point of meeting the Basic Democrats informally, discussing their problems and encouraging their efforts. The stimulus which this affords to the rapid progress of village uplift has to be seen to be believed.

I have not the time, nor would you have the patience, to enable me to tell you in detail of all that my wife and I have seen and heard in the course of our tours of East and West Pakistan during the last few years. But I hope I have said enough to give you a general picture of the great renaissance which has come, and is still coming, to the rural life of Pakistan. I know of no other country where the objective of bringing the rural masses forward, and encouraging them to play their full part in national life, is being pursued more consistently, more deliberately, more intelligently. I am not alone in thinking that many other Asian countries have much to learn from Pakistan in these matters. But however this may be, I can assure you that to watch the process is a heartening spectacle—indeed one of the most heartening spectacle which I, in the course of a fairly long life, have been privileged to witness. The great man whose memory we are gathered here to honour would have rejoiced to see it.

Forging Pakistan's Future

By AFTAB AHMAD KHAN, CSP

THE outlines of Pakistan's Third Five Year Plan covering the years from 1965 to 1970 are beginning to take shape. When ready, this document will represent a turning point in Pakistan's economic thinking and targets. Hitherto, the function of planning has been, in the main, to stimulate, consolidate and underpin economic development in the country.

Since 1955, when the first tentative steps were taken in the direction of planning, the necessary administrative and technical machinery has been set up and been run in. The basis has been laid and there has been massive investment in infrastructure—land and water improvement, dams, irrigation, electricity and roads, to take the main examples. The foundation has thus been laid for a future massive advance.

There have also been immediate, tangible gains. There has been a dramatic improvement in the rate of growth of the Gross National

Product during the present Plan period (1960-65)—from 2-3 per cent before 1960 to 5 per cent per annum currently. This economic progress has not as yet had a marked impact on the common man, but the general improvement is reflected in considerable increases in the *per capita* consumption of such items as food grains, sugar, tea and cigarettes.

Progress has been less satisfactory in social infrastructure—schools, hospitals and welfare work. There are other causes for anxiety. Agriculture remains the mainstay of our economy, and its output is still subject to the vagaries of the weather and its prices are at the mercy of fluctuations on international markets. Our dependence on foreign aid, too, is still considerable. Lastly, and perhaps most important, our population is, as has now been calculated, increasing at the rate of 2.6 per cent a year, and, given the improvements in health, the figure may soon rise to as much as 3 per cent. Such a rate of increase diverts much of the nation's potential savings from development or else depresses the already low standard of living of the masses.

THE PERSPECTIVE PLAN

Taking all these factors into account, the Planning Commission is working out a long term scheme designed to ensure a continuous line of development over the next twenty or twenty-five years in a Perspective Plan. This Plan will, of course, like the Third Five Year Plan, only be finalized after agreement has been reached with the Central Government, the two Provincial Governments and representatives of all vital sections of the economy. The Perspective Plan aims at raising *per capita* income from the present level of dollars 70 to dollars 200 by 1985, and at achieving full employment, which means finding jobs for the estimated eight million unemployed in 1965 and for the 38 million who will enter the labour market during the period covered by the Plan.

The other targets are equally ambitious. Foreign aid is to be eliminated, and disparity between the two Provinces abolished. The entire population will become literate—primary education being universal by 1975 and schooling up to the eight class by 1985. Lastly, the nation will move steadily towards the ideals of a welfare state, even though these are only sometimes complementary with those of economic progress, and more often (at the earlier stages especially) are in competition with them.

It is clear that such a tremendous programme can only be carried out if all our resources are mobilized, if the best possible use is made of our manpower and if our people are drawn into the great economic and social transformation before us and are thus stimulated to agree to the short term sacrifices which will be offset by immediate gains and above all by vast

long term improvements. Development, as the experience of other countries shows, means for some-time a tightening of the belt.

The Perspective Plan and the Third Five Year Plan are closely interrelated. Indeed the latter is the first step of the long range design and paves the way for it. And decisions reached on either will inevitably affect the shape and contents of the other.

The targets of the Third Five Year Plan are ambitious. The central objective is to increase the national income by about 30 per cent. This will mean a rise from the present annual figure of 5 per cent. The total expenditure contemplated is Rs. 47,000 million—Rs. 32,000 million in the public sector and Rs. 15,500 million in the private one. Actual expenditure will probably not be so high and is put tentatively at Rs. 43,500 million. This implies an 80 per cent increase in investment over the Second Five Year Plan which provided for schemes totalling Rs. 23,000 million.

The Third Five Year Plan figures include expenditure on works programmes, which were given separately in the Second Five Year Plan and on waterlogging and salinity schemes but not recurring expenditure in the social sector or expenditure on the Indus Basin.

FINANCE

Of the total funds needed in the public sector, some Rs. 13,500 million will be found from domestic resources (revenue surplus and capital receipts on the basis of existing taxation, additional taxation and deficit financing). The remaining Rs. 15,000 million will come from external resources. Some Rs. 7,500 million are expected from project loans and grants (including technical assistance), Rs. 5,500 million from commodity loans and grants and Rs. 2,000 million from PL 480 counter part funds. The total of Rs. 15,000 million needed for the private sector are to be secured from private savings to the extent of Rs. 12,000 million, and the balance of Rs. 300 million from foreign credits including private foreign investment.

The total share of foreign assistance in financing the Third Plan will decline to about 40 per cent from 50 per cent in the Second Plan, though in absolute terms the figure may be higher. The rate of domestic saving implicit is 14 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product by 1969-70, which would mean a great improvement over the present rate of 8 per cent. Nearly one half of the additional income created during the Third Plan period will have to be saved. Gross investment at the end of the Plan will be slightly over 20 per cent, against a current level of about 13 per cent of G.O.P.

The Third Plan will continue and intensify the progress already made towards the abolition of disparity between East and West Pakistan. It is proposed to remove at least 5 per cent of the disparity in *per capita* income during the Plan period, by obtaining an increase in national income of 34 per cent in East Pakistan against a target of 27 in the West. These estimates flow in part from the larger share of development funds allocated to East Pakistan for the Plan period. Every effort, too, will be made to ease the way for that Province's rapid advance, particularly in industry.

ALLOCATIONS

The proposed sectoral allocations in the Plan are as follows:

					(Rs. million)		
					<i>Public</i>	<i>Private</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agriculture	...	...	...	...	4,500	1,500	6,000
Water and Power	...	...	...	...	8,700	300	9,000
Industry	...	...	...	...	5,500	7,500	13,000
Fuels and Minerals	...	...	...	...	1,000	1,000	2,000
Transport and Communications	...	...	...	...	5,000	2,000	7,000
Housing and Settlement	...	...	...	...	3,500	2,500	6,000
Education	...	...	...	...	2,300	200	2,500
Health	...	...	...	...	1,000	—	1,000
Manpower and Social Welfare	...	...	...	...	500	—	500
Total (Gross)					32,000	15,000	47,000
<i>Less likely shortfall of about 10 per cent in public sector development outlay</i>					3,500	—	3,500
Total (net)					28,500	15,000	43,500

EMPHASIS

It will be seen that great emphasis has been laid on industry. It has been the leading sector in recent years both in generating growth and in providing employment. It is also the field in which the whole process of development can be most easily and rapidly affected by virtue of the concentration of people in one area or indeed in one factory. Hence, the new techniques and attitudes inherent in development spread almost automatically.

Within the sector, the emphasis will be on heavy industry with the aim of replacing imports of capital goods such as machinery by domestic production. It will absorb about two-thirds of the total allotment, the rest going to consumer industries. Just as industry is being emphasized as a key sector, it is proposed to concentrate on those schemes, branches and areas which offer the greatest promise of rapid and successful development. We cannot afford to spare our limited resources. They must be devoted to those sectors, and areas where the best results can be obtained in the shortest possible time. Selectivity is now the watchword.

NEW VISTAS

Taken in its entirety, the Plan opens new vistas for Pakistan. The development process is not only getting under way, but it is now being backed by a broad measure of popular interest. Schemes are no longer being elaborated at the centre but coming up from the grass roots, and communication is being established between the Government and the governed—an essential pre-condition for the nationwide success of the Plan. The immediate benefits in the way of consumption will be there but at least equally important are the improvements in education, health and housing foreshadowed by the proposals and the emergence of an economy which will build up its strength in both industry and agriculture by the acquisition of modern, high-output techniques which, in turn, will gradually pave the way for the standard of living our citizens have a right to expect.

Recent Trends in Sino-Nepalese Relations

By M. D. STEVENS

As yet it is difficult to ascertain with any amount of precision to what extent the recent border agreement between China and Nepal represents a radical change in the relationship of the two countries. To the many writers who view the present regime in Peking purely in terms of Chinese historical tradition the diplomacy of the People's Republic is logical; it is all a question of a militarily strong China defining the extent of her territories. Those who see only the Communist label on the Chinese package will state that the actions of China with regard to her frontier with Nepal are fairly typical of what one would expect from a nation professing such an ideology and in need of some good propaganda with which to blackmail a hostile India. Probably neither of these hypotheses is strictly true, although there is an element of truth in both.

Whereas the governments that followed the Revolution of 1911 all have a smack of familiarity to the student of Chinese history, the events which have taken place since 1949 are in many ways alien to this tradition. The People's Republic is different in much the same way that a modern office block built on an Ancient Greek foundation would be "different"; one has the feeling that there is a line of development, but does not quite recognize the end product.

The treaty between the Mao Tse-tung Government and Nepal suggests that China no longer views the latter as a vassal as in former times. And yet one is immediately suspicious of an administration which takes over Tibet in 1950 using historical claims as an excuse for aggression, but can ignore such considerations to tacitly treat Nepal as an equal when Chinese Communism possibly hopes thereby to gain some 12,000 square miles of the Aksai Chin area. In fact has Nepal's status changed during the last fifteen years from that of the time of the Ch'ing Dynasty (A.D. 1644-1911) or even the more recent Kuo-min-tang regime? It is perhaps enlightening to look more closely at Sino-Nepalese relations over the last two centuries in order to attempt to answer this question.

Nepal is approximately 550 miles in length with a width ranging from 100 to 150 miles, giving a total area of about 54,000 square miles. According to the 1961 Census the population was 9,387,661, being mainly


composed of the Mongoloid tribes of the Bhotiyas, Gurungs and Magars. Although the Nepali language is of the Indo-Aryan group most of the peasantry speak in Tibeto-Burman tongues. Indulging in a somewhat dangerous generalization it can be stated that, owing to an allegiance to the Mahayana Buddhist religion, Nepal tends to look towards Tibet culturally, but India economically. Like most of the Himalaya region Nepal has been in the past something of a refuge area from, and a transitional zone between, the two great cultures of China and India. The influence of the Lamas is strongest in the more northerly areas whilst the Hindu religion takes a hold in the south.

Everything in Nepal revolves around the Valley of Katmandu (see map). In the 17th and early 18th Centuries this region was divided amongst three princelings with capitals at Katmandu, Bhatgaon and Patan, all within a few miles of each other. During the 18th Century the Rajputs were consolidating their power around the centre of Gorkha to the west of the Valley. In about 1769 the Gorkha leader Prithwi Narayan managed to bring the Valley area under his rule; there followed a period of Nepalese empire-building which was to challenge the Sikh power to the west, the British East India Company to the south and Tibet and China to the north.

In 1789 the Gorkhas made their first attack into Tibetan territory. In 1791 the Lhasa administration refused to provide the balance of an indemnity promised to the Nepalese by the Tibetan authorities in Tashilhumpo. The reason for the refusal on the part of Lhasa is thought to have been political as Tashilhumpo was a centre of rising influence within Tibet; Lhasa's denial of its aid to Tashilhumpo led to the expected reaction on the part of the Nepalese with renewed invasion and the plundering of the rival Tashi Lamas' monastery. Having watched the power of Tashilhumpo crushed by the Gorkhas Lhasa requested the aid of the Chinese Emperor.

China's alien Manchu dynasty gained much from the support given to it by the adherents to the Lamaist religion and so an appeal from Lhasa was not to be taken lightly. Following a role as protectors of the Buddhist interests in Tibet the Manchus dispatched an army which decisively defeated the withdrawing Nepalese in 1792. In the treaty between Nepal and China which ensued the Gorkhas had to return their plunder and agree to send a tributary mission to Peking every five years. Whilst the Chinese did not bother to extend their control in Nepal as they had done in Tibet the Katmandu government was considered as a vassal of the Chinese Empire.

What was the attitude of Nepal towards Peking during this period? At the beginning of the 19th Century, Mir Izzut Ullah¹ informed William Moorcroft, a Bengal Government veterinary surgeon, that the Rajah of



Sketch Map of Nepal

Nepal had appealed to the Chinese Emperor for protection should the British East India Company attack him; this suggests a mental outlook similar to that at Lhasa also prevailed at Katmandu with regard to China. As befitted their role the Manchus are reputed to have answered favourably to the Nepalese request and enquired what resources the Rajah might need.

With a certain inevitability the expansion of Gorkha power to the south led to conflict with the British East India Company. Hostilities began in 1814 and during the war the British captured the draft of a letter from Katmandu to the Chinese Emperor requesting the Manchus to send an army into Bengal to create a diversion and so relieve the military pressure upon the Gorkha armies. A treaty between the East India Company and Nepal was signed on November 28th, 1815, at Segauli by which Nepal lost its position in Sikkim and territory around Kumaon, Garwhal and all land gained west of the Kali River. Katmandu was also forced to agree to a British Resident. What is of interest is that Nepal was not added to British India as it was considered as a Chinese sphere of influence and a counter-offensive from Peking was feared.

Both Nepal and the British East India Company awaited with much apprehension the Chinese reaction to their exclusion from the negotiations which preceded the Segauli Treaty. Would the Ch'ing Emperor repeat the Chinese action of 1792 when an army of 70,000 men had been led by General Fu Kang'an against the Gorkhas? But the power of the Manchus

had already begun to lose its effectiveness and the only Chinese move was a polite request to the East India Company to remove the Katmandu Residency; the Celestial Empire still considered Nepal as a vassal but lacked the power to operate against the British threat so far from Peking.

From 1804 to 1837, Nepal was guided by a Prime Minister of impressive ability, namely Bhim Sen. His policy rested on the notion that the Nepalese military traditions should be directed against the British and that any territorial expansion should be at the expense of India. China was considered of far greater importance to Nepal than the British and the wily Premier concluded that the Manchu overlord must not be goaded by Gorkha invasions into Tibet nor by too cordial Nepalese-British relations. Hardly had the Segauli Treaty been signed than Bhim Sen was conspiring with the Chinese to throw out the British Resident at Katmandu. Bhim Sen was only too aware of the threat of peaceful British penetration and so the British Resident was restricted to the Nepalese capital. In 1837 Bhim Sen was disgraced and retired into private life; the machinations of the half-demented monarch led to the suicide of the ex-Prime Minister when, in 1839, he was reputed to have been told that his wife had been forced to walk naked in public.

The fall of Bhim Sen left Nepalese foreign policy somewhat in the air. After 1837 the Gorkhas could not decide whether to follow a hostile line against the British or a pose of strict neutrality. The attitude towards China did not change, the Gorkhas considered themselves still Chinese feudatories to the extent of offering their services to the Manchu Emperor during the Sino-British conflict known as the Opium War; the assistance of Nepal was declined by the Chinese.

In 1845 Jang Bahadur became Prime Minister of Nepal and the administration took on a distinctly pro-British appearance. The defeat of the Chinese at the hands of the British in the Opium War probably had a considerable effect on the Gorkha outlook and from this time British prestige and influence increased at the cost of the Chinese. In 1850 Jang Bahadur visited Britain.

Despite something of a decline in the respect accorded the Chinese the Gorkhas continued to send their Tribute Missions to Peking every five years, partly because they proved to be profitable and partly as the Manchus were still a power to be reckoned with in Nepalese eyes. The 1852-54 Mission was badly treated in both China and Tibet. Taking advantage of the fact that the Chinese were tied down by the Taiping rebellion the Gorkhas used the excuse that Nepalese nationals of the Tribute Mission had been badly treated in Lhasa to attack Tibet. In March 1856 the Tibetans agreed to pay the Gorkhas an annual tribute of 10,000 rupees (a practice that did not end until 1953), abolished customs'

duties on Nepalese goods and assented to a representative of the Katmandu Government being stationed in Lhasa to look after the interests of the Nepalese traders. On April 1st, 1856 the Gorkhas started their withdrawal from Tibet. The situation with regard to Chinese power in the Himalaya region had changed considerably from that of sixty years previously.

In 1856 Jang Bahadur resigned and in recognition of his services King Surendra Vikram Shah bestowed upon him the title of Maharaja and made the Nepalese Premiership hereditary to his family. But Jang Bahadur's retirement was brief and he was recalled to office in 1857 where he implemented a policy of assisting the British to crush the Indian Mutiny with the aid of 12,000 Gorkha troops. For this action he was made a Grand Commander of the Order of the Bath and some territory ceded to India in 1815 along the Oudh frontier was returned to Nepal.

But China had not faded completely into the background. Even if the Nepalese no longer shared the Chinese opinion of the Gorkhas lowly vassal status they did decide to dispatch another Tribute Mission to Peking in 1866. This journey was looked upon also as a trading venture as it carried opium for sale in China. The Mission did not return to Katmandu until 1869 after being made to feel its tributary position by the Chinese.

In order to counteract the effect of the honours conferred on Jang Bahadur by Queen Victoria the Emperor of China in 1872 granted the Nepalese Premier the Celestial Empire's greatest award accompanied by the "Double-eyed Peacock Feather" and the "Sable Coat." In 1877 the first hereditary Prime Minister of Nepal died, having dedicated much of his service to creating an outlook sympathetic to British interests along the northern borderlands of India. Until 1951 the power of the Kings of Nepal was secondary to that of their Premiers and much of the country's history was of a violent nature during this period. In 1835 Jang Bahadur's successor Ranaudip Singh was assassinated. Prime Minister Bir Shamsher Jang Bahadur died in 1901 after having survived two attempts to take his life. The nobility tended to wax fat on the rule of the Rana family whilst few reforms were made in the interests of the peasantry.

In 1890 China acknowledged Britain's interests in Sikkim, an action which was followed in 1893 by an agreement regulating trade between India and Tibet. In 1895 the Tibetans threw off Chinese suzerainty and refused to recognize the Sino-British treaties. In 1902 the Tibetans raided Sikkim and Nepal endeavoured to act as mediator between Britain, Tibet and China. The 1904 Younghusband expedition to Lhasa had a yak supply column provided by Nepal. With the conclusion of hostilities Nepal had earned the gratitude of Britain and the Gorkha Prime Minister was decorated by the Chinese.

It apparently took the British rather a long time to grasp the full significance of the Nepalese Tribute Missions to Peking. It was not until 1895 when the British re-examined the whole set-up that they condemned it as a sign of vassalage. The slowness of Britain can partly be blamed on the fact that until 1895 China was something of an unknown quantity, but in that year the Japanese demonstrated the decay of the Ch'ing Empire and Britain no longer felt any need to conciliate China. By the latter part of the 19th Century Nepal regarded herself as a sovereign state, but the Chinese did not. Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher might visit Britain in 1908 to confirm the independent status of Nepal, but such a visit to China would have proven worthless from the Gorkha point of view. In the same year the last Tribute Mission from Katmandu visited China. F. Tücker writes, "Chinese Olympian pride and arrogance had always maintained that these friendly communications represented the tribute paid by a vassal to its lord . . . It has of late years been brought home to the world at large that Chinese arrogance has not lessened and that her claims to suzerainty over lands that never were hers or never had more than an exchange of courtesies with her, are still being pressed . . ."²

In 1909 P'u Yi, a child of two years, was proclaimed Chinese Emperor with the name Hsüan T'ung. Under the Regency the Manchus had a rather inglorious last fling occupying Rima in Tibet and advancing into the Mishmi country of north-eastern India. In 1910 Nepal was proclaimed a vassal of the Celestial Empire by the Chinese. By the following year the opposition to the Manchus was well under way and in 1912 the Ch'ing Dynasty came to an end.

The fall of the Manchus did not bring about the sort of reformation that the more enlightened elements of China hoped for. The situation took on fairly quickly the appearance of just another example of the three hundred year cycle of rising and declining dynasties. One of the successful revolutionists even tried to establish himself as Emperor, only to be cheated of his intention by death. China degenerated at the hands of greedy and corrupt men, both native and foreign. She was forced to enter the Great War on the side of the Allies which enabled Japan to exploit her position in Asia at the expense of the Chinese. At the end of the First World War the foreign Powers decided to replace the idea of territorial partition with regard to China by a more sophisticated form of exploitation based on international finance. The hopes of such revolutionists as Sun Yat-sen receded with each year; China was split into two with the North existing as a separate entity to the South. In this age of the petty warlord China's foreign policy revolved around the demands of such as Japan, Britain and France; there was little opportunity for a weak China to state her policy towards such matters as the status of Nepal.

Whilst China ceased to be an effective force in international affairs Nepal went about gaining firm support for her proclaimed status as an independent state. In 1923 British recognized Nepal's sovereignty by treaty. The Gorkhas had to wait many years for similar acknowledgement from the other Western nations but in 1947 the United States documented her recognition, to be followed by France in 1949 and her large neighbour India in 1950. In December of 1955 Nepal took its place as a member of the United Nations. Although the Nepalese views might not have been shared by either the Chinese Communists nor the Nationalists Gorkha independence was substantially backed by world opinion in 1955.

In 1925 Sun Yat-sen died in Peking whilst trying to bring about a reunion between the North and South of China. Sun Yat-sen had desired to bring about a gradual change in China's outlook, welding that best that the West had to offer onto the finer parts of the traditional Chinese culture. With his passing the Kuo-min-tang Party experienced a period of conflict within its ranks over the leadership of the movement. In 1926 the Communist element was expelled from the Kuo-min-tang and Chiang Kai-shek began to dominate his rivals for power. In March of 1927 Chiang Kai-shek's armies reached Shanghai where the Kuomintang was forced to take a critical decision; if the Party was willing to disassociate itself from its left wing elements Shanghai could be taken without much trouble. Chiang Kai-shek decided to join forces with the right wing element of capitalists and landowners and Shanghai submitted without a struggle; with the alienating of the more enlightened elements within the Kuomintang it is possible to make out a case for Chiang Kai-shek's party being a lost cause as early as 1927.

In 1931 Japan occupied Manchuria without China being able to do anything more than appeal to the League of Nations which condemned the Japanese action but offered no practical help. By 1935 Chiang-Kai-shek had established himself effectively as leader of the Kuomintang. What was the attitude of this outstanding Chinese soldier and politician towards such nations as Nepal and Tibet? How did a man who had carried the conflict against Japan in China between 1937 and 1945 so ably view the Himalaya borderlands? In his book of 1944 "China's Destiny" Chiang Kai-shek's opinions were emphatic, China's aim was the recovery of her 1840 frontiers. In support of the Chinese Nationalist outlook maps published in Peking tended to show Nepal as part of the Republic of China. The views of the Manchus in the 19th Century were inherited by the Kuomintang as far as the status of Nepal was concerned.

The fall of Chiang Kai-shek's regime in 1949 heralded the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. As W. Eberhard stated³ Chinese Communism "is not merely a popular rising of Chinese peasants, but also part of an inter-

national movement.” Despite its international pretensions the new Communist regime tended to view Nepal in the traditional Chinese way. One of the interesting points brought up by Peking was that in the 1856 treaty between Nepal and Tibet the Chinese amban at Lhasa acted as mediator. In the preamble that preceded the meat of the agreement it was written that Nepal and Tibet were “respecters” of the Emperor of China; the Chinese state that the dubious word “respector” is the equivalent to “subject.”

Whilst China was in a turmoil Nepal was undergoing a similarly dramatic domestic drama of her own. In February of 1951 under the late King Tribhuvana Bir Vikram Shah Deva the power of the Ranas was crushed. In 1956 King Mahendra Bir Vikram Shah Deva came to the throne. On 12th February, 1959 a new constitution was proclaimed (drafted by a commission advised by the British lawyer Sir Ivor Jennings) giving the right to vote to every person over 21 years of age. In May of 1959 the country's first democratically elected government took office.

Nepal was equally sensitive to the influence of China and India, but nevertheless concluded treaties of friendship and trade with the latter in 1950. In the same year India's Premier Nehru made a verbal guarantee of Nepal's borders to which the Gorkha Prime Minister replied, “We have had for centuries excellent relations with China.”⁴ But the 1951 edition of the Chinese maps showed Nepal as part of the new Communist state. Even the maps in the new “Atlas of Chinese Peoples' Republic” published in 1953 showed large areas of Nepal as Chinese territory.

The year 1956 saw negotiations begin between Nepal and China over the 1856 Tibeto-Nepalese treaty. As a result of these discussions Nepalese bodyguards were withdrawn from Lhasa, the existing Gorkha office in Tibet became a Consulate and the Chinese opened a Consulate in Katmandu. Nepal continued to get certain trading rights within Tibet. The Prime Minister of Nepal was invited to pay a visit to China by Chou En-lai to which Tanka Prasad Acharya assented.

After 1956 Peking's attitude towards Nepal appears to have mellowed. On 21st March, 1960 an agreement⁵ was concluded between China and Nepal which provided the initial basis for the formal Boundary Treaty signed in Peking on 5th October, 1961. As now demarcated the boundary line follows mainly what may be termed the “watershed principle”⁶ (i.e., it separates two contiguous drainage areas). Although it is hard to say whether this represents a genuine change of attitude on the part of China towards Nepal, it is nonetheless a move which is alien to the former trends of Sino-Nepalese politics. Perhaps this treaty is merely a move calculated to be of use in the dispute between India and China. It might even be true that such an agreement means nothing other than China

“shelving” the region until such time she can direct her concept of World Revolution against Nepal. But whatever historians may see in China’s past to add evidence to any interpretation of this action of Peking it is not really in the tradition of the last 200 years; no Ch’ing Empire representative nor Kuo-min-tang dictator would have agreed to discuss any settlement of a border which for them did not exist.

¹ For a fuller account of Mir Izzut Ullah and William Moorcroft see Alastair Lamb: *Britain and Chinese Central Asia*; Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1960. pp. 38–40.

² F. Tüker: *Gorkha*; Constable, London, 1957. pp. 190–91.

³ W. Eberhard: *A History of China*; Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1950. pp. 350.

⁴ Reported in the *Manchester Guardian*, March 31st, 1955.

⁵ For details of the agreement see *Peking Review* for March 29th, 1960.

⁶ The precise boundary line is given in *Peking Review* for October 20th, 1961.

Japan Industry Floating Fair to visit Europe in 1964

THE Fifth Japan Industry Floating Fair will visit London during the summer of 1964. The Fair will be open to the public from June 18th till the 21st, according to the itinerary announced by the Japan Industry Floating Fair Association.

This will be the first European visit for Japan’s floating fair since the programme was initiated in 1956 and the second overseas tour of the specially-designed m.s. *Sakura Maru*. It will also be the first time for the fair ship to bring its exhibits to the industrialized nations of the world.

The purpose of this fifth mission is to introduce to Europe the nature of Japan’s industrial development through exhibitions and displays of heavy and light machinery, durable consumer goods as well as textiles and general merchandise, all examples of the high levels of Japan’s technological achievements. Representatives of the exhibitors will be on board to provide information and answer questions from visitors.

A secondary purpose is to display various aspects of Japanese life today through the medium of diagrams, models and photo exhibits.

Features will be activities in farming, forestry and fishing communities as well as current developments in public utilities, education and welfare.

UNIQUE "SAKURA MARU"

This programme of displaying a nation's industrial products by means of a floating, itinerant display ship is considered rather unique in the world today and Japan is the first country to design and build a ship solely for this purpose. The 12,200 ton *Sakura Maru*, commissioned in October, 1962, was constructed at a cost of approximately £27 million and all materials used, from engines and instruments to tablewares and furnishings, were manufactured in Japan. In other words, this unusual vessel is truly representative of the best of Japanese industrial techniques.

The ship itself is of modern design and style, easily identified by the fact that it has no ordinary funnel, the main mast serving that function. The exterior is painted an attractive light blue and the interior appointments resemble those of a de luxe hotel.

Facilities include exhibition halls on the 2nd and 3rd decks and the hold, with a total of 430 exhibition booths capable of displaying up to 20,000 separate items. The halls are spacious enough to permit a smooth flow of visitors without crowding and are connected with three escalators and a main elevator. In order to provide as much uninterrupted space as possible, the engine room has been placed in the stern of the ship.

The upper deck contains exhibition offices, shops and information desks as well as a dining room. A large reception room for up to 500 guests and a stage, where demonstrations of traditional Japanese arts are held, is located on the bridge deck. There are also lounges, smoking rooms, conference rooms, a cocktail lounge as well as suites and state-rooms. All halls and public rooms are fully air-conditioned at a constant temperature and humidity to assure maximum comfort for visitors at all times.

This Floating Fair has been enthusiastically received on its previous tours to other parts of the world and has been dubbed with the nickname "Caravan on the Sea." The first trip took the fair to South-East Asia in 1956, the second to Latin America in 1958-59, the third to Oceania in 1960-61, and the fourth (maiden voyage of the *Sakura Maru*) to the Near East and Africa in 1962-63.



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The salary range for a lecturer is at present £A1,750 - 100 - £A2,450 p.a. and for a senior lecturer £A2,450 - 110 - £A3,000 p.a. Salary on appointment will be in accordance with qualifications and experience. A cost of living allowance, at present £A31 p.a., will be paid to an appointee within the lecturer range, except at the maximum of the range. Salaries are at present under review.

Further information and the forms which should accompany an application may be obtained from the Secretary, Association of Commonwealth Universities (Branch Office), Marlborough House, Pall Mall, London, S.W.1. Applications close in Australia and London on 28th October, 1963.

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The salary will be at the rate of £2,800 per annum.

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
Further particulars and information as to the method of application should be obtained from the Secretary, Association of Commonwealth Universities (Branch Office), Marlborough House, Pall Mall, London, S.W.1. Applications close in New Zealand and London on 15th October, 1963.

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* Proceedings of the East India Association.



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
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